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RANDOMLY DISTRIBUTED TRIAL COURT JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY
AND SIREN FROM THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY WORLD
GARY NEUSTADTER*
ABSTRACT
Between February 24, 2010 and April 23, 2012, Heritage Pacific Financial,
L.L.C. ("Heritage"), a debt buyer, mass produced and filed 218 essentially identical
adversary proceedings in California bankruptcy courts against makers of
promissory notes who had filed chapter 7 or chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions. Each
complaint alleged Heritage's acquisition of the notes in the secondary market and
alleged the outstanding obligations on the notes to be nondischargeable under the
Bankruptcy Code's fraud exception to the bankruptcy discharge. The notes
evidenced loans to California residents, made in 2005 and 2006, which helped
finance the purchase, refinancing, or improvement of California residential real
property. When issued, the notes were secured by junior consensual liens on the
real property, but subsequent foreclosure of senior consensual liens, precipitated by
the mid-decade burst of the housing bubble, left the notes unsecured.
This Article reports an empirical study of these bankruptcy adversary
proceedings. Because the proceedings were essentially identical, they offer a rare
laboratory for testing the extent to which our entry-level justice system measures up
to our aspirations for "Equal Justice Under Law." We are unlikely to find many
conditions better suited to empirical exploration of that question: (1) civil litigation
filed during a relatively brief time span by one plaintiff against 266 defendants
(including co-defendant spouses); (2) some defendants defaulting, some defendants
appearing pro se, and some represented by an attorney; (3) dispersal of the
litigation among forty-seven different bankruptcy court judges, all sitting in one
state (and thus, where applicable, required to apply the relevant substantive law of
a single state); and (4) legal claims and factual allegations by the plaintiff so nearly
identical that each dispute is resolvable on the basis of one obvious and
straightforward factual question (reliance by an originating lender on a borrower's
misrepresentations) or on the basis of three less obvious and more complex legal
rules (a California statutory limitation on fraud claims and two alternative varieties
of a standing defense).

*

Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. I am grateful to law student Megan Gritsch and
graduate fellow Steve Horner for their assistance in gathering and recording some of the data used in this
study, to colleagues Patricia Rauch, Kandis Scott, and William Woodward for their continuing interest in
and intellectual contributions to this study, to Professor Eleanor Willemsen for her assistance with statistical
analysis, and to colleagues Kerry Macintosh, Kenneth Manaster, and David Yosifon for helpful comments
on portions of a draft of this Article.
The author supervised law students representing defendants in three of the 218 adversary proceedings that
are the subject of this Article, serving as attorney of record in each.
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The results in the Heritage adversary proceedings evidence a stunning and
unacceptable level of randomly distributed justice at the trial court level, generated
as much by the idiosyncratic behaviors of judges, lawyers, and parties as by even
handed application of law. We anticipate some randomly distributed justice as the
inevitable byproduct of disparities in economic and other resources of the parties
and disparities in the knowledge, capabilities, and attitudes of even well-meaning
attorneys and judges acting reasonably in an imperfect system. We aspire,
nonetheless, to equal justice under law. The findings of this study reflect a
departure from that ideal on a scale both larger than we may have expected and
larger than we should tolerate.
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INTRODUCTION
Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C. ("Heritage"), formed in 2009 as a Texas
limited liability company,1 was a debt buyer.2 Preceding its January 2014 financial
demise, 3 it actively invoked California and federal judicial systems, seeking to
collect on unpaid promissory notes with face amounts aggregating in the hundreds
of millions of dollars that it had purchased for at most pennies on the dollar.4 The
notes, issued by California residents to institutional lenders in 2005–06, promised
1

Heritage filed a certificate of formation as a limited liability company with the Texas Secretary of State
on
March
26,
2009.
For
formation
information,
see
TEX. SEC'Y OF STATE,
http://www.sos.state.tx.us/corp/sosda/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
2
I use the term "debt buyer" advisedly, because Heritage asserted in one court submission that it stopped
purchasing loans in mid-2009, choosing instead to take a temporary assignment of a one percent ownership
in the loans from a third party on whose behalf it would service the loans or litigate to collect on them. See
Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C.'s Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Contempt
and Sanctions at 6, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013), ECF No. 265. Yet, in
each of the adversary proceedings that are the subject of this study, all initiated after 2009, Heritage alleged
in each of its complaints that originating lenders or their assignees had duly assigned loan obligations to
Heritage and that Heritage was the "current owner and/or holder" of those loan obligations. E.g., Plaintiff's
Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 4, In re Adams, No. 11-02127 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb.
24, 2011), ECF No. 1. In one, Ben Ganter, self-described director of client relations, custodian of records,
and director of the legal department for Heritage, testified at trial that Heritage generally bought loans in
default and then made efforts to collect on them and that Heritage generally had approximately 50,000 loans
in its portfolio at any one time. See Transcript of Trial at 6, 44–45, In re Adrian, No. 10-01334 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. Mar. 18, 2013), ECF No. 59. In any event, the findings and conclusions of this study do not depend on
whether one characterizes Heritage as debt buyer, servicer, or debt collector.
For a detailed description and empirical assessment of the debt buying industry, see FED. TRADE COMM'N,
THE
STRUCTURE
AND
PRACTICES
OF
THE
DEBT
BUYING
INDUSTRY
(2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/structure-and-practices-debt-buyingindustry/debtbuyingreport.pdf. The Federal Trade Commission derived its empirical data from information
furnished to it by six of the nation's largest debt buyers. Id. at 8–9. In the study, credit card receivables
constituted sixty-two percent of the portfolios purchased by debt buyers. Id. at 14. Those debt buyers were
thus institutional debt buyers attempting in the main to collect a recurring type of debt. Heritage, in contrast,
was a situational debt buyer, formed at least in part with a view to acquiring and profiting from debt
generated by specific historical circumstances.
3
Heritage filed a voluntary chapter 7 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Texas. See Petition of Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C., In re Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C., No. 1440107 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2014), ECF No. 1.
4
It purchased the notes from multiple entities. For example, in January 2009, Heritage appears to have
purchased notes with a face amount of $69,327,453 from Promor Investments, L.L.C., for one-half cent on
the dollar. In summer 2009, Heritage appears to have purchased notes with a face amount of approximately
$116,961,649 from Anson Street L.L.C. for .97 of one cent on the dollar. In February 2010, Heritage appears
to have purchased notes with a face amount of $104,561,120 from Dreambuilder Investments, L.L.C. for
approximately 1/5th of a cent on the dollar. For these three purchases, then, Heritage appears to have
purchased notes with a face amount of approximately $290,850,222 for approximately $1,690,287.
In each of these three agreements, Heritage acknowledged that the debt purchased was delinquent, that the
purchase price had been adjusted accordingly, and that it was purchasing the debt "as is." Copies of each of
the three agreements pursuant to which it made these purchases are on file with the author.
Copies of notes and allonges gathered for this study reflect indorsement of notes to Heritage from many
additional entities. I did not have access to the agreements pursuant to which these other entities sold notes
to Heritage and thus can only infer that those agreements provided pricing and other provisions roughly
comparable to those in the three foregoing examples.
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repayment of loans that helped finance the purchase, refinancing, or improvement
of California residential real property. 5 At issuance, the notes were secured by
junior consensual liens on the real property, but subsequent foreclosure of senior
consensual liens, in many cases probably precipitated by the mid-decade burst of
the housing bubble, left the notes unsecured.6
In late 2009 and early 2010, Heritage sued makers of 157 of these notes for the
outstanding balances, joining seemingly random groups of them in three separate
actions filed in the Federal District Court for the Central District of California.7
During the balance of 2010, in a veritable avalanche of litigation, Heritage filed at
least 534 additional lawsuits in California Superior Court against makers of some of
the notes it had purchased.8 And, between February 24, 2010 and April 23, 2012,
Heritage filed 218 adversary proceedings in California bankruptcy courts against
makers of these notes who had filed chapter 7 or chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions,
alleging the outstanding obligations on the notes to be nondischargeable under the
Bankruptcy Code's fraud exception to the bankruptcy discharge. 9 This Article,
drawing mostly from PACER-accessible records, 10 reports on a study of these
bankruptcy adversary proceedings, all but one of which has been closed.11
5

For convenience, "notes" includes a very small number of home equity line of credit agreements and
other non-negotiable instruments. A few of the notes subject to this study were secured by liens on real
property located outside California.
6
Deposition testimony and declarations of Ben Ganter, a Heritage principal, and declarations of Mark
Schuerman, an expert witness retained by Heritage, make clear that Heritage sought to collect on notes
originally secured by junior liens on real property. See, e.g., Oral Deposition of Benjamin A. Ganter at 13–
15, 17–18, 21–22, 30, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-cv-173203 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2011) (on file with
author); Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Declarations of Ben Ganter and Mark Schuerman in Support at 12, 18–19, In
re Mabson, No. 10-02445 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 19, 2011), ECF No. 20. Foreclosure of a senior consensual
lien on real property extinguishes junior liens on the property, leaving a "sold-out junior." Bank of Am. v.
Graves, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
7
For a discussion of these three federal district court actions, see infra Part II.A.1.
8
For a discussion of some of the state actions, see infra Part II.A.2.
9
An adversary proceeding is a lawsuit filed in bankruptcy court that is largely governed by Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001–87, 9017. Because of
bankruptcy's automatic stay, Heritage could not initiate suit against makers of notes in either federal district
court or state court after a maker had filed a bankruptcy petition, and it could not continue a federal district
court or state court action initiated against such a maker prior to the bankruptcy filing. See 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(1) (2012). Broadly speaking, an individual's discharge of debt in bankruptcy does not discharge a
debt incurred by fraud if the creditor timely files an adversary proceeding and thereafter obtains a
bankruptcy court judgment that the debt is nondischargeable. See id. § 523(a)(2), (c)(1) (2012); FED. R.
BANKR. P. 4007(c). For a discussion of the adversary proceedings, see infra Part III.A.
10
Electronic versions of the dockets and all relevant documents filed in each of the 218 adversary
proceedings, written summaries of each proceeding, Excel spreadsheets recording fifty-seven discrete data
points as to each proceeding, and tables generated from the spreadsheets are on file with the author. The
author expresses his appreciation to Bankruptcy Judges Carroll, Jaroslovsky, Klein, and Taylor, Chief
Judges of the Bankruptcy Courts for the Central, Northern, Eastern, and Southern Districts of California,
respectively, for PACER fee exemption orders that enabled free access to these records. The relevant
documents consist of pleadings, entries of default, most motions, memoranda of points and authorities and
declarations in support of and in opposition to motions, transcripts of hearings, some status reports, referrals
to mediation and mediators' reports, settlement stipulations, orders, judgments, and, for the very few cases in
which there was a trial or appeal, exhibit and witness lists, trial briefs and transcripts, and appellate briefs.
Except where helpful to an understanding of the proceeding, I have not saved any summonses, certificates of
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Heritage mass produced most of the significant records that it filed in the
adversary proceedings and its attempted prima facie showing in each was identical
in every material respect—identical in legal theory, identical in critical factual
allegations, and identical in the kind of evidence offered to support those
allegations:
1. Using a uniform residential loan application (Fannie Mae Form 1033),12
individuals applied for residential real property secured loans, mostly
through mortgage loan brokers dealing with wholesale lenders, but
occasionally directly with an originating lender.13
2. The loan applications, signed by prospective borrowers beneath warnings
of civil and criminal liability for knowingly false statements,
misrepresented the prospective borrower's income, employment, or
intended use of the real property, or, in a few cases, the nature or extent of
the borrower's liabilities.
3. Originating lenders relied on the misrepresentations in making what
Heritage's expert identified as "stated income" loans and what others have
less charitably identified as "liar loans."14
4. Originating lenders sold the notes, secured by junior liens on real
property, in the secondary mortgage market.15
service, or notices of mailing, and have not saved most status reports, scheduling and other miscellaneous
orders, or civil minutes. For adversary proceedings commenced in the Northern District of California,
records also include audio files of hearings, made available because of the Northern District's participation in
PACER's Digital Audio Recording Project. See Digital Audio Recording Project, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT
ELECTRONIC RECORDS (PACER), https://www.pacer.gov/announcements/general/audio_pilot.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2015). The Central, Eastern, and Southern Districts of California did not participate in the
audio recording project at the time of the adversary proceedings.
11
One proceeding remained open as of April 5, 2016. In that proceeding, the bankruptcy court entered a
judgment in favor of the defendant on his motion for summary judgment. Entry of Final Judgment, In re
Montano, No. 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2012), ECF No. 166. The court thereafter awarded
attorney's fees to the defendant, Order on Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, In re Montano,
No. 11-04008 (Jan. 25, 2013), ECF No. 198, an award that Heritage appealed to the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, see infra text accompanying notes 345–46. The Panel affirmed the attorney's
fee award in In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 112–19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013), but the proceeding remains open
because of the defendant's extended and extraordinary efforts to enforce the attorney's fees judgment. Some
of those efforts are briefly described infra note 353.
12
Uniform
Residential
Loan
Application,
FANNIE MAE
(revised
June
2009),
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide_form/1003rev.pdf.
13
Unlike a direct lender, a wholesale lender does not conduct the loan origination process directly with the
borrower; instead, it solicits and acts upon loan applications submitted by mortgage brokers or other
intermediaries. Loan applications and promissory notes available from PACER typically show that the loan
application was taken by an "interviewer" working for an entity other than the entity identified on the
promissory note as the lender. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 11,
14, In re Cervantes, No. 11-01733 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2011), ECF No. 1. A few loan applications
were taken directly by the entity identified in the promissory note as the lender. See, e.g., Exhibits A and B
to Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Alejandre, No. 11-02349 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. June 19, 2011), ECF No. 1. Shortly after funding a loan, a wholesale lender typically sells the loan in
the secondary mortgage market.
14
E.g., In re Machuca, 483 B.R. 726, 730 n.4, 731 n.5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).
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5. Borrowers defaulted in payments on the notes, typically leaving a
balance equal or nearly equal to the face amount of the note. Foreclosure of
a senior lien extinguished the junior lien, leaving the notes unsecured.
6. Heritage acquired the notes, in some cases directly from the originating
lenders and in other cases from the last in a chain of intermediate
transferees. None of its complaints alleged that Heritage relied on the
misrepresentations, 16 but, under Ninth Circuit authority, Heritage's claim
under the fraud exception to the bankruptcy discharge could rest on the
reliance of the originating lender.17
Despite the undifferentiated nature of Heritage's legal theory, allegations, and
supporting evidence, this study reveals significant and unjustified disparity in
adjudicated outcomes among the many bankruptcy judges who heard the adversary
proceedings. It also reveals that most attorneys representing defendants did not
plead defenses that might have defeated liability, that defendants represented by
attorneys did not necessarily fare better than pro se defendants or defendants who
defaulted, and that represented defendants in the Northern District of California
generally fared better in settlement of the Heritage claims than represented
defendants in the other three California federal districts. The study also suggests
that the Bankruptcy Code's attorney fee shifting provision, 18 intended to deter
adversary proceedings alleging fraud that are not substantially justified, does not
function effectively.
Taken together, these findings advance our understanding of debt buyer
initiated litigation, studied by others primarily in the context of much smaller
contract claims filed by institutional debt buyers in state court.19 More importantly,
15
See, e.g., Declaration of Mark G. Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 3–
4, In re Frutos de Espinoza, No. 10-09078 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2011), ECF No. 31.
16
Heritage nonetheless frequently submitted a standardized declaration of Ben Ganter in which he
identified himself as Director of Client Relations of Heritage and asserted that Heritage relied only on
information provided in a loan application when purchasing loans on the secondary market. E.g., Declaration
of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 1–2, In re Calderon, No. 10-09077
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2011), ECF No. 57.
17
See Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that in an
action under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) the assignee need not demonstrate its own reliance on a
misrepresentation if it can demonstrate reliance by the original lender).
18
11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (2012).
19
The most recent published study, of lawsuits filed by debt buyers in Maryland, identifies, summarizes,
and contrasts the results of prior studies. See Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400
Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 198–202, 225–29 (2014). Holland's study
randomly selected 4400 lawsuits filed in Maryland collection courts by eleven debt buyers with the highest
volume of filings, over one thousand each, in 2009–2010. Id. at 185–86, 203. The lawsuits primarily
involved attempts to collect relatively small amounts of credit card debt, typically less than five thousand
dollars and averaging less than three thousand dollars. Id. at 193, 205. Holland's study and previous studies
all revealed high rates of default, high rates of judgments against defendants (either by default or otherwise),
and very low rates of attorney representation. Id. at 225–28. Each of these findings contrast sharply with the
findings reported in this Article, likely because of the significantly greater amounts sought by Heritage in its
adversary proceedings. In Holland's study, defaulting defendants fared worst, pro se defendants fared better
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these findings reflect what may collectively and colloquially be described as
randomly distributed justice at the trial court level—outcomes driven at least as
much by luck as by the inherent merits of the case. We anticipate some randomly
distributed justice as the byproduct of disparities in economic and other resources of
the parties and disparities in the knowledge, capabilities, and attitudes of even wellmeaning attorneys and judges acting reasonably in an imperfect system. We aspire
nonetheless to equal justice under law. The findings of this study reflect a departure
from that ideal on a scale both larger than we may have expected and larger than we
should tolerate.
To develop this thesis and to foreshadow the description of disparate outcomes
in the adversary proceedings, Part II describes salient features of Heritage's (nonbankruptcy) lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California and in the California Superior Court. Part III describes the Heritage
adversary proceedings in California bankruptcy courts, focusing on one factual and
two legal issues whose disparate resolution generated disturbingly different
adjudicated outcomes. Part IV explains how Heritage played with a deck stacked in
its favor—the beneficiary of information asymmetry, mass production of
documents, the complexity of the legal issues, and the impotence of the Bankruptcy
Code's attorney fee shifting provision. Part IV also describes wild cards randomly
undermining Heritage's advantages. Part V offers suggestions for reform and Part
VI concludes.
I.  

HERITAGE LAWSUITS IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AND CALIFORNIA
SUPERIOR COURT

A.   The District Court Actions
Heritage's initial litigation foray in California appears to have been in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California, where it filed
three actions. The remarkably inconsistent outcomes in these three essentially
identical actions foreshadow the randomly distributed justice in its subsequently
filed adversary proceedings.
Each of the complaints alleged diversity jurisdiction,20 and each joined multiple
individuals as defendants, presumably to save filing fees. Heritage filed the first of
these actions ("Chao") on December 11, 2009, joining fifty individuals as
but still poorly, and defendants represented by attorneys fared best. Id. at 210–13, 223–24. Those findings
too contrast sharply with the findings reported in this Article.
20
Heritage, a limited liability company, alleged that it organized under Texas law and had its principal
place of business in Texas, that each of the defendants resided in California, and that the amount in
controversy for each defendant exceeded $75,000. E.g., Complaint for Damages, Specific Performance, &
Other Equitable Relief at 2–3, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Chao, No. 09-01466 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009),
ECF No. 1. Heritage failed to allege the citizenship of each of its owners or members, and its later failure to
offer evidence of that citizenship proved fatal in one of the three actions. See infra notes 26–28 and
accompanying text.
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defendants, the second ("Cole") on January 20, 2010, joining fifty-five individuals
as defendants, and the third ("David") on February 4, 2010, joining fifty-two
individuals as defendants.21 It filed Chao and David in the Santa Ana Division of
the Central District, where each was assigned to a different judge, and it filed Cole
in the Los Angeles Division of the Central District, where it was assigned to a third
judge.
The complaints in the three actions were virtually identical. All three alleged
that each defendant had misstated income on a residential loan application, had
caused the misleading loan application to be transmitted to prospective lenders, had
thereby obtained a loan, had signed a note promising repayment, and had defaulted
on the note. Heritage alleged that it was the holder of each note through assignment
from an originating lender or intervening assignee. Each complaint also alleged the
possibility that one or more of the defendants may have also misrepresented an
intention to use the real property as a primary residence. One of the three
complaints also alleged that each defendant had misrepresented the nature and
history of his or her employment. One of the complaints alleged that each
defendant had sought the loan for purchase of real property; the other two
complaints alleged that some defendants had sought the loan to purchase and others
to refinance real property.
Each complaint pleaded causes of action for intentional and negligent
misrepresentation and breach of contract, and two of the three added a cause of
action for fraudulent concealment. In each, Heritage sought actual damages from
each defendant equal to the face amount of the relevant note plus twice that amount
in punitive damages.22
Following sua sponte orders to show cause why multiple defendants had not
been improperly joined, the court in both David and Cole dismissed all but one
defendant because of improper joinder.23 But because dismissal of the entire action
is not the proper remedy for improper joinder,24 the court in David left the case
pending against defendant Susana David, apparently only because her name,
although not alphabetically first, appeared first among fifty-two defendants in the
caption of the complaint. The court in Cole left the case pending against defendant
Hector Hernandez, the one defendant unlucky enough to have filed an answer to the
complaint prior to the court's order dismissing the remaining defendants. 25 But
21

See Complaint for Damages, Specific Performance, & Other Equitable Relief, supra note 20; Complaint
for Damages, Specific Performance, & Other Equitable Relief, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Cole, No. 1000394 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2010), ECF No. 1; Complaint for Damages, Specific Performance, & Other
Equitable Relief, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. David, No. 10-00133 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1.
22
None of the complaints sought interest that had accrued on the obligations following the borrowers'
defaults.
23
See Civil Minutes – General, Cole, No. 10-00394 (May 3, 2010), ECF No. 54; Civil Minutes – General,
David, No. 10-00133 (May 14, 2010), ECF No. 67.
24
A federal court may not dismiss an action for improper joinder but may drop parties to cure the
improper joinder. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
25
See Civil Minutes – General at 4, Cole, No. 10-00394 (May 3, 2010), ECF No. 54; Defendant Hector
Hernandez’ Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint for Damages, Cole, No. 10-00394 (Mar. 4, 2010), ECF No. 41.
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serendipity saved Mr. Hernandez from this misfortune. The court's sua sponte order
in Cole had also required Heritage to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for lack of subject matter (diversity) jurisdiction. 26 Heritage probably
could have responded successfully by offering evidence that the sole member of
Heritage (an L.L.C.) was a citizen of Texas, thus establishing diversity of
citizenship, but it misread the law and failed to do so. 27 The court therefore
dismissed the action against Mr. Hernandez.28
Susana David was not so fortunate; the court's sua sponte order in her case had
not raised the jurisdictional issue.29 Ms. David had not appeared in the action, and
Heritage moved for a default judgment against her on both its contract and fraud
claims after procuring entry of default. 30 The court denied the motion, having
properly concluded that California legislation, section 726(g) of the California Code
of Civil Procedure,31 barred an action for fraud by a holder of a note if the note
evidenced a loan that was secured, as it was in Ms. David's case, by single-family,
owner-occupied residential real property actually occupied by the borrower and if
the loan was for less than $150,000 (adjusted for inflation). 32 But the court left
Heritage the option of reinstating a breach of contract claim that the court believed
Heritage had abandoned.33
The court should have dismissed with prejudice instead, because relevant law
also barred the breach of contract claim asserting default on the note. California
anti-deficiency legislation, section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure,
precludes recovery "[u]nder a deed of trust or mortgage on a dwelling of not more
than four families given to a lender to secure repayment of a loan that was used to
pay all or part of the purchase price of that dwelling, occupied entirely or in part by
the purchaser."34 The legislation applies to an action on a note held by a sold out
26

Civil Minutes – General at 1–2, Cole, No. 10-00394 (Mar. 8, 2010), ECF No. 44.
In the Ninth Circuit, an L.L.C. is a citizen of every state in which its owner/members are citizens.
Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (joining five other circuits
that had addressed the issue). Heritage's later filed voluntary bankruptcy petition identified Christopher D.
Ganter as its sole member and its attached Schedule H stated his address to be in Frisco, Texas. Petition of
Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C., supra note 3, at 3, 44. Heritage's response to the order to show cause
asserted that "each of Plaintiff's members is a citizen of the State of Texas," but Heritage failed to include
with its response any evidence to that effect (e.g. a declaration of Christopher Ganter stating his residence).
Instead, its response argued, incorrectly, that its Texas organization and Texas principal place of business
determined its citizenship. Response to Order to Show Cause and Request to Discharge the Court's Order to
Show Cause at 3–4, Cole, No. 10-00394 (Mar. 23, 2010), ECF No. 46.
28
Civil Minutes – General, Cole, No. 10-00394 (June 7, 2010), ECF No. 57.
29
Civil Minutes – General, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. David, No. 10-00133 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2010),
ECF No. 61.
30
Notice of Application and Application for Final Default Judgment Against Defendant Susana David,
David, No. 10-00133 (Aug. 18, 2010), ECF No. 74; Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiff's Application for Final Default Judgment Against Defendant Susana David, David, No.
10-00133 (Aug. 18, 2010), ECF No. 74-1.
31
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(g) (2012).
32
Civil Minutes – General at 2–5, David, No. 10-00133 (Oct. 17, 2011), ECF No. 108.
33
Id. at 6.
34
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (2012).
27
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junior lienholder35 and therefore should have barred Heritage, a subsequent holder
of Ms. David's note, from recovery. In focusing on section 726(g) of the California
Code of Civil Procedure, the court overlooked the underlying prohibition on the
collection of a deficiency. 36 As we shall see, in one adversary proceeding, a
bankruptcy court did the opposite (properly acknowledging the anti-deficiency rule
but overlooking section 726(g)).37
Heritage didn't look a gift horse in the mouth. It amended its complaint against
Ms. David, reinstating its breach of contract claim, and renewed its motion for a
default judgment. 38 The court granted the motion, saddling Ms. David with a
$144,434 default judgment on a deficiency claim barred by California law.39 Even
more troubling, the court's correct ruling on the fraud claims did not deter Heritage
from filing three subsequent adversary proceedings invoking the fraud exception to
the bankruptcy discharge,40 and no document that Heritage filed in its still pending
adversary proceedings acknowledged the ruling of the court in David that section
726(g) of the California Code of Civil Procedure barred certain fraud claims. To
the contrary, many of the complaints that Heritage filed in its adversary proceedings
(i.e. in other courts) alleged: "Plaintiff is not barred from pursuing this action by
any anti-deficiency statute or rule. Plaintiff does not seek a deficiency judgment for
the balance of a promissory note following foreclosure, but rather seeks a judgment
for Defendant's fraud in connection with their loan application, as alleged herein."41
35
See Spangler v. Memel, 498 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Cal. 1972); see also Kurtz v. Calvo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 99,
100 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
36
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied exclusively on three cases identified by Heritage that
addressed the effect of California's one form of action rule on a sold out junior lienholder but none of which
involved the type of purchase money loan addressed by California's anti-deficiency rule. See Civil Minutes –
General, supra note 32, at 4–5 (discussing Nat'l Enters., Inc. v. Woods, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001), Bank of Amer. v. Graves, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), and Roseleaf Corp. v.
Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1963)).
The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit provided the correct analysis in
affirming a judgment against Heritage in one of the subsequently filed Heritage adversary proceedings. See
In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 105–12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013). For further discussion of that proceeding, see
infra text accompanying notes 241–44.
37
See infra text accompanying notes 249–53.
38
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint for Breach of Contract Against Defendant Susana David, David,
No. 10-00133 (Dec. 21, 2011), ECF No. 110; Motion for Final Default Judgment Against Defendant Susana
David, David, No. 10-00133 (May 10, 2012), ECF No. 123.
39
Order of Judgment Against Defendant Susana David After Default, David, No. 10-00133 (July 23,
2012), ECF No. 130. Because judgment on the fraud claim was denied and entered instead on the contract
claim, Ms. David could discharge the claim in bankruptcy because exceptions to the bankruptcy discharge
do not include claims for breach of contract. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012). A PACER search on Ms. David's
name revealed no bankruptcy filing in California.
40
Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Dekoekkoek, No. 11-90491 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2011), ECF No. 1; Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re
Nsahlai, No. 11-02983 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011), ECF No. 1; Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2012), ECF No 1. In each,
Heritage alleged that it was not seeking a deficiency judgment but was instead seeking a judgment for fraud
in connection with the defendant's loan application.
41
See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 4, In re Alabsi, No. 11-03019
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2011), ECF No. 1.
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In Chao, the third of the three federal district court actions, the court did not
question either joinder or subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, in advance of ruling
on Heritage's motions for default judgments against multiple defendants, it
expressed concern about two issues: (1) whether Heritage, as successor-in-interest
on a note, could invoke the originating lender's reliance on alleged borrower
misrepresentations in support of its fraud claims; (2) whether the defendants might
be protected by anti-deficiency legislation. 42 In supplemental briefing, Heritage
addressed the first issue but not the second. 43 The court nonetheless must have
resolved its misgivings about potential application of anti-deficiency legislation and
may have been unaware of section 726(g) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, because it entered default judgments in favor of Heritage totaling
$1,841,363 against twenty-three individuals (ranging from $43,380 to $145,273,
with a median judgment of $87,833). 44 Although the judgments mention that
Heritage waived its right to punitive damages,45 they do not state whether they were
based on Heritage's contract or fraud claims, or both. Thus, unlike Susana David,
none of the Chao defendants against whom default judgments were entered could
know whether the judgments against them were, like the default judgment against
Susana David, based only on a contract claim dischargeable in bankruptcy. 46
42
Civil Minutes – General at 1–2, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Chao, No. 09-01466 (C.D. Cal. May 25,
2010), ECF No. 123.
43
Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's Supplemental Brief in Support of its Application For Entry of Final
Default Judgments, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Chao, No. 09-01466 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2010), ECF No.
133.
44
Judgments Against Defendants, Chao, No. 09-01466 (Dec. 7, 2010, June 13, 2011, and June 14, 2011),
ECF Nos. 177, 205, 206, 208, 209. No PACER-accessible document explains the court's thinking on the
anti-deficiency issues. We have only a transcript of a hearing on the motions for default judgments in which
the judge comments: "And I've thrown a lot of things at you, including antideficiency issues and other
issues." Reporter's Daily Transcript of Pretrial Proceedings at 6, Chao, No. 09-01466 (Dec. 6, 2010) (on file
with author).
45
Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's Supplemental Brief in Support of its Application For Entry of Final
Default Judgments, supra note 43.
46
The fate of the Chao defendants, Susana David, and other defendants against whom Heritage obtained
judgments in subsequent state actions or bankruptcy adversary proceedings is fertile soil for study. Here is
one example. At least one of the twenty-three Chao defendants against whom Heritage obtained a default
judgment, Jennie Arizmendez, filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on January 4, 2012, just over a year
after the entry of the default judgment against her. See Petition of Jennie Arizmendez at 3, In re Arizmendez,
No. 12-10200 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012), ECF No. 1. She listed Heritage's claim as $97,959.60,
Schedule F – Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority Claims at 13, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan.
18, 2012), ECF No. 11, the exact amount of the default judgment against her, and noted wage garnishment
by Heritage in July 2011, Statement of Financial Affairs at 21, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 18,
2012), ECF No. 11. Her other debt schedules reveal this claim to have constituted ninety percent of her total
priority and non-priority unsecured debt. Schedule F, supra, at 13; Schedule E – Creditors Holding
Unsecured Priority Claims at 12, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 11. The Heritage
wage garnishment therefore played heavily in her decision to file. At the time of her petition, she stated that
she was married, had one dependent daughter, was employed as a cashier at Target (for thirteen years) with a
net monthly take home pay of $1,153.73, received an additional $800 per month from a combination of
rental income and "family contribution," and that her husband received $1,367.16 per month from social
security and pension or retirement income. Schedule I – Current Income of Individual Debtor(s) at 16, In re
Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 11. She listed average monthly expenses of $2,856.29,
including $1,726.57 as rent or a home mortgage payment. Schedule J – Current Expenditures of Individual
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Sections 580b47 and 726(g) of the California Code of Civil Procedure48 may well
have barred both the contract and fraud claims upon which many of these
judgments were based. The court dismissed all but three of the remaining twentyseven defendants upon Heritage's request.49
To recapitulate this remarkable set of disparate outcomes among three identical
lawsuits: (1) Susana David, fortuitously the first of fifty-two co-defendants named
in a Heritage lawsuit filed in the Santa Ana Division of the Federal District Court
for the Central District of California, suffered a $144,434 deficiency judgment
based on a misreading of California law after the judge sua sponte had dismissed
her fifty-one co-defendants for improper joinder; (2) Hector Hernandez, fortuitously
the only defendant among fifty-five co-defendants to have filed an answer, escaped
a similar fate in a Heritage lawsuit filed in the Los Angeles Division of the Federal
District Court for the Central District of California, if only because the judge sua
sponte dismissed the lawsuit against him for lack of diversity jurisdiction after
having sua sponte dismissed his co-defendants for improper joinder; (3) twentythree other defendants, among fifty sued by Heritage in a second lawsuit filed in the
Santa Ana Division of the Federal District Court for the Central District of
California, suffered default judgments totaling nearly two million dollars
Debtor(s) at 18, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 11. She indicated her sole
ownership of a single-family residence in Chino, California, subject to a secured claim of $399,451.66 and
estimated to be underwater by $119,451.66. Schedule A – Real Property at 5, In re Arizmendez, No. 1210200 (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 11. The judge confirmed a five-year chapter 13 plan calling for payments of
$465 per month based on disposable income of $27,900 over the period of the plan. Order Confirming
Chapter 13 Plan, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Mar. 21, 2012), ECF No. 28. Heritage filed a claim for
$97,959.60. Proof of Claim at 1, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Mar. 9, 2012), Claim 3-1. An entity
known as VAK M12 FUND, L.L.C. later filed notice that Heritage had assigned the claim to VAK, Transfer
of Claim Other Than For Security, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Mar. 7, 2013), ECF No. 36, suggesting
that Heritage may have sold to others at least some of the judgments it had obtained. Ms. Arizmendez
converted the case to chapter 7 on December 31, 2013. Notice That The Case Has Been Converted to
Chapter 7 from Chapter 13, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 2, 2014), ECF No. 50. The court thereafter
granted her a chapter 7 discharge. Discharge of Debtor, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Apr. 15, 2014),
ECF No. 69. VAK M12 FUND, L.L.C. did not file an adversary proceeding to determine the
dischargeability of the debt assigned to it by Heritage. Docket, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 4,
2012).
PACER searches on the other Chao defendants against whom default judgments were entered revealed
either no bankruptcy filing or a bankruptcy filing by more than one person with the same name.
47
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (2012).
48
See id. § 726g.
49
Analysis of the docket indicates that Heritage requested dismissal of many defendants for whom it had
not filed a proof of service of summons and complaint and against whom it therefore had not requested or
obtained a default; as to these defendants it was presumably unable to effectuate service. Heritage requested
dismissal of a few other defendants after obtaining their default and naming them in its initial but not in its
second motion for default judgment. Heritage requested dismissal of a few other defendants who had filed
answers (one of whom had filed a motion for summary judgment, one of whom had filed a third party
complaint, and one of whom had filed a counterclaim) and one who had filed bankruptcy. The court ordered
dismissal in response to all of these requests except as to the defendant who had filed bankruptcy, a second
defendant jointly sued with her spouse, and a third defendant as to whom Heritage had filed a stipulation to
dismiss. The case was closed with no further docket entries as to the three remaining defendants. See
Docket, Chao, No. 09-01466 (Dec. 11, 2009).
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notwithstanding the same infirmities that led two other judges to dismiss 107
defendants in the other two Heritage lawsuits.
B.   The California Superior Court Actions
Notwithstanding its success against twenty-three defendants sued in Chao,
Heritage filed no further actions in any California federal district court. Instead,
Heritage began filing actions in California Superior Court as early as March 2010.50
A detailed analysis of those lawsuits is beyond the scope of this Article, in part
because there are so many of them and in part because obtaining the relevant
records would be extraordinarily time-consuming and expensive. 51 But a brief
survey of some of the easily accessible data about some of those lawsuits provides
additional important context for analysis of the adversary proceedings.
Heritage filed at least 534 civil actions in California's ten most populous
counties.52 There is ample reason to believe that the core allegations of most if not
50

Heritage may have filed some of these actions against defendants dismissed from the federal district
court actions because of improper joinder, but discovering the extent to which it did so is beyond the scope
of this study.
51
The California Superior Court operates at the county level. California has fifty-eight counties, many of
which do not provide for online retrieval of either basic case information or records filed in a case. Some
larger California counties provide for online name searches and some provide for online retrieval of basic
case information (party names, case numbers, nature of the case, names of documents filed, and
identification of rulings, judgments, and other events), either for a nominal fee or for free. A few also
provide for online retrieval of images of some records filed in some cases, typically only for a fee.
52
Heritage filed 195 actions in Los Angeles County (civil party name search function available at
SUPERIOR
COURT
OF
CAL.,
CNTY.
OF
L.A.,
Party
Name
Search,
https://www.lacourt.org/paonlineservices/civilindex/cipulbicmain.aspx? (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 81
actions in Orange County (case index search function available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF
ORANGE, Case Index, https://ocapps.occourts.org/CourtIndex/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 74 actions in
Riverside County (civil case name search function available at RIVERSIDE SUPERIOR COURT, PUB. ACCESS,
Civil Main Menu, http://public-access.riverside.courts.ca.gov/OpenAccess/CivilMainMenu.asp (last visited
Mar. 2, 2015)), 51 actions in Sacramento County (civil party name search available at SACRAMENTO
SUPERIOR
COURT,
PUB.
CASE
ACCESS,
Search
by
Name
Civil,
https://services.saccourt.ca.gov/PublicCaseAccess/Civil/SearchByName (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 47
actions in San Bernardino County (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF
SAN
BERNARDINO,
Court
Case
Information
and
Document
Sales,
http://www.sbcourt.org/Divisions/Civil/CaseInformationOnline.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 39 actions in San Diego
County (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF SAN DIEGO, Party Name
Search, http://courtindex.sdcourt.ca.gov/CISPublic/namesearch (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 24 actions in
Contra Costa County (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF CONTRA
COSTA,
Online
Case
and
Calendar
Information,
http://www.cccourts.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&pageId=6736 (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 11 actions in
Santa Clara County (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF SANTA
CLARA,
Public
Access
Civil
Case
Information
Website,
http://www.sccaseinfo.org/pa6.asp?display_name=index_party (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 9 actions in
Fresno County, (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF FRESNO, Smart
Search, https://publicportal.fresno.courts.ca.gov/FRESNOPORTAL/ (last visited July 13, 2015)), and 3
actions in Alameda County (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF
ALAMEDA, DomainWeb, https://publicrecords.alameda.courts.ca.gov/PRS/Home/Disclaimer (last visited
Mar. 2, 2015)).
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all of those actions mimicked those in the district court actions. First, several online
indices identify these actions as seeking relief for fraud, a description consistent
with the nature of the claims asserted in the district court actions, and some of the
online indices identify the actions as being unlimited civil cases (cases in which the
claim exceeds $25,000), 53 an amount consistent with the amount of the claims
asserted in the district court actions. Second, online indices indicate that Heritage
filed all of these actions between March 9, 2010 and October 22, 2010, suggesting
the likelihood of boilerplate allegations in identical lawsuits. Reinforcing this
inference, online records for which the information is available identify the law firm
that represented Heritage in the state court proceedings as either of the two law
firms that represented Heritage in the district court proceedings. Third, the time
period during which Heritage filed these actions in part slightly overlaps but in
larger part slightly precedes the time period during which Heritage filed the
adversary proceedings.54 That timing suggests that Heritage sued individuals in state
court and thereafter filed adversary proceedings against state court defendants who
filed bankruptcy (hence invoking the automatic stay) during the pendency of the
state court action.55 Finally, the complaints filed in a small sample of these actions
mimic one another and largely mimic the complaints in the district court actions,
and some of them, like the district court actions, join multiple defendants and
include the same boilerplate allegations against each defendant.56
53

See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 85–88 (2012).
Heritage filed 42 of the 218 adversary proceedings within the same time period. With the exception of
one adversary proceeding filed in April 2012, Heritage filed all of the remaining adversary proceedings
between October 22, 2010 and November 11, 2011.
55
Cases involving defendants Javier Tovar and Jesus Montano exemplify this pattern. Heritage sued Javier
Tovar on February 4, 2010, in one of its three district court actions. See Complaint for Damages, Specific
Performance, & Other Equitable Relief at 2, 7, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. David, No. 10-00133 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1. The district court dismissed him and others for improper joinder on May 14, 2010.
See Civil Minutes – General, David, No. 10-00133 (May 14, 2010), ECF No. 67. Heritage then sued him in
Los Angeles County Superior Court on June 11, 2010. Civil party name search function available at
SUPERIOR
COURT
OF
CAL.,
CNTY.
OF
L.A.,
Party
Name
Search,
https://www.lacourt.org/paonlineservices/civilindex/cipublicmain.aspx? (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). He filed
a bankruptcy petition on July 30, 2010. See Petition of Javier Tovar, In re Tovar, No. 10-41664 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. July 30, 2010), ECF No. 1. Heritage filed an adversary proceeding against him on November 5, 2010.
See Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Nov. 5, 2010), ECF No.
1.
Heritage joined Jesus Montano as one of several defendants in an action filed in Alameda County Superior
Court on May 6, 2010. See Complaint for Damages at 1–2, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Cloird, No.
10514182 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 6, 2010) (on file with author). He filed a bankruptcy petition on October 13,
2010. See Petition of Jesus Montano, In re Montano, No. 10-71788 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2010), ECF
No. 1. Heritage filed an adversary proceeding against him on January 9, 2011. See Plaintiff's Complaint to
Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Jan. 9, 2011), ECF No. 1.
56
The sample, on file with the author, consists of complaints in: Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Cloird, No.
10514182 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 6, 2010); Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Duran, No. 30-2010-00372102 (Cal.
Super. Ct. May 13, 2010); Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Aquino, No. CIV 495303 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 20,
2010); Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Bulan, No. CIV 495304 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 20, 2010); and Heritage
Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Salvi, No. CIV 497206 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 26, 2010). The sample also consists of
"previews" of portions of five complaints filed in the County of Sacramento, in which the names of the
defendants, the case numbers, and the filing dates are obscured unless downloaded for a fee, and the first
54
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Judges in at least two of these actions, both presiding in the Santa Clara County
Superior Court, entered summary judgment against Heritage on the basis of the
limitation on fraud claims in section 726(g) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure. 57 That conclusion replicated the conclusion reached by the federal
district court judge in David, previously discussed,58 but, as we shall see, rescued a
defendant in only one of the 218 adversary proceedings.59 And in the only one of
the Heritage state court actions that reached the appellate level, a California court of
appeal affirmed a trial court judgment against Heritage on the basis of what
amounted to a lack of standing defense that had not surfaced in any of the district
court actions and surfaced only rarely in the adversary proceedings.60
The court of appeal's description of the alleged facts typifies the facts alleged in
both the district court actions and in the adversary proceedings. In 2006, Maribel
Monroy purchased her son's residence in Richmond, California for $425,000. 61
WMC Mortgage Corp. ("WMC") financed 100 percent of the purchase price with
two loans, one for $340,000 secured by a senior deed of trust and a second for
$85,000 secured by a junior deed of trust.62 After her default in mortgage payments,
the holder of the senior mortgage foreclosed.63 Heritage thereafter acquired the sold
out junior note as part of its acquisition of a larger pool of notes.64
Heritage filed its superior court action against Ms. Monroy on June 1, 2010,
alleging her misrepresentation of income on her loan application and pleading
causes of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent
concealment, and promissory fraud.65 It did so after its apparently common, but in
her case unsuccessful, pre-litigation collection activities.66 It had sent Ms. Monroy
an initial notice that it had purchased her unpaid junior note, attempted to speak
with her, sent her a second notice of its ownership of the note, and sent her a third
notice asserting her obligation to pay Heritage on the note.67 Shortly after filing the
page of five complaints filed in the County of Riverside. The complaints in the state law sample differ from
the complaints in the three district court proceedings in two principal respects: they substitute for breach of
contract a cause of action for promise without intent to perform and they seek prejudgment interest and an
unspecified amount of punitive damages.
57
See Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v.
Pena, No. 1-10-CV-173402 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2012) (on file with author); Order Re: Motion for
Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Jiminez, No. 1-10-CV-171231
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2012) (on file with author).
58
See supra text accompanying notes 30–32.
59
See infra text accompanying notes 241–44.
60
Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Monroy, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013), petition for review
denied, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6631 (Cal. July 31, 2013).
61
Id. at 33.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See Monroy, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 33.
67
Id. Deposition testimony in another case, by Ben Ganter, self-described managing partner and head of
the legal department of Heritage, suggests that Heritage typically pursued this type of pre-litigation activity.
It would "[s]end them letters, try and dig any more information out of them, you know, find out their ability
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action, Heritage sent her a copy of the complaint and summons together with a
letter advising her, among other things, that it had filed the action and encouraging
her to contact Heritage to try to resolve the matter short of litigation.68
The court of appeal agreed with the trial court's conclusion that Heritage had
failed, in three attempts, to adequately allege the originating lender's assignment of
a fraud claim to Heritage.69 Indorsement of the note to Heritage from the originating
lender assigned only a contract claim (barred by anti-deficiency legislation). 70
Neither an allegation of an industry custom and practice to assign a fraud claim with
assignment of a note, nor a declaration from a representative of the originating
lender two years after the sale of the notes, was sufficient to show an intention to
assign a fraud claim.71 The trial court had invited Heritage to attach to an amended
complaint a copy of any written assignment by the originating lender.72 Instead of
doing so, Heritage's second amended complaint alleged that the "loan sell
agreement" implied assignment of the fraud claim by using the following language:
"Seller does hereby sell, assign and convey to Buyer, its successors and assigns, all
right, title and interest in the loan."73 That allegation was insufficient to plead the
originating lender's intent to assign a fraud claim.74
In other words, Heritage lacked standing to assert the fraud claim because it did
not own it. This defense, standing alone (no pun intended), likely would have
defeated many if not all of Heritage's actions, in district court, in state court, and in
the adversary proceedings, but the March 29, 2013 decision in Monroy came too
late for perhaps hundreds of other defendants sued by Heritage and an unknown
number of others who may have settled with Heritage in response to its prelitigation collection activities.75
to pay and come up with settlement agreements." Oral Deposition of Benjamin A. Ganter, supra note 6, at
19 (on file with author).
68
Id. at 34. A copy of what appears to be an identical (and therefore form) letter sent by Heritage to
another individual on July 26, 2010 is on file with the author.
69
Monroy, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 42.
70
Id. at 42.
71
Id. at 41, 43.
72
Id. at 34.
73
Id. at 35. Copies of each of the three loan sale agreements on file with the author contain comparable
language.
74
Id. at 36.
75
The Monroy decision did not come too late to rescue defendant Mary Aquino, sued by Heritage in
another state court action. Complaint for Damages, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Aquino, No. CIV 495303
(Cal. Super. Ct. May 20, 2010) (on file with author). Following the court's denial of Ms. Aquino's earlier,
pre-Monroy, motion for summary judgment on the ground that "the lender's mortgage fraud claims passed,
as a matter of course, with the transfer of the note to Plaintiff," Order Denying Motion for Summary
Judgment by Defendant Mary Aquino at 3, Aquino, No. CIV 495303 (July 30, 2012) (on file with author),
Ms. Aquino's counsel renewed the motion after the Monroy decision. In response, the court, citing Monroy,
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, stating: "Neither the November 2, 2007, Sale and Assignment
Agreement between WMC Mortgage Corporation [the originating lender] and Mountain View Capital
Mortgage Trust [the initial assignee], nor the January 20, 2009, Mortgage Loan Sale Agreement between
Promore Investments, L.L.C. and HERITAGE PAC. FIN., L.L.C., manifest an intent to transfer tort claims."
Judgment of Dismissal With Prejudice at 2, Aquino, No. CIV 495303 (Dec. 19, 2013) (on file with author).
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Moreover, the Monroy decision does not offer enduring protection against fraud
claims asserted by debt buyers. It teaches future debt buyers to insist on express
assignment of fraud claims in future debt purchase agreements. When debt buyers
purchase note pools from intermediate assignees, the assignment of fraud claims
would also have to be expressed in each previous assignment up the line to the
originating lender. It would not be surprising if this lesson were to penetrate the
market sufficiently to prompt originating lenders and intermediate assignees to
include the necessary boilerplate language in all future debt purchase agreements,
thus obviating this standing defense.
II.   HERITAGE ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS IN CALIFORNIA BANKRUPTCY COURTS
A.   An Overview
Between February 24, 2010 and April 23, 2012, Heritage filed 218 adversary
proceedings in California bankruptcy courts against individuals who had filed
chapter 7 or chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.76 It filed 40 in the Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of California, 37 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of California, 125 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of
California, and 16 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California.77
Forty-seven different bankruptcy judges presided in these proceedings, ten in the
Northern District, seven in the Eastern District, twenty-five in the Central District,

76

Debtors named in eighteen of the adversary proceedings had filed chapter 13 petitions, either
individually or jointly with a spouse; the debtor in one of them converted to a chapter 7 proceeding. The
balance of the debtors had filed chapter 7 petitions, either individually or jointly with a spouse. Bankruptcy
courts dismissed three adversary proceedings following dismissal of the underlying chapter 13 proceeding
and three other adversary proceedings following dismissal of the underlying chapter 7 proceeding.
77
PACER's Bankruptcy Party Search in each of these districts under the name "Heritage Pacific Financial"
revealed more than 218 entries for adversary proceedings, but many of the entries were duplicates.
Jurisdiction of the Northern District, allocated among four divisions, covers Northern California coastal
counties from Monterey County in the South to Del Norte County at the Oregon border. See U.S. DIST.
COURT, N. DIST. OF CAL., Jurisdiction Map, http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/jurisdictionmap (last visited
Mar. 4, 2015). Jurisdiction of the Eastern District, allocated among three divisions, covers counties, largely
in California's Central Valley, from Kern County in the South to Siskiyou and Modoc Counties at the
Oregon
border.
See
U.S.
BANKR.
COURT,
E.
DIST.
OF
CAL.,
District
Map,
http://www.caeb.uscourts.gov/Locations/DistrictMap.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). Jurisdiction of the
Central District, allocated among five divisions, covers Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino,
San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura counties. See U.S. DIST. COURT, C. DIST. OF CAL.,
Jurisdiction Map for the Central District of California, http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/jurisdiction (last
visited Mar. 4, 2015). Jurisdiction of the Southern District, allocated to one division, covers San Diego and
Imperial counties in the southern end of the state. See U.S. MARSHALS SERV., Southern District of
California, Area of Service, http://www.usmarshals.gov/district/ca-s/general/area.htm (last visited Mar. 4,
2015). For division locations in each district, see U.S. BANKR. COURT, E. DIST. OF CAL., United States
Bankruptcy Courts Within California, http://www.caeb.uscourts.gov/documents/Forms/EDC/EDC.002070.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
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and five in the Southern District.78 Twenty-three of the judges presided in at least
five separate proceedings.
As in its federal district court and state court actions, Heritage alleged in each
adversary proceeding that a lender had loaned the defendant79 money relying on a
defendant's intentional misrepresentations in a loan application and that Heritage
owned the relevant promissory note. 80 Virtually every complaint alleged on
information and belief that the defendant's loan application had misrepresented the
defendant's employment, income, or intended use of the property as a primary
residence; a few alleged the loan application's misrepresentation of the defendant's
liabilities. 81 Each complaint sought a judgment that the unpaid debt was
nondischargeable in the debtor's bankruptcy because the debt was for money
obtained on the basis of one or both of the species of fraud described in section
523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: (A) false pretenses, a false representation, or
actual fraud other than a statement respecting the debtor's financial condition;82 (B)
a materially false statement in writing respecting the debtor's financial condition,
made with the intent to deceive, upon which the creditor to whom the debtor is
liable reasonably relied.83
In the 218 proceedings, Heritage sued 266 individuals 84 for claims totaling
$21,267,016. The claims in each of the adversary proceedings were substantial,
ranging from $11,773 to $458,596,85 with a median claim of $89,363. Figure 1
depicts the number of claims by amount (grouping the amounts in $15,000
increments starting with the lowest claim of $11,773). Claim distributions in each
of the four federal districts roughly mirror this distribution among all districts
combined.86

78

Because of judicial reassignments, two judges presided successively in seventeen of the proceedings and
three judges presided successively in three of the proceedings.
79
For convenience, this Article uses the singular "defendant" or its singular possessive even though
Heritage joined co-defendants in forty-eight of the proceedings.
80
See, e.g., Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 2–4, In re Countouriotis, No. 10-02774
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010), ECF No. 1.
81
For a discussion of five iterations of the complaint, see infra note 112.
82
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
83
See id. § 523(a)(2)(B).
84
In forty-eight of the proceedings, Heritage joined co-borrowers, typically spouses at the time of the loan
application.
85
The largest note was for $200,000. The $458,596 claim appeared in a complaint asserting liability on
three separate notes.
86
Figures depicting the claim distribution for each of the four federal districts are available from the
author.
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FIGURE 1: Claim Distribution
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In almost every proceeding, Heritage's claim equaled or was only slightly lower
than the face amount of the note, both because defendants had purportedly failed to
make any payments, or only nominal payments, on the notes, and because Heritage
did not pursue any claim to accumulated and unpaid interest on the notes. Heritage
also did not pursue any claim to its attorney's fees although its complaints in the
adversary proceedings included both a prayer requesting attorney's fees and an
allegation that its damages included attorney's fees.87
87
Heritage may not have been entitled to a judgment that included attorney's fees even though all but a
handful of the 175 notes available through PACER included boilerplate language entitling the lender to
attorney's fees. At least in the Ninth Circuit, a creditor obtaining a judgment of nondischargeability under
section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code would be entitled to attorney's fees for the adversary proceeding
only if it would have been entitled to such fees in a non-bankruptcy court. See In re Pham, 250 B.R. 93, 97–
99 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000), relying on Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 224 (1998). In California, a party
may recover its attorney's fees in litigating a tort claim if the parties had so agreed in a contract between
them. See In re Chen, 345 B.R. 197, 200 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (2012)).
The wording of an attorney's fee provision in a contract determines whether there is a contractual right to
recover attorney's fees in litigating a tort claim. See Santisas v. Goodin, 951 P.2d 399, 405 (Cal. 1998). The
author did not examine the attorney's fees provisions in the notes on which Heritage sued to assess whether
they were worded broadly enough to encompass recovery of attorney's fees in an action for fraud, but a
bankruptcy court did so in one of the adversary proceedings. Relying on Chen, it denied a motion for
attorney's fees in part because of its conclusion that the language of the note was not broad enough to
encompass a fraud claim. See Docket Text Order, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 15,
2013). Paragraph 4(D) of the relevant promissory note (incorrectly referred to in the Docket Text Order as
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An attorney represented the defendant throughout a proceeding in 51.4 percent
of the proceedings and for only portions of a proceeding in another 11.5 percent of
the proceedings. 88 Defendants represented themselves in 21.1 percent of the
proceedings and failed to appear in 16 percent of the proceedings.
Information about the amount of Heritage's recovery from a defendant is
available for 210 of the 218 proceedings. It recovered nothing in ninety-four of
those 210 proceedings (45 percent). 89 It suffered seven judgments of
dischargeability, four on summary judgment and three following trial. 90 It
acquiesced to dismissal with no payment to Heritage, based on mutual releases, in
forty-nine filed written settlement agreements. Bankruptcy courts dismissed
twenty-six other proceedings on Heritage's unilateral requests for dismissal,91 and
dismissed, or entered a judgment against Heritage, in twelve proceedings for other
reasons.92
In the remaining 116 adversary proceedings for which the information is
available (55 percent), Heritage recovered at least $2,142,561 in aggregate
(approximately 10 percent of its total claims), consisting of $1,138,564 owing by
"para. 5D") provided simply for the note holder's recovery of attorney's fees for the borrower's failure to pay
the note holder as required. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 13, In re
Palines, No. 12-03063 (Apr. 23, 2012), ECF No. 1.
88
An attorney substituted in for a pro se defendant at various stages in eighteen proceedings and
substituted out in favor of a pro se defendant in four proceedings. In two proceedings, an attorney substituted
out in favor of a pro se defendant who later retained a second attorney, and in one proceeding an attorney
substituted in for a pro se defendant but later substituted out in favor of the pro se defendant.
89
This includes one proceeding in which the parties settled for payment of one dollar to Heritage.
90
Heritage appealed one of the four summary judgments of nondischargeability, probably because it was
based on an issue of law—the applicability of section 726(g) of the California Code of Civil Procedure—the
resolution of which was critical to its chances in many other cases. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel affirmed the summary judgment and Heritage did not appeal further. See In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013). For a discussion of this proceeding, see infra text accompanying notes 241–44.
Heritage appealed one of the three trial judgments of nondischargeability, rendered in a proceeding in
which the defendant had, through trial, represented himself pro se. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel affirmed the judgment and Heritage did not appeal further. See In re Trejo, Ch. 7 No. NC-11-1652HPaMk, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5881, at *20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012).
91
A court order of dismissal followed each request except in one case in which the court simply closed the
proceeding without an order of dismissal. Although the available records do not reveal reasons for these
Heritage requests, some of the requests likely reflected its assessment of ultimate success or failure before
the judge involved. For example, one request followed a court's denial of a Heritage motion for a default
judgment in the proceeding. See, e.g., Request for Dismissal of Adversary Proceeding Against Defendant, In
re Cox, No. 11-90357 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. May 18, 2012), ECF No. 24, following two weeks after the court
denied a motion for default judgment for insufficient evidence of a false representation or materiality of the
representation, Memo re Order: Request for further documentation or further action, In re Cox, No. 1190357 (May 4, 2012), ECF No. 20.
92
A court dismissed four proceedings for failure to prosecute. See, e.g., Order Dismissing Adversary
Proceeding for Failure to Prosecute, In re Diaz, No. 10-01335 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2011), ECF No. 19.
It dismissed one for failure to timely schedule a default prove-up hearing. See infra notes 369–74 and
accompanying text. It dismissed six because of dismissal of the underlying chapter 7 or chapter 13
proceeding. See, e.g., Order Dismissing Adversary Proceeding, In re Dominguez, No. 11-01646 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. July 11, 2011), ECF No. 5. It entered a judgment against Heritage in one proceeding for
unspecified "good cause" on the day of trial. See Civil Minute Order, In re Mindt, No. 11-02217 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. Oct 5, 2011), ECF No. 12.
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virtue of ten default judgments, one summary judgment, two judgments following
trial,93 and $1,003,997 pursuant to 103 filed written settlement agreements.94 The
default judgments, summary judgment, and judgments following trial ranged in
amounts from $49,721 to $147,710.95 Table 1 summarizes this data.

TABLE 1: Recovery by Heritage
(210 of 218 adversary proceedings)
Filed
Settlement
Agreements

Heritage
Requests
Dismissal

Dismissal
for Other
Reasons

Default
Judgments

Summary
Judgments

Trials

$0 recovery
by Heritage

49

26

12

Eight
motions
denied*

4

3

>$0
recovery by
Heritage

103
($1,003,997)

N/A

N/A

10**
($867,996)

1
($61,417)

2
($209,151)

* Excludes one proceeding in which evidence in support of motion for default judgment not available from
PACER.
** Excludes default judgment in one proceeding in which default (and hence default judgment) was later set
aside.

Each of the written settlement agreements calling for payment to Heritage
provided for payment of significantly less than the amount of Heritage's claim
against the settling defendant, typically through installment payments. Figures 2
and 3 depict the range of amounts defendants agreed to pay by way of settlement,
expressed first in absolute numbers (ranging from $500 to $32,000) and second as a
percentage of Heritage's claim against each defendant (ranging from .9 percent to
48.3 percent).96

93

A defendant in one of the two proceedings in which the court entered a judgment of nondischargeability
following trial appealed the judgment. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the judgment
and the defendant did not appeal further. See In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr.
LEXIS 3633 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012). For a discussion of this proceeding, see infra text accompanying
notes 199–213.
94
Ninety-four of the settlement agreements called for and resulted in entry of money judgments of
nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2)(A) or 523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, or both (or in one
case entry of a monetary judgment without a judgment of nondischargeability). Ten of the settlement
agreements resulted in the court's dismissal of the adversary proceeding without entry of judgment (or in one
case closing of the proceeding without entry of an order of dismissal), based on money paid or promised to
Heritage.
95
Courts awarded Heritage 100% of its claim in twelve of these thirteen proceedings and, for unexplained
reasons, only 95% of its claim in the other.
96
Eleven settlement agreements provided a relatively small discount for early payment that is not reflected
in the ensuing figures.
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Number of Debtors

FIGURE 2: Settlement Amounts Owing in Installments
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FIGURE 3: Percentage of Claim Owing in Installments
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In seventy-eight of these settlement agreements, however, the defendant
became liable for a larger sum, often a significantly larger sum, upon default in
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installment payments. 97 The risk of default was not insignificant, given both the
necessitous financial circumstances in which many debtors continue to find
themselves after bankruptcy 98 and the often lengthy duration of the installment
payments.99 Figures 4 and 5 depict the range of amounts defendants agreed to pay
upon default in installment payments, expressed first in absolute numbers (ranging
from $1000 to $149,855) and second as a percentage of Heritage's claim against
each defendant (ranging from 2.9 percent to 170 percent). Were every defendant to
default in installment payments, Heritage (or its successor-in-interest) would
become entitled to collect $2,853,883 on the basis of settlement agreements.

Number of Debtors

FIGURE 4: Settlement Amounts Owing If Default in Installment Payments
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These settlement agreements typically provided for entry of a judgment of nondischargeability for the
larger amount that would not be enforced if the defendant timely made the agreed installment payments. See,
e.g., Stipulation for Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff, In re Antunez, No. 11-01569 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 12,
2011), ECF No. 18. Bankruptcy courts would then enter a judgment of nondischargeability in accordance
with the stipulation. See, e.g., Judgment at 1–2, In re Antunez, No. 11-01569 (Oct. 19, 2011), ECF No. 19. A
term in a settlement agreement stipulating to a later entry of a judgment in a larger amount if a party defaults
in making installment payments totaling a smaller amount constitutes an unlawful and hence unenforceable
liquidated damages term under California law. See Greentree Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Execute Sports, Inc., 78 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (decided before the Heritage adversary proceedings); see also Purcell v.
Schweitzer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (decided after the Heritage adversary proceedings).
The same might be true when the settlement agreement provides for immediate entry of judgment for the
larger amount not to be enforced absent default in installment payments. See Chambreau v. Coughlan, 69
Cal. Rptr. 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
98
See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy's Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
67, 88–93 (2006) (discussing financial plight of substantial minority of families after filing bankruptcy).
99
Repayment periods ranged from a low of one month (seven defendants) to a high of fifteen years (one
defendant), with a mean repayment period of 50.9 months and a median repayment period of sixty months.
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FIGURE 5: Percentage of claim owing if default in installment payments
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Heritage did not collect all of the money owing prior to its January 2014
bankruptcy filing, in part because some of the promised installment payments had
not yet become due and in part because it claimed to own only a percentage interest
in some of the judgments.100 But defendants who have not yet paid Heritage could
be pursued for payment by a debt collector employed by Heritage's bankruptcy
trustee on a fifty percent commission basis.101
100
In its bankruptcy schedules, Heritage lists as assets hundreds of unpaid judgments, discounts the face
amount of each judgment 98% to reach an estimated fair market value of the judgments, and then claims
only a 30% ownership in that market value. See Petition of Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C., supra note 3,
at 9 (Schedule B), 17–21 (Attachment B-18). Reversing that mathematical process, one derives $27,451,435
as the total face amount of unpaid judgments, much no doubt attributable to its state court actions. Heritage's
Schedule B includes at least three judgments, one for $120,000 against Javier Tovar, and two totaling
$144,037.51 against Maria Taraz, Petition of Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C., supra note 3, at 18, 20
(Attachment B-18), equal to the amount of the judgments rendered against them in an adversary proceeding.
See Judgment, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011), ECF No. 44; Judgment by
Default, In re Taraz, No. 10-90456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011), ECF No. 25 (judgment on two separate
notes). Heritage's claim to 30% ownership seems consistent with its position, asserted elsewhere, that as to
notes on which it filed suit, it owned only a temporary 1% ownership that reverted to a third party after
judgment but as to which Heritage was entitled to a thirty percent fee on amounts collected. See Plaintiff
Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C.'s Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Contempt and
Sanctions, supra note 2, at 6.
101
See Order Approving the Employment of Debt Collector, In re Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C., No. 1440107 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2014), ECF No. 63. Amounts to be collected may include unlawful
liquidated damages. See supra note 97. Such collection efforts might be minimal, however. Heritage's
bankruptcy trustee recently wrote: "I hired Commercial Recovery Systems and they have collected $0.
Before I hired them I was assured how good at collecting they were. Once hired, they claim that the debts
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B.   Deconstructing the Outcomes
To deconstruct these starkly different outcomes in proceedings that were at core
legally and factually identical, this section of the Article first briefly reviews two
key elements of the prima facie case under section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code: misrepresentations made with intent to deceive a creditor and a creditor's
actual and either reasonable or justifiable reliance on the misrepresentations. It then
discusses three findings in depth: (1) the dramatic differences in judicial response to
Heritage's claim of reliance on misrepresentations by the originating lender; (2) the
extent to which defendants failed to invoke the benefit of California's prohibition of
the fraud claim Heritage was asserting; (3) the extent to which defendants
overlooked two distinct arguments that Heritage lacked standing to assert its fraud
claim.
Section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code divides in two the universe of
nondischargeable fraud claims: (1) false written statements about a debtor's or
insider's financial condition, 102 and (2) all other types of fraud, excluding both
written and oral statements about a debtor's or insider's financial condition. 103
Although the two are mutually exclusive,104 most elements of each claim are the
same,105 and all must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.106 In either
case, the defendant must communicate a misrepresentation to a creditor intending to
deceive the creditor and the creditor must rely on the misrepresentation. 107 The
nature of the misrepresentation and the nature of the creditor's reliance distinguish
the two. For a false written statement of financial condition, reliance must be
reasonable; for all other kinds of fraud, reliance need only be justifiable.108
are too old and too difficult to collect." E-mail from bankruptcy trustee Christopher Moser to author (Feb. 4,
2016) (on file with author).
102
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2012).
103
See id. § 523(a)(2)(A).
104
See Eugene Parks Law Corp. Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Kirsh (In re Kirsh), 973 F.2d 1454, 1457
(9th Cir. 1992).
105
Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires proof of the traditional elements of common law fraud: a debtor's
misrepresentation, fraudulent omission, or fraudulent conduct, knowledge of the falsity or deceptiveness,
intent to deceive, justifiable reliance by the creditor, and damage to the creditor proximately resulting from
such reliance. See Turtle Rock Meadows Homeowners Ass'n v. Slyman (In re Slyman), 234 F.3d 1081, 1085
(9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted) (indicating that creditor must establish these five elements to
prevail). Except for the nature of the misrepresentation and the nature of reliance, section 523(a)(2)(B)
requires proof of the same elements. See Siriani v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., of Milwaukee, Wis. (In re Siriani),
967 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (June 29, 1992) (concluding that since sections 523(a)(2)(A)
and 523(a)(2)(B) are "substantially similar," adoption of the same test is appropriate for both).
106
See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), 760 F.3d 1038, 1050 (9th Cir.
2014).
107
See supra note 105.
108
Section 523(a)(2)(B) explicitly refers to reasonable reliance. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2012). Section
523(a)(2)(A) is silent on the nature of the reliance required, id. § 523(a)(2)(A), but the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the creditor's reliance under that section need only be justifiable. See Field v. Mans,
516 U.S. 59, 69–75 (1995). The Court's opinion explains the likely justification for requiring reasonable
instead of justifiable reliance in the context of section 523(a)(2)(B):
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To determine if a creditor's reliance was reasonable, a court must determine if
the "creditor exercised the same degree of care expected from a reasonably prudent
person entering into the same type of business transaction under similar
circumstances."109 Courts can make that determination, the Ninth Circuit has said,
"without additional help."110 To determine if a creditor's reliance was justifiable, a
court must consider the qualities and characteristics of the particular creditor and
the circumstances of the particular case rather than a community standard of
conduct.111
Because the nature of the required reliance differs, it would have seemed
significant for Heritage to have assessed whether alleged debtor misrepresentations
about the defendant's income, employment, liabilities, or intended use of property
qualified as false written statements of financial condition or rather as other types of
fraud. Heritage seemed to struggle with that question, because its complaints
evolved through several iterations reflecting seemingly different positions.112 In the
The House Report on the Act suggests that Congress wanted to moderate the burden on
individuals who submitted false financial statements, not because lies about financial
condition are less blameworthy than others, but because the relative equities might be
affected by practices of consumer finance companies, which sometimes have
encouraged such falsity by their borrowers for the very purpose of insulating their own
claims from discharge.
Id. at 76–77.
109
In re Machuca, 483 B.R. 726, 736 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).
110
Candland v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (In re Candland), 90 F.3d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1996).
111
See Field, 516 U.S. at 71 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1976)).
112
Heritage's first complaint, used in only the first two adversary proceedings, filed in February and March
2010, pleaded one claim for relief, alleging misrepresentations of income, employment, and intended use of
the property, that relied exclusively on section 523(a)(2)(A). See, e.g., Complaint to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt, In re Vega, No. 10-01101 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010), ECF No. 1. Heritage
may have abandoned this format so quickly upon realizing that misrepresentations about income might be
governed instead by section 523(a)(2)(B). The second and third iterations of the complaint, used in
adversaries filed from May through early December 2010 (thirty-one percent of the proceedings), pleaded
one claim for relief, alleging the same misrepresentations, based on both section 523(a)(2)(A) and section
523(a)(2)(B), without distinguishing between the types of misrepresentations actionable under section
523(a)(2)(A) from those actionable under section 523(a)(2)(B). See, e.g., Complaint to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt, In re Orozco, No. 10-01599 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2010), ECF No. 1. The
third iteration added to the second only an allegation that Heritage had attempted to resolve the matter before
filing suit by contacting the defendant's attorney. See, e.g., Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt
at 2, In re Birch, No. 10-01480 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2010), ECF No. 1. The fourth iteration of the
complaint, used in proceedings filed from December 2010 through August 2011 (sixty-four percent of the
proceedings), pleaded two claims for relief, one under section 523(a)(2)(A) for misrepresentations of
intended use of the property, and the other under section 523(a)(2)(B) for misrepresentations of employment
and income. It also added an allegation that Heritage's claims were not barred by anti-deficiency legislation.
Unlike earlier iterations, it also attached a copy of the loan application and note as exhibits. See, e.g.,
Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Vicente, No. 11-02016 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
Jan. 9, 2011), ECF No. 1. It also added an allegation that Heritage's claims were not barred by antideficiency legislation. Id. at 4.
Heritage used another variation of its complaint in six of the last seven adversary proceedings that it filed,
alleging in each only a misrepresentation of a defendant's liabilities. Five of them pleaded a claim for relief
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proceedings in which the parties agreed to a dismissal with no payment to Heritage,
the distinction obviously was moot. Even in the proceedings in which a defendant
agreed to pay Heritage something, the defendant, Heritage, and the bankruptcy
judges would have been indifferent to the distinction. In fact, most of the stipulated
judgments of nondischargeability, drafted by Heritage and signed by a bankruptcy
judge, stated that the debt was excepted from discharge "pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2)(A)-(B)." 113 Preceding such a settlement, however, the distinction might
have been relevant if the parties perceived the distinction to be pertinent to the
settlement value of the proceeding.
In all but a few cases, the defendants sued by Heritage had applied for loans via
a Fannie Mae Uniform Residential Loan Application, a form that calls for
information about a debtor's intended use of the real property subject to a
contemplated mortgage and about a debtor's employment, monthly income, monthly
housing expenses, assets, and liabilities. 114 Clearly, a misrepresentation about a
debtor's intended use of the property would not be a false written statement about
the debtor's financial condition, so that claim should have proceeded exclusively on
the basis of section 523(a)(2)(A), requiring only justifiable reliance by the lender.
But misrepresentations in a loan application about income and liabilities constitute
misrepresentations about a debtor's financial condition, so those claims should have
proceeded exclusively on the basis of section 523(a)(2)(B), requiring reasonable
reliance by the lender.115
under section 523(a)(2)(B). See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re
Nsahlai at 4–5, No. 11-02983 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011), ECF No. 1. One pleaded a claim for relief
under both section 523(a)(2)(A) and section 523(a)(2)(B). See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt at 4, 5–6, In re Bettencourt, No. 11-01224 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2011), ECF
No. 1.
113
E.g., Order (Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment) at 2, In re Agsalud, No. 1090597 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 18. At least one bankruptcy judge was more attentive to
the distinction. In his order approving a settlement agreement, he struck the reference to section 523(a)(2)(A)
but not the reference to 523(a)(2)(B). See Order (Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Settlement) at 2, In
re Torell, No 11-01080 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011), ECF No. 47.
114
See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 10–13, In re Castaneda, No.
10-01749 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010), ECF No. 1.
115
Courts differ on the meaning of a "statement . . . respecting the debtor's . . . financial condition." Some
take the broad view that it encompasses any written statement that reflects the financial condition of the
debtor, while others take the narrow view that it encompasses only written statements that provide
information about the debtor's overall financial health. See Schneiderman v. Bogdanovich (In re
Bogdanovich), 292 F.3d 104, 112–13 (2d Cir. 2002) (listing cases). The Ninth Circuit adopted the narrower
view. See In re Belice, 461 B.R. 564, 573–78 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011). Although Heritage filed all but one of
its adversary proceedings before the December 2011 decision in that case, misrepresentations in a loan
application of income and liabilities would seem to present a picture of the debtor's overall financial health.
In two appeals to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel involving a Heritage adversary proceeding,
both decided after the court's decision in Barnes, the Panel did not consider the question. See In re Tovar,
Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *30 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) (assuming
written statement regarding debtor's financial condition because not contested by appellant); In re Trejo, Ch.
7 No. NC-11-1652-HPaMk, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5881, at *11–19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (affirming
trial court conclusion that reliance was neither justifiable nor reasonable). Misrepresentations about the
nature of one's employment may not qualify under the narrow view. See, e.g., In re Carlson, Ch. 7 No. WW-
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Whatever the misrepresentations alleged, every defendant answering a
complaint denied having made misrepresentations, or at least denied having made
them with intent to deceive a creditor. Most did so in their answers with a simple
denial;116 some added a boilerplate affirmative defense alleging fault of unnamed
"others."117 Answers from other defendants more explicitly blamed a broker or real
estate agent, as in the following three unedited excerpts from the answers of pro se
debtors:
When I applied for a loan for the purchase of my house, all
documentation was made by the sales agent, he only said to me:
SIGN HERE, I wanted to have a home to live in with my family
and fulfill my American dream, in no time I had the intension [sic]
of doing some fraud on my behalf.
But the bad economic situation around world, affected my
economy, I lost my job, I could not make monthly loan payments
and lost my house.
I have never altered documents to make fraud; I don't speak or
write English, everything was made by the sales agent.118
––––
Because I am not well versed in purchasing property, I trusted my
broker to provide me with accurate information. I signed the loan
papers as instructed and the broker had completed the rest of it.
Since that time, I have learned that the broker I used was indited
[sic] and convicted in federal court for fraud. I am a victim of his
illegal activities and was none the wiser.119
––––
I Oscar Villatoro pleading that all of this is not a fraud. Yes I did
sign the paper but I did not know the real estate agent had put my
income really high. I didn't realize what I was signing I gave all my
11-1486-KiJuH, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2304, at *22 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. May 22, 2012) ("[R]epresentations about
sources of income that could be looked to for repayment are not statements of financial condition.").
116
See, e.g., Answer to Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Gomez, No. 10-03197
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011), ECF No. 6.
117
See, e.g., Answer to Complaint at 3–4, In re Taber, No. 10-05395 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2012),
ECF No. 24.
118
Answer, In re Barahona, No. 11-02210 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 8.
119
Notice of Motion and Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) at 11, In
re Fontenot-Kenney, No. 11-01953 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2011), ECF No. 8.
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information and paystubs to the agent so I trusted him. Should I
have check [sic] what I was saying "yes", was I stupid for not
checking "yes". Honestly I don't know what else to say, if Heritage
Pacific Financial want [sic] to sue me, well I don't know how much
they will get because I have nothing I don't make much. So this is
my plea.120
Bankruptcy courts found intentional misrepresentation in five of the seven
proceedings in which they adjudicated that issue. 121 The remaining adversary
proceedings settled, were resolved by a bankruptcy court on other grounds, or were
dismissed at Heritage's request. For most of the proceedings, therefore, we cannot
assess the accuracy of Heritage's claims of intentional misrepresentations. But even
assuming intentional misrepresentations of income or employment in every
proceeding, it is nonetheless possible to compare results across a significant number
of the proceedings, because intentional misrepresentation alone, without the
appropriate degree of reliance, is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case. It is
therefore to the question of reliance by the originating lender that this Article now
turns.
1.   Reliance, Like Beauty, is in the Eye of the Beholder
Heritage submitted evidence purporting to demonstrate reliance by the
originating lender in twenty-nine proceedings: in a motion for default judgment in
at least eighteen of nineteen proceedings, 122 in support of or in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment in six proceedings, and in five trials. In each of
those contexts, some bankruptcy judges found the evidence sufficient and others
found it insufficient to demonstrate the requisite reliance of the originating lender,
even though, as detailed below, the evidence in most was either identical or
functionally equivalent.

120

Answer, In re Villatoro, No. 11-01315 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 31, 2011), ECF No. 5.
See Order Following Trial at 2, 4–5, In re Trejo, No. 10-05392 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011), ECF
No. 33 (misrepresentations of income and employment deemed admitted from unanswered Request for
Admissions); Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. Sept. 20, 2011), ECF No. 19 (defendant encouraged by another to misrepresent income); Transcript of
Trial, supra note 2, at 119–20 (misrepresentations of income, employment, and intended use of property);
Transcript of Trial at 16–17, In re Mabson, No. 10-02445 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011), ECF No. 21
(misrepresentations of income and intended use of property); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2,
In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011), ECF No. 43 (unspecified false representations);
Memorandum of Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 7, 9, In re Martinez, No. 1101131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2012), ECF No. 35 (misrepresentation of income, no misrepresentation of
intended use of property or ownership of restaurant, and unresolved issue of material fact concerning intent
to misrepresent income); Memorandum at 8–10, 12–13, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
Mar. 13, 2012), ECF No. 47 (insufficient evidence of false representations and insufficient evidence of intent
to deceive).
122
Documents are not available from PACER for one of the nineteen motions for default judgment.
121
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a.   In Motions for Default Judgment
The troubling differences in outcome are most evident in the resolution of
Heritage's motions for default judgment, each filed following a defendant's default.
In support of each of its motions for default judgment, Heritage offered the
declaration of Ben Ganter. Describing himself as Heritage's Director of Client
Relations, Mr. Ganter declared his familiarity with Heritage's regular course of
business and with its operations in the secondary mortgage market, which included
the purchase of notes. 123 His declarations typically attached the defendant's loan
application and promissory note as exhibits,124 and routinely asserted that Heritage
relied on the truthfulness of loan applications when it purchased loans. 125 This
implausible assertion was in any event irrelevant because Heritage neither pleaded
nor argued its own reliance as a predicate for its fraud claims.126 His declarations
did not claim his employment by or other association with any originating lender or
any other basis to establish his personal knowledge of an originating lender's
underwriting practices or its reliance on a specific loan application. 127 For that
reason, some bankruptcy judges found his declaration insufficient to establish the
originating lender's reliance. One bankruptcy judge put this bluntly in granting a
judgment for the defendant after trial:
123

See, e.g., Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Motion for Default Judgment at 1, In re Wilson, No.
10-01291 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2011), ECF No. 17. In another proceeding, Mr. Ganter testified that he
was a managing partner and custodian of records of Heritage. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 121, at 9. In
testimony in a state law proceeding, Mr. Ganter described himself as managing partner and head of the legal
department of Heritage, but not a lawyer. See Oral Deposition of Benjamin A. Ganter, supra note 6, at 8–9.
124
See, e.g., Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 4, In re
Arana, No. 10-01575 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2011), ECF No. 8-2.
125
See, e.g., Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, supra note
124, at 3.
126
Proof of Heritage's own reliance (in lieu of proof of reliance by the originating lender) would have
sufficed to satisfy the reliance requirement of section 523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Machuca,
483 B.R. 726, 731 n.6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012), but Mr. Ganter's assertion that Heritage relied on
representations in loan applications was implausible for several reasons. As previously indicated, supra note
4, Heritage purchased blocks of notes for at most pennies on the dollar several years after defendants
represented income and employment in loan applications. Both the purchase price and timing of these
purchases reflect the implicit understanding of seller and buyer that many of the notes will be uncollectible,
either because of inaccuracy in income or employment information stated in the loan application or because
of a subsequent change in the borrower's financial circumstances. Moreover, Mr. Ganter testified that when a
portfolio of loans became available for purchase, and before bidding on the portfolio, a Heritage
representative would visit the facility at which the loan files were stored, verify the existence of loan files,
but not look at the loan application or other documents in the loan files. See Deposition of Benjamin Alan
Ganter at 18–23, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Aquino, No. CIV- 495303 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2011) (on
file with author). One bankruptcy court commented on both the irrelevance and implausibility of Mr.
Ganter's assertion of reliance by Heritage, noting that Heritage had not alleged that it had been defrauded
but, had it done so, the court would not have been persuaded by Heritage's "blind reliance on the loan
application . . . ." Civil Minutes at unnumbered fourth page, In re Calderon, No. 10-09077 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
Sept. 28, 2011), ECF No. 68.
127
See Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 2, In
re Medrano, No. 10-03142 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012), ECF No. 30-3 (failing to establish any
personal knowledge of originating lender's underwriting practices).
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However, the Ganter Declaration provides no evidence of the
original lender's reliance on the statements within the Loan
Application. Mr. Ganter provides no personal knowledge as to the
reliance undertaken by the original lender. The Ganter Declaration
claims that the original lender approved the Loan based on the
Defendant's misrepresentations. This is a bald, unsupported
statement, without personal knowledge of the original lender's
reliance or state of mind.128
Yet in three proceedings in which Heritage offered Ben Ganter's declaration as the
only evidence of the originating lender's reliance, two bankruptcy judges granted
Heritage's motion for default judgment, commenting in one, without elaboration,
that "[t]he motion is supported by competent evidence."129
Heritage also offered the declaration of Mark Schuerman, an expert witness, in
support of sixteen of the nineteen motions for default judgment. 130 Each of his
declarations recited his credentials and extensive experience in the real estate and
mortgage industries.131 The most common form of his declaration, used in support
of ten motions for default judgment, stated that originators of stated income loans
expected to hold notes for thirty to ninety days before selling them to an investor
and that "[t]he buyers of these notes rely on the stated income and representations
made in the 1003 Applications when purchasing these notes from the original
lenders." 132 It then quoted a paragraph of those applications in which the loan
applicant represents the truthfulness of information in the application to lenders and
their successors in interest and described that paragraph as crucial to the viability of
the lending industry.133 It concluded that holders of notes secured by a second deed
of trust heavily rely on income, employment, assets, and debts stated in the loan
application because they are at the mercy of foreclosure by the holder of a first deed
of trust on the same property.134
The second most common form of his declaration, used in support of six
motions for default judgment, described the defendant's loan as a stated income loan
128

Memorandum, supra note 121, at 11.
Civil Minutes, In re Wilson, No. 10-01291 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 18, 2011), ECF No. 22. Two months
later, the same court granted Heritage's motion for default judgment in another proceeding, without
comment. See Civil Minutes, In re Phillips, No. 10-01308 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 27, 2011), ECF No. 29. In
the third of the three proceedings, discussed more fully infra note 153, another bankruptcy court granted
Heritage's motion for default judgment without comment on the evidence. Order and Judgment of
Nondischargeability in Favor Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C. and Against Daniel Hawker Taber, In re
Taber, No. 10-05395 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 5, 2011), ECF No. 16.
130
For simplicity, this presumes that Heritage submitted this declaration in support of a motion for default
judgment in one proceeding for which relevant documents are not available from PACER.
131
See, e.g., Declaration of Mark Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 1–2,
In re Calderon, No. 10-09077 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011), ECF No. 30.
132
Id. at 3.
133
See id.
134
See id. at 3–4.
129
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and offered greater detail about the standards of practice and customs in the lending
industry for stated income loans from 2005 to 2007, the period of the loans in
question.135 The practice, he said, was to obtain a borrower's loan application and
rely on the borrower's FICO score and debt-to-income ratio in approving loans.136
At the time, he stated, "[t]he stated income loan was favored . . . as it sped up the
underwriting and closing processes."137
Notably absent from both forms of Mr. Schuerman's declaration was any
statement that a specific originating lender actually relied, justifiably relied, or
reasonably relied on income, employment, or other information in a specific
defendant's loan application. Presumably he could not have made any such
statement, because none of his declarations claimed his employment by or other
association with an originating lender or claimed any other basis to establish his
personal knowledge of an originating lender's underwriting practices or reliance on
a specific loan application. Neither of these two forms of his declaration mentioned
the defendant's name, enabling Heritage to duplicate it, attach a cover page with a
caption that included the defendant's name, and file it in more than one proceeding,
sometimes months after Mr. Schuerman's signed it.138
Some bankruptcy judges found the Schuerman declaration insufficient to
establish reliance by an originating lender. In one proceeding, against defendant
Maria Becerra, Heritage offered both the Ganter declaration and the more
frequently used form of the Schuerman declaration.139 The judge declined to enter a
default judgment but gave Heritage the opportunity to submit additional evidence
after making the following comments:
This . . . loan was made in 2006, when home lending practices in
California and the nation as a whole were sloppy at best. The court
has a substantial question whether any underwriting due diligence
was performed by lenders . . . . Given the industry practices at the
time, the court is unwilling to presume that anyone even looked at
the financial statements and other documents submitted in support
of loan applications. In other words, this court will not presume
justifiable reliance by the originating creditor, even if the

135

See, e.g., Declaration of Mark Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 4–5,
In re Medrano, No. 10-03142 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012), ECF No. 30-2.
136
See id. at 4–5.
137
Id. at 4.
138
See, e.g., Declaration of Mark Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re
Calderon, supra note 131, which Mr. Schuerman had signed on October 1, 2010, and which was duplicated
off-center and at an angle distinct from a covering caption page.
139
See Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re Becerra, No.
10-01517 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2011), ECF No. 12-1; Declaration of Mark G. Schuerman in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Apr. 29, 2011), ECF No. 12-5.
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representations in the financial statement were materially false.
Evidence of reliance by the original lender is required.140
The judge's reference to sloppy home lending practices in 2006 is arresting.
Ms. Becerra had defaulted and therefore offered no such evidence; Heritage had not
submitted any such evidence and would have been foolish to do so. Perhaps the
bankruptcy judge took judicial notice of sloppy home lending practices sub silentio.
A court may sua sponte take judicial notice of a fact not subject to reasonable
dispute if it is generally known within the court's territorial jurisdiction. 141 The
bankruptcy judge would be in good company were that her justification. The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit effectively did likewise one year
later in affirming a defendant's attorney fee award in another Heritage proceeding:
By identifying his Loan as a stated income loan . . . [the defendant]
implicated the now-discredited practice of indiscriminately making
mortgage loans without verifying the income stated on the loan
application. Lenders who made these so-called "liar's loans" often
did not care what income the borrowers listed and sometimes
actively encouraged misstatements of income. Indeed, the
economic incentives associated with originating such high-risk,
high-interest rate loans led some brokers to falsify loan applications
without the borrower's knowledge or active participation.142
Offered the opportunity to submit additional evidence against Ms. Becerra after
the court denied its motion, Heritage submitted the declaration of a vice-president
of a successor-in-interest to the originating lender stating that the originating lender,
consistent with industry practices, had relied on information provided by "an
applicant/borrower in his/her loan application through all stages of the underwriting
process."143 The judge again denied the motion for default judgment, finding the
supplemental declaration insufficient to establish the declarant's familiarly with the
140
Court's Request for Supplemental Brief on Justifiable Reliance in Motion for Default Judgment at 3, In
re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Aug. 18, 2011), ECF No. 19. To demonstrate misrepresentation, Heritage had
submitted a tax transcript showing that Ms. Becerra's earnings for 2006 were lower than earnings for that
year stated in her loan application. See Exhibit C to Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Default Judgment, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Apr. 29, 2011), ECF No. 12-4. The tax
transcript had been requested in January 2011, probably by Heritage. See id. at 2. Submission of a tax
transcript requested in 2011 suggests that the loan file did not contain a tax transcript ordered by the
originating lender prior to making the loan in 2006; that, in turn, implies that the originating lender, WMC
Mortgage Corp. ("WMC"), may not have taken any steps to verify Ms. Becerra's stated income. The
implication is fortified by the contents of WMC loan files that Heritage offered into evidence in two other
proceedings discussed infra notes 183–92 and accompanying text.
141
See FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(1), (c)(1), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R.
BANKR. P. 9017.
142
In re Machuca, 483 B.R. 726, 730 n.4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012). The court cited three law review articles
following its description of lending practices. Id.
143
Declaration of Robert Rothleder at 2, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Sept. 19, 2011), ECF No. 20-1.
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loan in question because the declarant had not been employed by or been an officer
of the originating lender at the time the loan was made.144 Undeterred, Heritage then
submitted additional briefing and the less frequently used form of the Schuerman
declaration.145 The judge again denied the motion, with the following comments:
Plaintiff's attempt to prove reliance by expert testimony is
insufficient to prove that the actual lender on the loan in question
followed any industry standard or relied on anything when the loan
was made. The only competent admissible evidence sufficient to
establish reasonable reliance in this case would be testimony from
an employee or underwriter of this loan by . . . [the originating
lender] in the relevant time frame. Plaintiff presents no such
evidence.146
The same bankruptcy judge denied a Heritage motion for default judgment in
another proceeding for the same reason.147 Two other bankruptcy judges shared the
same view. One denied a Heritage motion for default judgment in part because he
concluded that the Ganter and Schuerman declarations failed to demonstrate
reliance of the originating lender. 148 Another continued a hearing on a Heritage
motion for default judgment with the comment that Heritage's evidence, which had
included the Ganter and Schuerman declarations, had not demonstrated reliance.149
Heritage requested dismissal of each of these proceedings thereafter, presumably
because it didn't wish to speculate on and invest in the possibility of identifying,
locating, and procuring favorable testimony from someone personally

144
Denial of Judgment Against Defendant Maria Becerra at 2, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Dec. 20,
2011), ECF No. 21.
145
See Plaintiff's Second Supplemental Brief in Support of its Application for Default Judgment Against
Defendant Maria R. Becerra, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Apr. 3, 2012), ECF No. 22; Supplemental Brief
of Mark G. Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Second Supplemental Brief in Support of its Application for
Default Judgment Against Defendant Maria R. Becerra, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Apr. 3, 2012), ECF
No. 22-1.
146
Order Denying Entry of Default Judgment Against Defendant Maria Becerra at 2, In re Becerra, No.
10-01517 (Sept. 7, 2012), ECF No. 25.
147
See Order for Judgment Against Defendant Domingo Castaneda – Denied, In re Castaneda, No. 1001749 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2012), ECF No. 26. In a third proceeding pending before the same judge,
Heritage moved for a default judgment without a hearing. Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Default Judgment
by the Court, In re Villegas, No. 10-01526 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 24, 2011), ECF No. 13. The docket in the
proceeding reflects no ruling on the motion. See Docket, In re Villegas, No. 10-01526 (Aug. 31, 2010).
Twenty-two months later, the court issued an order to show cause why the matter should not be dismissed
for failure to prosecute. See Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute, In re Villegas, No.
10-01526 (Mar. 20, 2013), ECF No. 18. In response, Heritage moved to dismiss the case, presumably
because of the judge's earlier rulings denying a motion for default judgment in both the Becerra and
Castaneda adversary proceedings. See Request for Dismissal of Defendant Jose Asuncion Villegas, In re
Villegas, No. 10-01526 (Mar. 25, 2013), ECF No. 21.
148
See Civil Minutes, supra note 126, at unnumbered pages 4–5.
149
See Calendar Notes, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012), ECF No. 22.
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knowledgeable about underwriting procedures of the originating lender many years
earlier, at the time the loan was made.150
In striking contrast, eight bankruptcy judges granted a Heritage motion for
default judgment in eleven proceedings. As a result, Heritage obtained default
judgments, ranging from $49,722 to $147,710, totaling $867,996, approximately
forty-one percent of its recovery in the 117 proceedings in which it became entitled
to recover something.151 Heritage submitted the Ganter declaration alone in support
of three of the motions (as noted earlier) and also submitted the Schuerman
declaration, but no other evidence, in support of eight of the motions.152 Two of
these eight judges later seem to have changed their evaluation of the evidence,
concluding in Heritage proceedings against other defendants that the Ganter and
Schuerman declarations did not demonstrate the requisite reliance.153
150

Heritage requested dismissal of four other proceedings in which it had filed a motion for default
judgment, one before a hearing on the motion, one in which a bankruptcy judge denied the motion for
undisclosed reasons, one in which the bankruptcy judge denied the motion on grounds other than lack of
proof of reliance, and one in which the bankruptcy judge required additional briefing on issues not described
in the PACER-accessible documents.
151
The total excludes a default judgment for $147,500 later set aside after the defendant appeared,
discussed infra note 153.
152
See, e.g., Declaration of Mark Schuerman, In re Arana, No. 10-01575 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2011),
ECF No 8-1.
153
In one proceeding, Heritage submitted the Ganter declaration (attaching the loan application, note, and
tax transcripts, requested in 2011, reflecting the defendant's income for 2005–2007) and the Schuerman
declaration. See Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, supra note
124; Exhibits A–C to Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re
Arana, No. 10-01575 (Feb. 1, 2011), ECF Nos. 8-3, 8-4, 8-5; Declaration of Mark Schuerman, supra note
152. The court entered a default judgment for Heritage. Order of Judgment Against Josefina Arana, In re
Arana, No. 10-01575 (Apr. 18, 2011), ECF No. 12.
One month after that order, in another proceeding before the same judge, Heritage submitted identical
evidence (except that the tax transcripts, requested in 2011, covered only 2005–2006). See Declaration of
Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (May 10,
2011), ECF No. 13-1; Exhibits A–D to Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Default Judgment, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (May 10, 2011), ECF Nos. 13-2, 13-3, 13-4, 13-5;
Declaration of Mark Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re Moreno, No.
10-01685 (May 10, 2011), ECF No. 13-6. The docket reflects denial of the motion. Docket, In re Moreno,
No. 10-01685 (Nov. 19, 2010). Heritage renewed the motion eight months later, Plaintiff's Motion for
Default Judgment by Court, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (Jan. 9, 2012), ECF No. 17. Just before the hearing
on the motion Heritage filed the alternative form of the Schuerman declaration in support of the motion. See
Supplemental Declaration of Mark G. Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment
Against Defendant Joel R. Moreno, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (Apr. 4, 2012), ECF No. 21-3. The judge
continued a hearing on the motion with notes indicating that the supplemental papers did not demonstrate
actual reliance. Calendar Notes, supra note 149, at 2. In July 2012, Heritage again renewed its motion,
adding the declaration of an account executive working for the originating lender at the time of the loan to
Mr. Moreno who stated that the originating lender relied on the information provided by the "applicantborrower" in the loan application. See Declaration of Richard Turner in Support of Plaintiff's Amended
Default Judgment Against Defendant Joel R. Moreno at 2, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (July 9, 2012), ECF
No. 27-3. For unknown reasons, Heritage requested dismissal of the action before a hearing on the renewed
motion. See Request for Dismissal of Defendant Joel R. Moreno, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (Oct. 3,
2012), ECF No. 35.
In another proceeding, before a different bankruptcy judge, Heritage submitted only the Ganter declaration
(attaching the loan application and note). See Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Motion for Default
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Records from the eleven proceedings in which the court granted a Heritage
motion for default judgment reveal nothing about the judges' view of the
declarations or thinking on the issue of reliance.154 Perhaps some of these judges
thought a default judgment justified on the basis of Heritage's complaint, because
federal law permits default judgments on the basis of well pleaded complaints
alone. 155 If so, that would have been inconsistent with the decision of another
bankruptcy judge who dismissed a like Heritage complaint in another proceeding
for failure to plead fraud with the requisite particularity:
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misrepresented her income and/or
employment status and that the loan application submitted by
Defendant was "false." Again, however, the complaint is
completely devoid of any factual support for these conclusions. In
fact, it appears to the Court that Plaintiff has utilized a "canned"
complaint, which simply recites the elements of the causes of
action, and then concludes, without an iota of factual support, that
Defendant's conduct is wrongful and that the debt owed to Plaintiff
should be determined nondischargeable. While this method of
practice may save time and allow Plaintiff to file multiple
complaints against various defendants with little work, it is
ineffective in the face of a motion to dismiss. Thus, because the
complaint only offers "threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," it is

Judgment, In re Taber, No. 10-05395 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 13, 2011), ECF No. 10-2. At the hearing on the
motion, with respect to the issue of reliance, the judge stated only: "The creditor maintains that they
reasonably relied on it and there is a declaration to support that." Oral Argument at 1:35–1:41, In re Taber,
No. 10-05395 (June 30, 2011), ECF No. 15. The court then entered a $147,500 default judgment for
Heritage. Order and Judgment of Nondischargeability in Favor of Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C. and
Against Daniel Hawker Taber, supra note 129. The defendant thereafter moved to vacate the default and
default judgment on the grounds that he mistakenly believed that his bankruptcy counsel would be
responsible for responding to the complaint in the adversary proceeding. See Notice of Motion; Motion to
Vacate Default and Default Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 4, In re Taber, No. 1005395 (Nov. 18, 2011), ECF No. 19. The court granted the motion, vacated the judgment, and permitted the
defendant to answer the complaint. See Order Vacating Default Judgment, In re Taber, No. 10-05395 (Jan.
11, 2012), ECF No. 22.
Two months after having granted a default judgment in the proceeding against Mr. Taber, the same
bankruptcy judge denied a Heritage motion for summary judgment against defendant Oscar Trejo. See Order
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Trejo, No. 10-05392 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 8,
2011), ECF No. 20. In his order, the judge found the Ganter declaration (the only declaration offered in
support of the motion for default judgment against Mr. Taber) showed reliance only by Heritage and not by
the originating lender. See id. at 6. In the order, the judge also commented on the insufficiency of the
Schuerman declaration to demonstrate reliance by the originating lender, and also noted that the defendant
had signed the loan application one day after having signed the note, thus suggesting the possibility that the
originating lender had not relied on the loan application. See id. at 5–6.
154
See, e.g., Order of Judgment Against Josefina Arana, supra note 153; Order Granting Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 121.
155
See In re McGee, 359 B.R. 764, 772 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006).
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insufficient and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.156
Ipso facto judges granting a motion to dismiss for this reason would not have
entered a default judgment on the basis of the complaint alone, because the
complaint was not well pleaded. And those judges who denied a Heritage motion
for default judgment necessarily must have found allegations of like complaints
insufficient in themselves to establish liability because a claim for relief based on a
complaint that does not allege fraud with sufficient particularity may not support a
default judgment.157
b.   In Motions for Summary Judgment
Resolution of six motions for summary judgment reflect differences on the
issue of reliance comparable to those we have seen in resolution of Heritage's
motions for default judgment. Each of four bankruptcy judges considering a
defendant's motion for summary judgment found insufficient evidence of reliance.
Three of them granted the motion on that ground;158 a fourth granted the motion on
another ground 159 but later awarded attorney's fees to the defendant because of
insufficient evidence of reliance. 160 One of two bankruptcy judges considering a
Heritage motion for summary judgment likewise found insufficient evidence of
reliance and denied the motion, but a sixth bankruptcy judge granted the same
Heritage motion in another proceeding.161
Consider first the irreconcilable outcomes in the two proceedings in which
Heritage moved for summary judgment, one involving defendant Oscar Trejo and
the other involving defendant Yazmin Gonzalez. Heritage submitted the identical
Ganter and Schuerman declarations in each. 162 In each, Heritage also submitted
virtually identical unanswered requests for admissions.163 Factual statements made
156

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss With Leave to Amend and Without Oral Argument at 3, In re
Ferreira, No. 11-04053 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011), ECF No. 25 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)).
157
See In re Kubick, 171 B.R. 658, 661 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).
158
See Memorandum of Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 121, at 9–
10; Transcript of Oral Argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–8, In re Machuca, No.
10-05301 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012), ECF No. 51. The third of these three proceedings, involving
defendant Garrett Palines, is discussed infra note 192.
159
See infra text accompanying notes 241–44.
160
See infra text accompanying notes 170–75.
161
See infra text accompanying notes 162–69.
162
Compare Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the
Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, In re Trejo, No. 10-05392 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 27, 2011), ECF
No. 9-3, with Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the
Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011),
ECF No. 14 and Declaration of Mark Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or
in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Aug. 22, 2011), ECF No. 14.
163
Compare Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of Requests for Admission to Defendant Oscar Trejo, In
re Trejo, No. 10-05392 (July 25, 2011), ECF No. 15, with Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of Requests
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in an unanswered request for admissions are deemed admitted absent an answer or
objection to the request.164 The pro se defendants in each may have failed to answer
or object to the requests for admissions because of their ignorance of the manner or
importance of responding. Neither of the requests asked the defendant to admit
reliance by the originating lender. Instead, both requests, tracking the language of
section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, asked the defendant to admit obtaining
the relevant loan by false pretenses, through false representations, and through
fraud.165 But, as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held in an appeal of a
subsequent trial judgment in one of the two proceedings, those requests improperly
called for a legal conclusion and, in any event, failure to respond to them did not
establish reliance of the originating lender.166
Heritage submitted no other evidence in either proceeding. Neither pro se
defendant responded to the Heritage motion for summary judgment. One
bankruptcy judge denied the motion, finding neither the Ganter nor the Schuerman
declaration probative on the question of the originating lender's reliance.167 Heritage
fared no better at trial later in the same proceeding.168 The other bankruptcy judge
granted the motion without discussion of reliance, commenting instead that the
defendant had conceded all the essential elements for a claim under section
523(a)(2) (presumably because of a failure to respond to the request for admissions)
and that it was unfortunate, but no defense, that the defendant had been encouraged
by someone else to make false statements regarding her income.169
Consider next the conclusion of another bankruptcy judge in granting a
defendant's motion for attorney's fees after having granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment on another ground. Attorney's fees are available to a
defendant in a section 523(a)(2) adversary proceeding if, among other things, the
position of the creditor (in this case Heritage as successor-in-interest to the
originating lender) was not substantially justified. 170 Discussion of the issue of
reliance first arose at a hearing on a much earlier defense motion to dismiss the
complaint conducted by another bankruptcy judge to whom the proceeding
originally had been assigned. Although denying the motion to dismiss, that
bankruptcy judge cautioned Heritage that it would have to provide evidence of the
originating lender's actual reliance on misrepresentations in the loan application and
for Admission to Defendant Yazmin Gonzalez, Exhibit A to Declaration of Brad A. Mokri in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, In re Gonzalez,
No. 11-02088 (Aug. 22, 2011), ECF No. 14.
164
See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 36(a)(3), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R.
BANKR. PROC. 7036.
165
See, e.g., Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of Requests for Admission to Defendant Oscar Trejo,
supra note 163, at 7.
166
See In re Trejo, Ch. 7 No. NC-11-1652-HPaMk, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5881, at *9–10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
Dec. 20, 2012).
167
See Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 153, at 6.
168
See Order Following Trial, supra note 121, at 6–9.
169
See Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 121.
170
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (2012).

2016]

RANDOMLY DISTRIBUTED TRIAL COURT JUSTICE

389

that it faced formidable obstacles in doing so because the originating lender was
defunct.171 Heritage assured the court that it intended to do so.172 In opposition to
the defendant's later motion for summary judgment, Heritage offered the Ganter and
Schuerman declarations and the declaration of an assistant secretary to the
originating lender's successor-in-interest who stated that the originating lender
relied on information supplied by a borrower in a loan application. 173 Several
months later, at the hearing on the motion for attorney's fees, the second bankruptcy
judge assigned to the proceeding concluded that none of that evidence demonstrated
the originating lender's actual reliance.174 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel affirmed, stressing that justifiable or reasonable reliance necessarily required
a predicate showing of actual reliance.175 It is simply impossible to reconcile the
finding in this proceeding that Heritage had failed to demonstrate actual reliance of
the originating creditor with contrary implicit or explicit conclusions on the issue of
reliance previously discussed.
c.   At Trial
Comparing decisions on the issue of reliance in the five trials is more difficult
because the evidence of reliance in some differed from the evidence of reliance in
others. Heritage submitted the Ganter declaration and one of the two Schuerman
declarations in four of the five trials.176 Mr. Ganter testified in each of the five trials;
Mr. Schuerman did not appear at any of the five trials. 177 Judges in two of the
proceedings excluded Mr. Schuerman's declaration either because of Heritage's
failure to timely disclose him as a witness or because he failed to appear at trial for
cross-examination. 178 Judges in two other proceedings discounted but did not
technically exclude his declaration.179 Mr. Schuerman's absence from trial probably
reflected Heritage's decision not to pay travel expenses and expert witness fees.
More importantly, Heritage's failure to present him for trial reflected both its
171

Neither an audio recording nor a transcript of the hearing is available from PACER, but the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's opinion affirming the defendant's later motion for attorney's fees
mentions that caution. See In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).
172
Id.
173
See Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Summary Judgment, In re
Montano, No. 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2010), ECF No. 65-1; Declaration of Mark G. Schuerman
in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Montano, No. 1104008 (Mar. 7, 2010), ECF No. 65-2; Declaration of Diane Taylor, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Mar. 7,
2010), ECF No. 65-12.
174
See Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion to Reconsider of [sic] Court's Order Denying Request for
an Award Filed by Jesus Montano at 42–45, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Jan. 25, 2013), ECF No. 197.
175
See In re Montano, 501 B.R. at 115.
176
See, e.g., Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Declarations of Ben Ganter and Mark Schurmen [sic] in Support, supra
note 6. Heritage submitted the declarations in response to pretrial orders requiring that direct testimony be
given by declaration. See, e.g., Order Setting Trial Date and Establishing Procedures for Conduct of Trial at
1–2, In re Mabson, No. 10-02445 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011), ECF No. 18.
177
See, e.g., Transcript of Trial, supra note 121, at 3.
178
See, e.g., Memorandum, supra note 121, at 4–5.
179
See, e.g., Order Following Trial, supra note 121, at 3 n.3.
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implicit contention that his declaration in support of motions for default or summary
judgment had been unnecessary (as in the three motions for default judgment
granted without his declaration) and at the same time an implicit if unintended
concession that his declaration in support of motions for default or summary
judgment was either irrelevant or unpersuasive (as in other proceedings in which
bankruptcy judges found it insufficient).
Bankruptcy judges rendered a judgment for the defendant following trial in
three proceedings. Two of them found misrepresentations by the defendant in a
loan application but concluded that the originating lender's reliance on them was not
reasonable given its failure to heed "red flags" evident either from the loan
application or from other information obtained by the lender. Neither bankruptcy
judge explicitly addressed the predicate issue of actual reliance. 180 In the third
proceeding, involving defendant Rosa Vasquez, the bankruptcy judge found
insufficient proof of misrepresentations, insufficient proof of either actual or
reasonable reliance, and insufficient proof of intent to deceive.181
WMC Mortgage Corporation, an originating lender identified in many of the
Heritage adversary proceedings, made the loan to Ms. Vasquez. 182 Its loan file
reveals significant details that confirm the judge's conclusion on the issue of
reliance.183 Ms. Vasquez's loan application represented that she was self-employed
as the manager and partner of Nellie's Beauty Salon and earned $8200/month.184
The loan file included WMC's "Notice of Conditional Approval – Underwriting
Requirements," which required two sources of satisfactory evidence of a two-year
history of self-employment as a condition to approval of the loan.185 The loan file
also contained handwritten notes of an unidentified person on a "Pre-Funding SelfEmployment Audit" form that implied a telephone call to Nellie's Beauty Salon, but
nothing on the form identified the person called or the information gleaned from the
telephone conversation.186 The audit form also indicated an online verification of a
180

See Order Following Trial, supra note 121, at 7–9; Transcript of Trial, supra note 2, at 118–20.
See Memorandum, supra note 121, at 8–13.
182
See Exhibit B to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 2, In re
Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011), ECF No. 9-2.
183
Heritage submitted the loan file in advance of trial. See Exhibit Register and Notice Re Disposition of
Exhibits, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Feb. 23, 2012), ECF No. 41. The judge excluded the loan file from
evidence for failure to disclose it in a Joint Pretrial Order, Memorandum, supra note 121, at 5, and thus did
not consider the loan file in reaching her conclusion on the issue of reliance.
Contemporary news reports also suggested that employees of WMC may have knowingly approved loans
based on falsified paperwork and documentation. See, e.g., Michael Hudson, Fraud And Folly: The Untold
Story Of General Electric's Shady Subprime Debacle, DAILY BAIL (Jan. 19, 2012, 5:10 PM),
http://dailybail.com/home/fraud-and-folly-the-untold-story-of-general-electrics-shady.html; Michael Hudson
& E. Scott Reckard, GE lending unit said to be target of U.S. probe, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/20/business/la-fi-mortgage-probe-20120120.
184
See Exhibit Register and Notice Re Disposition of Exhibits, supra note 183, at 3–4.
185
See id. at Bates Stamp 000151.
186
See id. at Bates Stamp 000175. The audit form indicated a call to the telephone number that Ms.
Vasquez had provided on her loan application for Nellie's Beauty Salon. It hardly seems satisfactory
verification of self-employment to contact the very number given by the applicant for her place of self181
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"Beauty Salon" license, 187 but separate documents in the file showed an online
verification only of Ms. Vasquez's cosmetology license and a copy of the
cosmetology license. 188 No document in the loan file demonstrated, as WMC's
underwriting requirements required, that Ms. Vasquez owned Nellie's Beauty Salon
or that she had a two-year history of self-employment.
WMC's notice of conditional approval also required that "INCOME MUST BE
CONSISTENT WITH PROFESSION AND EXPERIENCE." 189 The loan file
contained a copy of an IRS form 4506-T, authorizing the IRS to supply a tax
transcript for Ms. Vasquez. 190 Line 5 of the form, authorizing mailing of the
transcript to a third party, was blank,191 and the loan file contained no tax transcript.
The loan file thus suggested that WMC did not use the transcript request form to
verify her income prior to approving the loan. Nor is there any evidence in the loan
file to suggest that WMC attempted to verify that her stated income was consistent
with her experience as a cosmetologist or with her ownership of a beauty salon.192

employment unless the verification indicates that the caller in fact reached a business named by the loan
applicant and spoke with someone other than the applicant (e.g. an employee). The audit form did neither.
187
See id.
188
See id. at Bates Stamp 000167, 000178.
189
Id. at Bates Stamp 000151.
190
Id. at Bates Stamp 000114.
191
Exhibit Register and Notice Re Disposition of Exhibits, supra note 183, at Bates Stamp 000114.
192
A notice of conditional loan approval and a pre-funding audit form from yet another WMC loan file,
submitted by Heritage in an adversary proceeding against defendant Garrett Palines, influenced the decision
of another bankruptcy judge to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment for failure of Heritage to
demonstrate reliance by the originating lender. Mr. Palines' loan application had claimed employment as an
administrator, at $18,869/month, by Primetimers Senior Resources. See Exhibit A to Declaration of James
Michel in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim of Plaintiff Heritage Pacific
Financial at 3, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2012), ECF No. 27-4. WMC's
conditional loan approval required that his income be consistent with his profession and experience and also
that it must be validated. See Exhibit B to Declaration of Diane Taylor for WMC Mortgage Corporation in
Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, In re Palines, No. 1203063 (Oct. 11, 2012), ECF No. 33-2. Handwritten entries in WMC's pre-funding audit form implied a
telephone contact with Mr. Palines' employer to verify his stated income, Exhibit D to Declaration of Ben
Ganter in Support of the Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, In re Palines, No.
12-03063 (Oct. 5, 2012), ECF No. 30-4, but, as the bankruptcy judge noted, those entries neither responded
to a preprinted question on the form asking whether the information agreed with the information stated in the
"1003" (the loan application) nor stated Mr. Palines' income. See Oral Argument at 19:25–20:25, In re
Palines, No. 12-03063 (Oct. 19, 2012), ECF No. 36. Heritage submitted no other evidence from the loan file
demonstrating either verification of income or that the stated income was consistent with Mr. Palines'
profession and experience. Heritage did submit the declaration of a person employed by WMC at the time of
the loan who stated that she was fully familiar with its business operations. See Declaration of Diane Taylor
for WMC Mortgage Corporation in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Oct. 11, 2012), ECF No. 33. She had reviewed the loan
application and notice of conditional loan approval and stated that WMC, consistent with standard practices
in the loan industry at the time and with its own business practices, had relied on the information in the loan
application. See Declaration of Diane Taylor for WMC Mortgage Corporation in Support of Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra, at 2. The bankruptcy judge was not
persuaded, concluding from the other evidence that WMC had not followed its own procedures. See Oral
Argument, supra, at 11:20–11:40.
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The evidence from the Vasquez loan file suggesting WMC's failure to adhere to
the requirements of its own conditional loan approval is reminiscent of comparable
evidence evaluated in an adversary proceeding filed several years earlier that a
California bankruptcy court termed "a poster child for some of the practices that
have led to the current crisis in our housing market."193 The court concluded that the
borrowers had misrepresented their financial condition to National City Bank, that
their representations were material, and that they had made the representations with
knowledge of their falsity and intent to deceive.194 But the court entered judgment
for the borrowers because of its conclusion that the bank's reliance on the
misrepresentations was not reasonable, including because the bank deviated from its
own internal guidelines on loan approval.195
The guidelines called for a third party vendor to evaluate the reasonableness of
stated income based on job type, tenure, and geographical location, but the bank
submitted no evidence that such an evaluation had been undertaken. 196 The
guidelines also permitted the bank to verify self-employment with a letter from a
CPA.197 The bank introduced such a letter, on the letterhead of a CPA, but the court
found it insufficient because the bank presented no evidence verifying the identity
or credentials of the person signing the letter.198
Bankruptcy judges rendered a judgment for Heritage following trial in two
proceedings. Each of them inferred both actual and reasonable reliance of the
originating lender. In one, the court found that defendant Julian Tovar falsely
represented self-employment as the owner of a landscaping business, falsely
represented his income, and falsely represented his intention to occupy real property
being purchased with the loan proceeds, and did so with intent to deceive.199 WMC
made the loan to Mr. Tovar.200 Heritage had not attempted at trial to demonstrate
WMC's stated underwriting practices or its compliance with them in processing Mr.
Tovar's loan application,201 even though Heritage bore the burden of proof on the
issue of reliance. 202 Its only witness was Ben Ganter. 203 Neither his declaration
193

In re Hill, Ch. 7 No. 07-41137 TT, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1668, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 28, 2008).
Id. at *10.
195
Id. at *13–17.
196
Id. at *5, 14.
197
Id. at *5–6.
198
Id.
199
See In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *35 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
Aug. 3, 2012).
200
Id. at *2.
201
See Transcript of Trial, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2011), ECF No. 36.
202
Mr. Tovar's counsel argued at trial that Heritage failed to introduce evidence demonstrating that WMC
took any steps to verify information provided by Mr. Tovar in connection with his loan application. See
Transcript of Trial, supra note 201, at 61–62. At trial, Mr. Tovar's counsel did not introduce any evidence of
WMC's underwriting procedures or any evidence from the loan file that might have proven WMC's failure to
comply with its underwriting procedures. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 201, at 61–62. There are no
PACER-accessible records that would reflect whether Mr. Tovar's counsel requested or was provided a copy
of the loan file in discovery.
203
Transcript of Trial, supra note 201, at 6–32.
194

2016]

RANDOMLY DISTRIBUTED TRIAL COURT JUSTICE

393

(submitted in lieu of direct examination) nor his subsequent in-person testimony
claimed any personal knowledge of those underwriting practices.204 The bankruptcy
judge nonetheless inferred WMC's actual and reasonable reliance on Mr. Tovar's
misrepresentations from four documents that Heritage introduced into evidence at
trial, or so the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel concluded in affirming the
judgment on appeal.205
Heritage had introduced an occupancy statement, indicating Mr. Tovar's
intention to occupy the real property, a bank statement, a "Latin Services"
statement, and a landscaping brochure. 206 The "Latin Services" statement was a
letter from an alleged tax preparer describing preparation of Mr. Tovar's tax returns
and describing Tovar's self-employment for two years in the landscaping business
under the name Tovar Landscaping Design.207 It did not refer to a CPA, was signed
by a person whose printed name and signature was illegible, and was unsupported
by any evidence that the originating lender had verified the nature of "Latin
Services" or the identity or credentials of the person signing the letter,208 gaps in
evidence that had led another bankruptcy judge to find a comparable letter
inadequate proof of reliance. 209 The landscaping brochure advertised Tovar's
alleged landscaping business. 210 To the bankruptcy judge, the mere presence of
these documents in the loan file must have indicated that the originating lender
actually looked at and relied on the documents. This inference stands in marked
contrast to the contrary view of another bankruptcy judge, noted earlier, who denied
a Heritage motion for default judgment because, given industry practices at the
time, she was unwilling to presume that anyone even looked at documents
submitted in support of loan applications.211
In affirming the judgment against Mr. Tovar, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
stated that a creditor's actual verification of information is not an explicit
requirement of reasonable reliance,212 but nonetheless seemed to require a lender's
compliance with its own underwriting practices when it also noted that "[n]othing in
the record suggests that WMC did not adhere to normal business practices . . . ."213
In so commenting, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel appears to have implicitly, and
incorrectly, shifted the burden of proof on that factual question to Mr. Tovar.

204
See Declaration of Ben Ganter, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Sept. 7, 2011), ECF No. 22; Transcript of
Trial, supra note 201, at 6–32.
205
See In re Tovar, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *32–34.
206
Id. at *5.
207
See Plaintiff's [Amended] Exhibit List and Exhibits 1–13 at 47, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. Sept. 8, 2011), ECF No. 26.
208
Plaintiff's [Amended] Exhibit List and Exhibits 1–13, supra note 207, at 47.
209
See supra note 197–98 and accompanying text.
210
Plaintiff's [Amended] Exhibit List and Exhibits 1–13, supra note 207, at 49.
211
See supra text accompanying note 140.
212
In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *33 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 3,
2012).
213
Id. at *34.

394

ABI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24: 351

A second bankruptcy judge rendering judgment for Heritage following trial,
against defendant Duane Mabson, drew an inference of reasonable reliance from
evidence less compelling than the evidence submitted in the trial involving Mr.
Tovar. Heritage again submitted the declaration of Ben Ganter, through which it
introduced the loan application and promissory note, 214 and made Ben Ganter
available for cross-examination.215 It submitted no other documents from the loan
file. It also submitted the declaration of Mark Schuerman,216 but the court excluded
his declaration because Heritage did not present him for cross-examination at
trial. 217 Heritage called Mr. Mabson as a witness to admit that he was a straw
buyer.218 Heritage also submitted an unanswered request for admissions, but, like
the requests for admissions earlier discussed,219 they did not include a request to
admit that the originating lender had relied on misrepresentations.220 On the issue of
reliance, the bankruptcy judge said only that "[t]he creditor's reliance was
reasonable under the circumstances," and "these representations [of income and
intended use of the property] were of a type that would be reasonably relied upon
by a lender in the original transaction . . . ."221 Necessarily the judge also inferred
actual reliance. Mr. Mabson did not appeal.
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has stated that "[t]o sustain . . .
an inference [of actual reliance], an inquiry must be made concerning the extent to
which the creditor considered the misrepresentation a substantial factor in
influencing its decision (i.e., actual reliance or reliance in fact)."222 It is difficult to
reconcile that requirement with the inferences of actual reliance drawn by the
bankruptcy judges in the proceedings against Mr. Tovar and Mr. Mabson. We
might nevertheless attribute affirmance of the judgment against Mr. Tovar to the
standard of appellate review requiring that an appellate court affirm a factual
finding unless clearly erroneous.223

214
See Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Declarations of Ben Ganter and Mark Schurman [sic] in Support, supra note
6, at 11–14.
215
See Transcript of Trial, supra note 121, at 8–129.
216
See Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Declarations of Ben Ganter and Mark Schurman [sic] in Support, supra note
6, at 15–20.
217
See Transcript of Trial, supra note 121.
218
Id. at 12–13.
219
See supra text accompanying notes 163–66.
220
The Request for Admissions, submitted as a trial exhibit, is not available from PACER. Heritage
referred to it in its trial brief and stated that the defendant did not respond to the requests. See Plaintiff's Trial
Brief, Declarations of Ben Ganter and Mark Schurman [sic] in Support, supra note 6, at 9. The trial brief
thereafter included a document captioned "Facts Admitted Into Evidence." Id. at 21–24. The thirty-two facts
recited in that document conform to Requests for Admission used in other proceedings that are on file with
the author. It is unclear whether the bankruptcy judge credited the admissions on the issue of reliance. He
stated: "The requests for admissions admit . . . virtually all of the salient facts necessary to establish a claim
of nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2)(B)." Transcript of Trial, supra note 121, at 15.
221
Transcript of Trial, supra note 121, at 17.
222
In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 117 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).
223
See In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
Aug. 3, 2012).
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2.   California's Limitation on Fraud Claims
We have previously seen that the prohibition of deficiency judgments in section
580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure should have defeated Heritage's
contract claim in its (non-bankruptcy) federal district court action against Susana
David and that the preclusion of certain fraud claims in section 726(g) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure properly defeated its fraud claim against her.224
Section 726(g) likewise should have defeated every Heritage adversary proceeding
in which the loan to the defendant was secured by single-family, owner-occupied
residential real property occupied by the defendant.
Sections 726(f) and (h) of the California Code of Civil Procedure permit the
real property secured lender or its successor in interest to assert a fraud claim
against a borrower notwithstanding any anti-deficiency rule,225 but section 726(g) of
the California Code of Civil Procedure precludes such fraud claims unless the loan
exceeds $150,000 as adjusted annually, commencing on January 1, 1987, to the
U.S. Department of Labor Consumer Price Index.226 As of February 24, 2010, the
date on which Heritage filed its first adversary proceeding in a California
bankruptcy court, the inflation-adjusted amount was $287,926.06. 227 None of the
notes on which Heritage sued exceeded that amount. Because "[t]he validity of a
creditor's claim is determined by rules of state law," 228 Heritage did not have a
legitimate fraud claim under section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code in any case
subject to the protection of section 726(g) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure.
Yet defendants failed to claim the protection afforded by section 726(g) in all
but a few of the very large number of adversary proceedings in which it was
224

See supra text accompanying notes 30–36.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(f), (h) (2012).
226
See id. § 726(g). A California court of appeal has held that California's anti-deficiency statutes did not
preclude actions for fraud. See Guild Mortg. Co. v. Heller, 239 Cal. Rptr. 59, 63–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). In
1985, the California legislature codified that result in section 7460 of the California Financial Code (with
respect to state or federally chartered savings and loan associations), in section 779 of the California
Financial Code (now section 1301 of the California Financial Code) (with respect to state and nationally
chartered banks), and in section 15102 of the California Financial Code (with respect to credit unions). Id. at
64–65. Each of those provisions, however, included the same exception, described by the court in Guild
Mortg.: "Because of evidence that fraud was most prevalent in loans for large, single-family dwellings,
multiple-unit dwellings and commercial property, the legislation exempted loans secured by single-family
residential real property, when the property is actually occupied by the borrower and the loan is for
$150,000 or less." Id. at 64; CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 7460(b), 1301(b), 15102(b) (2012). Sections 726(f) and (g)
of the California Code of Civil Procedure apply the same rules, including the same exception, to other
persons and entities authorized by California to make or arrange loans secured by real property who
originate any loan secured directly or collaterally, in whole or in part, by a mortgage or deed of trust on real
property. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(f), (g) (2012). The 1987 Guild Mortg. opinion did not mention
sections 726(f) and (g) because the legislature added those sections that very year. Act of July 22, 1987,
1987 Cal. Legis. Serv. 117–20 (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726).
227
CPI
Inflation
Calculator,
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (accessed Feb. 18, 2015).
228
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 283 (1991).
225
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potentially applicable. PACER-accessible records displayed loan applications in
175 of the 218 adversary proceedings. Loan applications in ninety-four of them
stated an intention to use loan proceeds to purchase a primary residence,229 loan
applications in two others stated an intention to use loan proceeds to construct a
primary residence, 230 a loan application in one concerned the purchase of a
manufactured home,231 and a loan application in one other stated an intention to use
loan proceeds for debt consolidation.232
Defendants failed to claim the protection against fraud claims in all but three of
this subset of ninety-eight proceedings. An attorney represented the defendant in
sixty-two of this subset of proceedings, asserting an anti-deficiency defense in
thirteen of them. This defense was technically inapplicable because Heritage was
claiming fraud, not a deficiency, but at least the defense aimed in the right direction.
Only three attorneys referred to a bar on fraud claims. 233 One of twenty pro se
defendants in this subset of proceedings asserted an anti-deficiency defense but
none of them asserted the bar on fraud claims.234 Sixteen defendants in this subset
of proceedings failed to appear.235
Defendants also failed to claim the protection against fraud claims in all fiftynine proceedings in which the loan application stated an intention to use loan
proceeds to refinance a primary residence. An attorney represented the defendant in
thirty-seven of these proceedings, asserting an anti-deficiency defense in four of
229

See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 10, In re Alcala, No. 10-72258
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan 22, 2011), ECF No. 1; Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at
9, In re Garcia, No. 11-41772 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 13, 2011), ECF No. 1.
230
See Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Needham, No. 1102562 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011), ECF No. 1; Exhibit A to Exhibit Index, In re Thomas, No. 1002716 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 1, 2011), ECF No. 26.
231
See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 9–13, In re Hernandez, No. 1105058 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2011), ECF No. 1.
232
See Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Moreno, No. 1101113 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011), ECF No. 1.
233
In one proceeding, the defendant, pro se through trial, first claimed the protection on appeal after
retaining counsel. See Appellee's Brief at 28–33, In re Trejo, No. 11-1652 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012),
ECF No. 20. In a second, the defendant erroneously relied on the comparable protection of section 7460(b)
of the California Financial Code (applicable to savings and loan associations but not to the loan originator
involved in the proceeding). See First Amended Answer at 5–6, In re Rodriguez, No. 11-05222 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 17. In a third, the defendant also initially relied on the protection of section
7460(b) of the California Financial Code, Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 12–14, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012), ECF No. 57-1, but
discussed section 726(g) in oral argument on a motion for summary judgment. See Transcript of Oral
Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment at 43–49, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Feb. 23, 2013), ECF
No. 206.
234
See, e.g., Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Heng, No. 1102255 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011), ECF No. 1 (indicating intent to purchase primary residence) and
Answer, In re Heng, No. 11-02255 (May 19, 2011), ECF No. 3 (asserting anti-deficiency defense).
235
See, e.g., Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Phillips, No.
10-62464 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2010), ECF No. 1 (indicating intent to purchase primary residence),
and Entry of Default and Order Re: Default Judgment Procedures, In re Phillips, No. 10-62464 (Mar. 28,
2011), ECF No. 11 (indicating failure to appear).
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them. Although anti-deficiency legislation arguably did not, at the time, apply to
loans used to refinance a primary residence and thus may not have protected these
defendants against a bankruptcy dischargeable contract claim,236 section 726(g) is
not so limited. It bars fraud claims without regard to the purpose of the loan as long
as the loan to the defendant is secured by single-family, owner-occupied residential
real property occupied by the defendant at the time of loan origination. None of the
fourteen pro se defendants in this subset of proceedings asserted the section 726(g)
protection. Eight defendants in this subset of proceedings failed to appear.
In sum, defendants failed to claim the section 726(g) protection against fraud
claims in 154 of the 157 proceedings in which it was potentially available, not
counting an additional unknown number of the forty-three proceedings in which
information about use of the real property used to secure the loan was unavailable
through PACER.237
There may have been good reason not to do so in some of the proceedings.
Recall that in most of its complaints Heritage alleged on information and belief that
the defendant had misstated employment, income and/or intended use of the
property as a principal residence. 238 The protection against fraud claims would
have been unavailable to those whose loan applications misrepresented the
defendant's occupancy of the residence. Indeed there were at least four such
defendants. 239 Attorneys representing some defendants may have learned these
236
Frequently cited dictum from one California appellate court decision states the inapplicability of the
purchase money anti-deficiency rule to such loans. See Bank of Am. v. Wendland, 126 Cal. Rptr. 549, 553–
54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). That dictum has been subject to scholarly criticism, Charles B. Sheppard,
California Code of Civil Procedure 580b, Anti-Deficiency Protection Regarding Purchase Money Debts:
Arguments for the Inclusion of Refinanced Purchase Money Obligations Within the Anti-Deficiency
Protection of Section 580b, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 245 (1997), and was disapproved in Helvetica
Servicing, Inc. v. Pasquan, 277 P.3d 198, 203–04 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (criticizing what it termed the
"flawed" reasoning of Wendland). In 2012, California legislation explicitly extended anti-deficiency
protection to credit transactions involving the refinancing of a purchase money loan that would have been
protected under section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 2012 Cal. Stat., Ch. 64, § 1
(originally adding 580b(c)), and then 2013 Cal. Stat, Ch. 65, § 2 (SB 426) (renumbering 580b(c) as 580b(b)),
now codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b(b) (2012).
237
Loan applications in fifteen proceedings specified an investment purpose for the loan, loan applications
in two proceedings did not specify a purpose for the loan, and the loan application erroneously attached to
the complaint in one proceeding pertained to a person other than the named defendant.
238
See, e.g., Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 3, In re Alvarez, No. 10-01575 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010), ECF No. 1.
239
In each of two proceedings in which the loan application represented a defendant's intention to use the
loan proceeds for purchase of the defendant's primary residence, the defendant admitted to having acted as a
straw buyer on behalf of a third person. See Stipulation for Mutual Release and Dismissal of All Claims
Against Defendant Evaristo Aguirre at 2, In re Aguirre, No. 10-05371 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2012), ECF
No. 30; Deposition of Vien Keomeuangson, Exhibit E in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment or in the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment at 20, 29, 32, In re Keomeuangsong, No. 1102525 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2012), ECF No. 15.
In a third proceeding, a defendant declared that he purchased the subject real property for his sister. See
Declaration of Garrett Palines in Support of Defendant's Motion for a Reasonable Attorney's Fee at 1–2, In
re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2012), ECF No. 39-1. Mr. Palines' loan application had
represented his intention to purchase a primary residence. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt, supra note 40, at 8.
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disqualifying facts from their clients and thus properly decided not to claim the
protection afforded by section 726(g). The data does not reveal the number of other
defendants whose loan applications falsely represented the defendant's intended use
of the property and we thus cannot know the extent to which the actual adversary
proceeding outcomes diverged from outcomes that section 726(g) would have
commanded had it been asserted, pursued, and factually substantiated. It seems
reasonable to suppose, however, that the loan applications of at least some, perhaps
many, defendants, including those represented by an attorney, truthfully represented
the defendant's intended use of the property as a personal residence.240 In every such
proceeding, if the property was a single-family residence, the section 726(g)
protection should have been claimed and, if pursued, should have led to dismissal
without any payment to Heritage.
The section 726(g) protection led to dismissal of only one adversary
proceeding, involving defendant Edgar Montano. Heritage's complaint included its
standard information and belief allegation that the defendant's loan application had
misstated employment, income, or intended use of property as a primary
residence.241 The bankruptcy court found that Mr. Montano used the property as a
primary residence242 and granted Mr. Montano summary judgment on the basis of
section 726(g). 243 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the
judgment on appeal in an opinion both describing the relationship between section
726(g) and California's anti-deficiency legislation and rejecting Heritage's

In a fourth proceeding, the defendant admitted that the residence was not his primary residence and that
his brother and brother's family lived in the property. See Joint Pretrial Order at 2, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011), ECF No. 18.
In two other proceedings, Heritage submitted evidence that the defendant had applied for multiple loans
within a short period of time yet had represented in each loan application an intention to use loan proceeds to
purchase a primary residence. From that evidence, it drew the reasonable inference that the defendant used
loan proceeds from at least one of the loans to acquire investment property. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Final Default Judgment by the Court Against Defendant
Emmanuel Kongnyuy Nsahlai at 6, In re Nsahlai, No. 11-02983 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012), ECF No.
11-1; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Final Default Judgment by the Court Against
Maria Taraz at 5, In re Taraz, No. 10-90456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. July 29, 2011), ECF No. 21-1.
In yet another proceeding, Heritage's complaint for recovery on two separate loans attached two loan
applications, each signed by the defendant on December 5, 2006. One loan application stated a purpose to
purchase a primary residence located at one address and the other loan application stated a purpose to
purchase a primary residence located at another address. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt at 9–18, In re Rodriguez, No. 11-05222 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 24, 2011), ECF No.
1.
240
For example, one bankruptcy court found the defendant to have truthfully represented his intention to
use loan proceeds to purchase a primary residence in a proceeding in which Heritage attempted to prove the
contrary. See, e.g., Memorandum of Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note
121, at 4.
241
See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 2–3, In re Montano, No. 11-04008
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2011), ECF No. 1.
242
Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 233, at 106–07.
243
Id. at 104–08; see Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Montano, No. 11-04008
(June 5, 2012), ECF No. 121.
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arguments that section 726(g) was inapplicable. 244 The bankruptcy court's order
granting summary judgment, entered on June 5, 2012, 245 and the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel's opinion, filed on November 1, 2013, came too late to offer
ammunition to the many defendants whose adversary proceedings had already been
resolved.
For example, we may infer that section 726(g) might have rescued at least one
pro se defendant from the $61,417 summary judgment entered against her on
September 20, 2011. The bankruptcy court's judgment rested on its finding that
Heritage had established a prima facie case based on misrepresentation of
income.246 Heritage's moving papers evidenced only misrepresentation of income
and employment but did not include evidence of a false representation about the
intended use of the real property securing the loan. 247 The absence of any such
evidence lent credence to the defendant's prose addendum to her pro se answer to
the complaint, in which she described her agent's advice to her about funding the
purchase of a home.248 She didn't oppose the motion for summary judgment, likely
unaware of how to do so or what to argue.
In contrast, the failure of another pro se defendant to assert the protection
afforded by section 726(g) proved harmless because a different bankruptcy court
concluded after trial that Heritage had failed to establish the requisite reliance on
misrepresentations of income and employment.249 Prior to reaching that conclusion,
the court sua sponte addressed and dismissed an anti-deficiency defense after
finding that the defendant had truthfully represented his intention to live in the
property purchased and had in fact lived in the property for an extended period of
time.250 It correctly stated that Heritage would have no right to a deficiency under
section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure absent a claim for fraud.251 It
was unaware, however, that section 726(g) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure limited fraud claims and thus incorrectly concluded that Heritage's fraud
244

See In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 106–12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).
See Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (June 5,
2012), ECF No. 121.
246
See Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 121.
247
See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or
in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment at 5–6, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug.
22, 2011), ECF No. 14. Heritage's memorandum claimed that the defendant admitted a false representation
concerning her intended use of the property to be acquired with loan proceeds by failing to respond to
Heritage's request for admissions. See id. Although a matter is deemed admitted if the party to whom a
request for admissions is directed fails to timely respond to them, FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(3), made applicable
to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. BANKR. P. 7036, Heritage's request for admissions, attached
as an exhibit to its memorandum, had not asked the defendant to admit that she misrepresented her intended
use of the property. See Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of Requests for Admission to
Defendant Yazmin Gonzalez, Exhibit A to Declaration of Brad A. Mokri in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 163.
248
See Answer to Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt and for Judgment at unnumbered third
page, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Mar. 10, 2011), ECF No. 7.
249
Order Following Trial, supra note 121, at 6–8.
250
Id. at 2, 4.
251
Id. at 4.
245
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claim could survive the defense.252 Recall that the federal district court in the David
case made the opposite error: it was aware of the limit on fraud claims and
dismissed Heritage's fraud claim but overlooked the basic protection of section
580b and granted Heritage a judgment on a contract claim.253
The dispositions in the remaining proceedings involving pro se defendants who
might have asserted but did not assert the protection afforded by section 726(g)
were mixed.254 The defendant was absolved of any payment obligation in ten of
these proceedings, primarily through a stipulated settlement with Heritage. In
sixteen others, however, pro se defendants stipulated to pay various amounts to
Heritage in settlement of its claims. Agreed amounts, payable in monthly
installments, ranged from a low of $2,000 in one proceeding to a high of $25,000 in
another proceeding and ranged as a percentage of Heritage's claim from a low of 2.6
percent in one proceeding to a high of 23.4 percent in another proceeding. In nine
of these proceedings, however, the defendant also agreed to liability in a greater
amount upon default in installment payments, ranging in amount from a low of
$20,000 in one proceeding to a high of $77,677 in another proceeding and ranging
as a percentage of Heritage's claim from a low of 20.3 percent in one proceeding to
a high of 51 percent in another proceeding.255
The mix of dispositions in the proceedings in which an attorney represented a
defendant 256 and in which the protection afforded by section 726(g) might have
been but was not asserted resembles the mix of dispositions in proceedings
involving pro se defendants. The defendant was absolved of any payment
obligation in twenty-nine such proceedings, primarily through a stipulated
settlement with Heritage, but in two proceedings by summary judgment257 and in a
252

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 30–36.
The number of dispositions reported here and in the ensuing two paragraphs of the text excludes
dispositions of proceedings for which PACER-accessible documents did not provide information about a
defendant's represented use of the real property securing the loan.
255
Bankruptcy courts dismissed two other such proceedings upon Heritage's request based on settlements
for undisclosed amounts and dismissed two others whose underlying bankruptcy case had been dismissed.
Heritage obtained a $59,154 default judgment of nondischargeability in another such proceeding against a
defendant who failed to cooperate or appear after having informally agreed to a settlement in mediation.
256
These proceedings include eighty-one proceedings in which an attorney represented the defendant
throughout the proceeding and thirteen others in which an attorney represented the defendant for only a
portion of the proceeding.
257
In one of these two proceedings, the defendant submitted as an exhibit a mortgage interest statement
showing the address of the defendant to be the same as the property identified in his loan application,
evidence that would have supported a defense based on section 726(g). See Exhibits A and C to Declaration
of Debtor in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Machuca, No. 10-05301 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
Oct. 27, 2011), ECF No. 24-3. But neither the defendant's answer nor his motion for summary judgment had
asserted the defense. See Answer, In re Machuca, No. 10-05031 (Aug. 2, 2011), ECF No. 18; Motion for
Summary Judgment, In re Machuca, No. 10-05031 (Oct. 27, 2011), ECF No. 24. In ruling on an appeal from
a later order granting the defendant's motion for attorney's fees, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel noted that
the bankruptcy court had granted the summary judgment because of insufficient evidence of the originating
lender's actual or reasonable reliance on alleged misrepresentations in the loan application. See In re
Machuca, 483 B.R. 726, 731–32 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).
253
254
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third proceeding following trial.258 In sixty others, however, the defendants agreed
to pay various amounts to Heritage in settlement of its claims. Agreed amounts,
payable in monthly installments, ranged from a low of $500 in one proceeding to a
high of $32,000 in another proceeding and ranged as a percentage of Heritage's
claim from a low of 0.9 percent in one proceeding to a high of 48.3 percent in
another proceeding. In forty-eight of these proceedings, however, the defendant
also agreed to liability in a greater amount upon default in installment payments,
ranging in amount from a low of $5,000 in one proceeding to a high of $143,693 in
another proceeding and ranging as a percentage of Heritage's claim from a low of
7.6 percent in one proceeding to a high of 100 percent in three other proceedings.259
We see a similar mix of dispositions in twenty-two proceedings in which a
defendant failed to appear and in which the protection afforded by section 726(g)
might have been but was not asserted. Bankruptcy courts entered a default
judgment in the amount of Heritage's claim in six such proceedings, ranging in
amount from $51,710 to $147,710. Heritage dismissed seven other such
proceedings after the bankruptcy court either denied a motion for default judgment,
required additional evidence or briefing in support of a motion for default judgment,
or took no action in response to a motion for default judgment. Bankruptcy courts
dismissed eight such proceedings upon Heritage's unexplained request for dismissal
and one such proceeding when the underlying bankruptcy case was dismissed.
3.   Heritage's Standing to Sue
A defense asserting Heritage's lack of standing to assert a fraud claim would
have been available to every defendant whose note was acquired through
agreements that did not also expressly assign a claim for fraud, regardless of the
purpose for which the defendant used the loan funds. Although derived from
California common law long predating the adversary proceedings, this defense did
In the other proceeding, neither the defendant's answer nor his motion for summary judgment asserted a
defense based on section 726(g). See Answer to Complaint for Determination of Dischargeability of Debt, In
re Martinez, No. 11-01131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2011), ECF No. 4; Notice of Motion and Motion for
Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Adjudication of the Facts, In re Martinez, No.
11-01131 (Jan. 30, 2012), ECF No. 12. In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
bankruptcy court acknowledged the defendant's evidence that the defendant had used the subject property as
his primary residence but did not consider the protection afforded by section 726(g). See Memorandum of
Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 121, at 4.
258
In this proceeding, neither the defendant's answer nor her trial brief asserted the defense afforded by
section 726(g). See Answer to Adversary Proceeding, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb.
28, 2011), ECF No. 12; Defendant's Trial Brief, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Jan. 5, 2012), ECF No. 26. In
the party's joint pre-trial order, Heritage indicated an intention to prove the defendant's misrepresentation of
income but not any misrepresentation of her intent to use loan proceeds to purchase a primary residence. See
Joint Pretrial Order, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Oct. 7, 2011), ECF No. 22. In granting judgment for the
defendant following trial, the bankruptcy court found insufficient evidence to support several of the elements
of a claim under section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, but did not consider the protection afforded by
section 726(g). See Memorandum, supra note 121, at 7–13.
259
In one outlier, for reasons not evident from PACER-accessible documents, the defendant stipulated to
pay Heritage 170% of its claim upon his default in monthly payments.
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not gain traction publically until the California appellate court's Monroy decision in
March 2013, discussed previously,260 resolving one of the Heritage lawsuits in state
court.
In 1941, the California Supreme Court stated in National Reserve Co. v.
Metropolitan Trust Co. that the unqualified assignment of a contract with no
indication of the intent of the parties vests in the assignee the assigned contract "and
all rights and remedies incidental thereto."261 It continued:
Unless an assignment specifically or impliedly designates them,
accrued causes of action arising out of an assigned contract,
whether ex contractu or ex delicto, do not pass under the
assignment as incidental to the contract if they can be asserted by
the assignor independently of his continued ownership of the
contract and are not essential to a continued enforcement of the
contract.262
In Monroy, Heritage could not demonstrate that assignment of a note to it also
specifically assigned a fraud claim first held by the originating lender. That left for
resolution the question of whether the fraud claim represented a right incidental to
the note or whether the fraud claim could be asserted independently by the
originating lender and was not essential to enforcement of the note. The National
Reserve opinion did not answer that question because the plaintiff in that case, an
assignee of contract rights, was not asserting a fraud claim.263 Prior to Monroy, no
reported California opinion had considered the question in the context of
assignment of a note. The closest analogy, perhaps, was either a 1936 opinion
holding that assignment of a note and chattel mortgage did not assign a right to
recover for conversion of some of the collateral prior to the assignment264 or a 2005
opinion holding that a divorce agreement awarding a husband's interest in a
diamond ring to the wife did not transfer to the wife the husband's claim for fraud
against a jeweler.265
Only two bankruptcy judges considered this lack of standing defense. One took
the matter under submission following a hearing, but the parties settled soon
thereafter, making a ruling on the motion unnecessary. 266 The other bankruptcy

260

See supra text accompanying notes 61–75.
Nat'l Reserve Co. of Am. v. Metro. Trust Co. of Cal., 112 P.2d 598, 602 (Cal. 1941).
262
Id.
263
Id. at 599–600.
264
See Millner v. Lankershim Packing Co., 56 P.2d 1295 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936).
265
See Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of Cal., Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 233, 237–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
266
Defendant Rosa Ortiz had filed a motion to dismiss that raised the standing issue. See Defendant Rosa
Maria Ortiz's Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 9–10, In re Ortiz, No. 11-01018 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. Oct. 20, 2011), ECF No. 19. The court held a hearing on the motion. See Docket, In re Ortiz, No. 1101018 (Jan. 10, 2011). Before the court ruled on the motion, the parties stipulated to a judgment of
261
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judge considered the defense in two separate proceedings, both before publication
of the Monroy decision. In the first, involving defendant Elia Garcia, the judge
rejected the defense, ruling that assignment of the note carried with it assignment of
the fraud claim.267 A year later, in the Montano proceeding previously discussed,268
the judge lent a more sympathetic ear to the defense in a hearing on a defendant's
motion for summary judgment, but granted the motion for summary judgment on
another ground.269 In one proceeding, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
declined to consider the defense because the pro se defendant had not raised it at
trial.270 In all but one of the other proceedings in which a defendant had explicitly
articulated the defense, the parties settled before its consideration by the court.271
Whether one is persuaded by the bankruptcy judge's rejection of the defense or
by the California appellate court's later vindication of the defense in Monroy, the
truly remarkable fact is that defendants articulated the defense so rarely by way of
answer, motion, or otherwise. They did so in only six of the 137 adversary
proceedings in which an attorney represented a defendant. Not surprisingly, only
one of forty-six pro se defendants raised the defense.272 To be sure, twenty-eight
other defendants represented by attorneys and two pro se defendants asserted lack
of standing as an affirmative defense in an answer, but one cannot determine
whether the boilerplate language used to express the defense in these additional
proceedings derived from the specific theory described here, from some other
theory, or simply from a form book or standardized answer.273
Had it been pressed with the defense in each proceeding, Heritage might not
have produced documents that assigned a claim for fraud to Heritage. It failed to do

nondischargeability and installment payments from Ms. Ortiz to Heritage totaling $6000. See Stipulation for
Entry of Judgment and Settlement Agreement, In re Ortiz, No. 11-01018 (Jan. 11, 2012), ECF No. 34.
267
See Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration at 2–4, In re Garcia, No. 11-04150 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
Jan. 10, 2012), ECF No. 47.
268
See supra text accompanying notes 241–44.
269
See Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 233, at 85–89, 104–08.
270
See In re Trejo, Ch. 7 No. NC-11-1652-HPaMk, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5881, at *19–20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
Dec. 20, 2012).
271
See, e.g., Joint Pretrial Order at 2, In re Navarette, No. 11-01167 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012), ECF
No. 15 (raising defense) and Stipulation for Settlement and Dismissal of the Adversary Proceeding, In re
Navarette, No. 11-01167 (Sept. 10, 2012) (settlement of $4,500).
272
See Answer at 4 (6th page of document), In re Heng, No. 11-02255 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 19, 2011),
ECF No. 7.
273
Typical of the boilerplate language is the following: "AS A SEPARATE AND DISTINCT
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, Debtor alleges that plaintiff lacks standing to bring the causes of action
asserted in the complaint." Answer to Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Credit Card Debt at 6, In
re Garcia, No. 11-04150 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 14, 2011), ECF No. 6. One suspects that the defense, when
first asserted in that answer, was drawn simply from a standardized answer, because the caption of the
answer had not been edited to reflect its probably more common use in defending against a claim for fraud in
the use of a credit card. See id. at 1. Yet the defendant's attorney was one of the few who later relied on the
specific theory described in the text. See Motion Setting Aside Order Denying Motion for Summary
Judgment and Entering Order Granting Summary Judgment Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105 and/or FRBP 9024
at 3–8, In re Garcia, No. 11-04150 (Nov. 22, 2011), ECF No. 37.
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so in Monroy even though directed to do so by the trial court judge. 274 Its
unwillingness to do so in that case might have reflected the existence of a nondisclosure covenant in a written agreement between it and its immediate
transferor. 275 Or, more generally, the agreements between Heritage and its
immediate transferors simply might not have included language expressly assigning
fraud claims. 276 Moreover, in the many cases in which Heritage obtained a note
from entities other than the originating lender, it may not have even been able to
locate and retrieve documents reflecting transfer of the notes from the originating
lender to an initial transferee or between intermediate transferees. Unless and until
Heritage produced documents reflecting transfers of both the notes and associated
fraud claims, every defendant should have asserted and pursued the defense.
Yet even if one assumes that Heritage's right to enforce a note implicitly carried
with it a right to assert an associated fraud claim, Heritage would still have lacked
standing to assert its fraud claim if it could not prove a "right to enforce" the note
within the meaning of Article 3 of the California Commercial Code.277 Heritage had
a right to enforce a note if it was either a holder of the note or, under a shelter
principle, if it was a non-holder in possession of the note who had the rights of a
holder.278 It might have had difficulty doing so in the many proceedings involving
notes that passed from an originating lender to Heritage through intermediate
parties.
In many proceedings, Heritage submitted copies of a note or an allonge
suggesting that it did not qualify as a holder of the note in its own right. Consider
the following example. In a proceeding against defendants Numan and Lynda
Ilayan, Heritage attached to its complaint a copy of a note issued by the Ilayans to
First Magnus Financial Corporation (the originating lender) and a copy of an
allonge showing an indorsement of the note from Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P.
("Cadlerock") to Heritage.279 Nothing on either the note or the allonge showed an

274
See Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Monroy, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 34–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013), petition for
review denied, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6631 (Cal. July 31, 2013).
275
Copies of each of three agreements pursuant to which Heritage purchased loan obligations, on file with
the author, contain identical provisions prohibiting the parties from disclosing terms of the transaction (other
than the identity of the seller and general nature of the transaction) without the written consent of the other
except to the extent, among other things, that disclosure is required under applicable court order.
276
See supra text accompanying notes 69–74.
277
A few defendants obligated themselves through contracts, such as a home equity line of credit, that did
not constitute negotiable instruments. In such cases, Heritage would still have had to demonstrate its right to
enforce the contract by virtue of one or more transfers of rights under the contract. See Cockerell v. Title Ins.
& Trust Co., 267 P.2d 16, 20–21 (Cal. 1954). Such a transfer could be made by indorsement even though the
contract was not a negotiable instrument. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1459 (2012).
278
See CAL. COM. CODE § 3301 (2012) (defining a person who is entitled to enforce an instrument). A
promissory note is an instrument. Id. § 3104(a), (b), (e). The Commercial Code also gives certain persons
without possession of an instrument a right to enforce it, id. § 3301, but Heritage seems to have had
possession of the relevant notes.
279
See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 13–16, In re Ilayan, No. 11-04079
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2011), ECF No. 1.
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indorsement by the originating lender. 280 Absent such an indorsement, neither
Cadlerock nor Heritage became a holder of the note.281
Heritage held possession of the note, however, and would still have been
entitled to enforce the note were it able to demonstrate that it held the rights of a
holder deriving from a transfer from the originating lender to Cadlerock. Unlike
negotiation, "transfer" does not require indorsement but does require delivery of the
note for the purpose of giving the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the
note.282 Transfer even without negotiation vests in the transferee any right of the
transferor to enforce the instrument. 283 Suppose for example that the originating
lender, a holder of the note and therefore someone with a right to enforce it, had
without indorsement delivered the note directly to Heritage for the purpose of
giving Heritage the right to enforce the note. Ben Ganter's declaration or testimony
about Heritage's acquisition of the note would have sufficed to establish those facts
because he was personally familiar with Heritage's business practices involving the
purchase of notes.284 Heritage would thus have taken the rights of the originating
lender to enforce the note. But assuming that Mr. Ganter lacked personal
knowledge of how or from whom Cadlerock acquired the note, his testimony could
not establish that Cadlerock took the rights of the originating lender through
transfer. Heritage might have been unable to locate a witness with the relevant
personal knowledge or unable to obtain documentary evidence demonstrating
transfer from the originating lender to Cadlerock. Missing that link, as to which it
had the burden of proof,285 it could not have established that Cadlerock and in turn
Heritage took the rights of the originating lender to enforce the note. Without the
right to enforce the note, either as a holder in its own right or as transferee from
someone entitled to enforce the note, Heritage could not have demonstrated that it
was the real party in interest and thus would have lacked prudential standing to
assert its claim.286

280

See id.
The originating lender was a holder of the note because the note was issued to it. CAL. COM. CODE §
3201; U.C.C. cmt. 1 (2012). A person acquiring the note from the originating lender could only itself
become a holder through negotiation of the note by a holder. CAL. COM. CODE § 3201(a) (2012). Unless
payable to bearer, negotiation requires indorsement by the holder. Id. § 3201(b). None of the notes held by
Heritage were payable to bearer. Accordingly, Cadlerock was not a holder, and Heritage was not a holder
because Cadlerock's indorsement was not an indorsement by a holder.
282
CAL. COM. CODE § 3203(a).
283
Id. § 3203(b).
284
See In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *27–28 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
Aug. 3, 2012).
285
CAL. COM. CODE § 3308; U.C.C. cmt. 2.
286
See In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011). Heritage likely derived ownership rights in the
notes it purchased, but ownership rights alone would not have given it rights to enforce the notes against the
defendants. For an explanation of that distinction and for discussion of the relevant provisions of Articles 3
and 9 of the Commercial Code, see James M. Davis, Paper Weight: Problems in the Documentation and
Enforcement of Transferred Mortgage Loans, and a Proposal for an Electronic Solution, 87 AM. BANKR. L.
J. 305, 322–30 (2013).
281
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Not a single defendant articulated this version of the lack of standing defense in
any of the adversary proceedings in which it would have been appropriate,
although, as noted earlier, a relatively small number of defendants asserted what
likely was a boilerplate lack of standing defense.287 The oversight was harmless in
the forty-nine proceedings in which Heritage and the defendant settled for no
payment to Heritage. 288 Mr. and Mrs. Ilayan, however, agreed to a $30,000
judgment of nondischargeability, as to which Heritage would refrain from execution
if the Ilayans timely paid $4000 through eight monthly installment payments.289 At
least fourteen other defendants who could have asserted this lack of standing
defense nonetheless entered settlement agreements with Heritage, in amounts
ranging from $5,000, satisfied by timely installment payments totaling $500,290 to
$30,000, satisfied by timely installment payments totaling $10,000. 291 One
additional defendant who could have asserted the defense suffered a default
judgment of $77,037.62,292 but a defense asserting lack of prudential standing is
waived if not asserted.293 Conceivably, the defense may also have been available to
multiple other defendants who agreed to judgments of nondischargeability, but
PACER-accessible documents do not provide information sufficient to reach that
conclusion.294
287

See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 16–19, In re Mena, No. 1105239 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2011), ECF No. 1 (incomplete chain of indorsements), Answer to
Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Mena, No. 11-05239 (Sept. 9, 2011), ECF No. 4 (no
standing defense plead), and Stipulation for Dismissal of all Claims Against Defendants Joaquin Mena and
Rafaela Mena, In re Mena, No. 11-05329 (Apr. 9, 2012), ECF No. 17 (mutual releases).
289
See Settlement Agreement and Stipulation at 1–2, In re Ilayan, No. 11-04079 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept.
27, 2011), ECF No. 13.
290
See Settlement Agreement and Stipulation at 1, 3, In re Gomez, No. 10-03197 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept.
12, 2011), ECF No. 17. Ms. Gomez had signed a note payable to Oak Hill Mortgage, Inc.; an allonge
showed an indorsement to Heritage from Argent Mortgage Co., L.L.C., but neither the note nor the allonge
showed an indorsement by Oak Hill Mortgage, Inc. or anyone else to Argent. See Plaintiff's Exhibit List at
9–11, In re Gomez, No. 10-03197 (Sept. 6, 2011), ECF No. 14.
291
See Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Settlement Agreement at 3, In re Han, No. 11-02042 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. July 14, 2011), ECF No. 18. Mr. Han and his spouse had signed a note payable to Ownit Mortgage
Solutions, Inc.; an allonge showed an indorsement to Heritage from Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P., but
neither the note nor the allonge showed an indorsement by Ownit Mortgage Solutions, Inc. or anyone else to
Cadlerock. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at un-paginated Exhibit B, In re
Han, No. 11-02042 (Jan. 20, 2011), ECF No. 1.
292
See Order for Judgment Against Defendant Manuel Orozco, In re Orozco, No. 11-02166 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. Nov. 15, 2011), ECF No. 15. Mr. Orozco had signed a note payable to Mortgage Lenders Network
USA, Inc.; an allonge showed an indorsement to Heritage from Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P., but neither
the note nor the allonge showed an indorsement by Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc. or by anyone else
to Cadlerock. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 11–13, In re Orozco, No.
11-02166 (May 5, 2011), ECF No. 1.
293
See Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2000).
294
To be conservative in counting the number of proceedings in which this standing defense could have
been successfully asserted, this Article did not count those proceedings in which the note included no
indorsement whatsoever, either in its body or in an allonge. In those proceedings, the defense would have
been unavailable if the originating lender had delivered the note directly to Heritage and this Article assumes
that it did so. This Article also excludes from the count those proceedings in which an allonge may not have
288
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PLAYING WITH A STACKED DECK

A.   Heritage's Hand
Heritage acquired debt for a song and then litigated with a deck stacked in its
favor. A paradigm "repeat player," 295 it litigated with superior information and
litigated efficiently by mass-producing documents for filing. Given its apparent
acquisition and litigation costs, it offered attractive settlements to defendants faced
with the prospect of significant attorney's fees and ruinous liability.
Two attorneys in one law firm (assisted by an unknown number of special
appearance attorneys and office staff) represented Heritage in virtually all of the
adversary proceedings. Another attorney represented Heritage throughout five of
the adversary proceedings and represented Heritage only initially in fifteen other
adversary proceedings. In contrast, one hundred twenty-six different attorneys
represented defendants in the roughly sixty-three percent of proceedings in which
the defendant was represented by counsel (either throughout the proceeding or in
part of the proceeding). 296 The consolidation of representation on one side and
dispersal of representation on the other afforded Heritage the advantage of superior
information as the filings unfolded over time. With each additional filing, Heritage
could learn from and adapt to defense positions and arguments advanced or judicial
reactions expressed, whereas almost every attorney representing a defendant
appeared in only one adversary proceeding and thus confronted issues posed by the
litigation only once.297
Many attorneys may have been unaware of Heritage's comparable proceedings
against others either in bankruptcy court, federal district court, or state court. Sound
representation might have counseled a PACER name search for Heritage in one or
more California federal district or bankruptcy courts, but an attorney's time
gathering, sorting, reviewing, assimilating, and evaluating information and ideas
available from PACER-accessible records filed in other Heritage adversary
proceedings would have been prohibitively expensive to most defendants. Even if
somehow affordable, the attorney could not assure the client in advance that the
attorney's fees to be incurred for that work would be a good investment because the
been effective to show a complete chain of indorsements. An allonge is effective only if affixed to the note.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3204(a) (2012). In one Heritage proceeding, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel expressed some skepticism about whether the allonge was affixed to the note. See In re Tovar, Ch. 7
No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *17–20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012).
295
Professor Marc Galanter coined this term in Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 97 (1974).
296
When a law firm of two or more attorneys represented a defendant, this figure counts only one attorney
even if more than one attorney associated with the firm appeared in the proceeding.
297
Only eleven attorneys represented a defendant in two of the adversary proceedings and two other
attorneys represented a defendant in three of the proceedings. The nature and range of results in those
twenty-eight adversary proceedings resemble the nature and range of results in the adversary proceedings
generally.
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attorney could not know in advance what a PACER search might reveal. Moreover,
an attorney could not have learned of Heritage's state court actions through PACER.
Learning about them would have been serendipitous and learning from them would
have been extraordinarily time consuming and expensive.
This information asymmetry might have been mitigated somewhat in an
unknown number of cases in which, through professional associations, ad hoc
informal networks, or other communication, a defendant's attorney obtained
information and ideas from attorneys representing other defendants. 298 But that
benefit to any one defendant would have been random and almost certainly would
have been unavailable to pro se defendants. Many if not most pro se defendants
would have been unaware of the PACER resource, unable to afford the cost of
downloading records (typically $.10/page),299 or unable to recognize, sift through,
understand, or effectively utilize relevant PACER documents filed by Heritage in
other adversary proceedings. In proceedings in which defendants appeared pro se,
therefore, Heritage benefitted from vastly superior information.
One example of the information asymmetry is particularly noteworthy. Recall
that in one of Heritage's federal district court actions the court ruled on October 17,
2011 that Heritage's fraud claim was barred by California's limitation on fraud
claims.300 Heritage did not mention that unpublished (but PACER-accessible) ruling
in any document filed in the three adversary proceedings it initiated after October
17, 2011 or in the many adversary proceedings still open on that date, but the failure
of its attorneys to do so did not violate California's rules of professional
responsibility. 301 Likely no defendant's attorney was aware of the ruling because
none mentioned it in any document filed in any adversary proceeding. The absence
of a professional obligation of Heritage's lawyers to disclose that ruling exacerbated
the information asymmetry.
Consider another subtler example, derived from four Heritage adversary
proceedings pending before the same judge. In two of them, the bankruptcy judge
either denied a Heritage motion for default judgment or required Heritage to

298

The author, for example, supervised law students representing three such defendants and in the process
soon learned of the mass filings and gained useful insights from two acquaintances, one a local bankruptcy
attorney and the other a local consumer law attorney.
299
See PACER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, https://www.pacer.gov/documents/pacer_policy.pdf (last
updated Aug. 18, 2014).
300
See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
301
California's rules of professional conduct prohibit only citation of a decision that has been overruled,
knowing its invalidity. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-200(D) (1992). American Bar Association
Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from knowingly failing "to disclose to the tribunal
legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel . . . ." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2002).
Putting aside the question of whether an unpublished federal district court ruling was legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction, California lawyers may consider but are not bound by the A.B.A. Model Rules. See
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-100(A) (1992). Moreover, the limitation on fraud claims may not
have been available in some of those proceedings, as discussed supra text accompanying notes 238–40.
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provide further briefing in support of its motion. 302 In each, Heritage thereafter
requested dismissal of the proceeding.303 In the other two, defendants represented
by attorneys stipulated to judgments of nondischargeability and payments to
Heritage, in one of them agreeing to pay $18,000 in installments (9 percent of the
claim) or $36,000 (18 percent of the claim) upon default in installment payments.304
One wonders whether the attorneys representing the two defendants who settled
were aware of the settlement leverage to be derived from the judge's skepticism in
response to the two motions for default judgment.
Consider a final example of the information asymmetry. In his deposition in a
state court action, Ben Ganter testified that in acquiring portfolios of loans he
(perhaps he meant Heritage) did not inquire of the originating lenders what they
relied upon in making loans.305 From this obscure testimony, known to Heritage and
the deposing attorney, but likely by few others, it might be reasonably (if not
conclusively) inferred that Heritage had no evidence of reliance by originating
lenders when it filed its adversary proceedings. If Heritage were thereafter unable
to acquire and present such evidence and the adversary proceeding were to be
dismissed for that reason, Heritage might be liable for the defendant's attorney's fees
because it lacked substantial justification for initiating the proceeding. 306
Knowledge of that evidence would therefore have provided additional powerful
settlement leverage to defendants.
In addition to its informational advantage, Heritage's mass production of
pleadings, motions, legal memoranda, and declarations afforded Heritage
economies of scale unavailable to defendants. Its mass production is evident from
comparison of documents it filed in any one proceeding with corresponding
documents that it filed in other proceedings, 307 from obvious errors in some
302

See Minute Order, In re Garibay, No. 10-90480 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012), ECF No. 28; Memo
re Order: Request for further documentation or further action, supra note 91.
303
See Request for Dismissal of Adversary Proceeding Against Defendant Antonio Anguiano Garibay, In
re Garibay, No. 10-90480 (Mar. 15, 2012), ECF No. 29; Request for Dismissal of Adversary Proceeding
Against Defendant Darrell E. Cox, supra note 91.
304
See Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, In re Calderon, No. 11-90402
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. June 5, 2012), ECF No. 18; Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment,
In re Dekoekkoek, No. 11-90491 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012), ECF No. 16.
305
See Oral Deposition of Benjamin A. Ganter, supra note 6, at 47.
306
See infra notes 326–29 and accompanying text.
307
As we have seen, Heritage mass produced complaints. See supra note 112. With minor adjustments to
each, Heritage also filed other documents multiple times, including memoranda in support of motions for
default or summary judgment, pre-trial conference statements, trial briefs, settlement agreements, and
judgments. Compare Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment by the Court, In re Garibay, No. 10-90480
(Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 17, with Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment by the Court, In re Cox, No. 1190357 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012), ECF No. 17; compare Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, In re
Lemus, No. 10-01092 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010), ECF No. 13, with Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary
Judgment, In re Hellawell, No. 10-03100 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 27, 2011), ECF No. 11-1; compare
Plaintiff's Trial Brief; Declarations of Brad A. Mokri, Ben Ganter and Mark Schuerman in Support Thereof,
In re Villatoro, No. 11-01315 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2011), ECF No. 8, with Plaintiff's Trial Brief, In re
Mercado, No. 10-02770 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011), ECF No 21.
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documents that might naturally have resulted from mass production,308 and by the
sheer volume of documents, numbering in the thousands, filed by the three lawyers
representing Heritage over a twenty-six month period. The mass production
prompted one bankruptcy judge to express his concern, at an initial status
conference, about "boilerplate language" in form complaints and to allude to similar
concerns shared by his colleagues.309 The mass production probably also extended
to written discovery propounded by Heritage, as is suggested by its apparent use of
a standardized request for admissions as a device to prove its allegations. 310 As
308

Examples of errors abound. Most troubling are the multiple instances in which Heritage named a
husband and wife even though only one of the parties had applied for the loan and signed the loan
application and promissory note. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 1,
19, 22, 25, In re Driscoll, No. 11-02333 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 10, 2011), ECF No. 1 (signatures on loan
application and note by Robert Driscoll but not by co-defendant Darlene Driscoll). That error was
compounded in the multiple instances in which both such co-defendants stipulated to entry of a judgment
against both, even if represented by an attorney. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of
Judgment, In re Driscoll, No. 11-02333 (Dec. 8, 2011), ECF No. 10. This error might or might not be
harmful, depending upon whether the person applying for the loan and signing the loan documents did so
prior to his or her marriage to the co-defendant and whether the spouse who did not apply for the loan or
sign the loan documents had separate property. In California, the community estate of the spouses is liable
for the debts of either spouse incurred prior to or during marriage, CAL. FAM. CODE § 910 (2012), but the
earnings of a married person are not liable for a debt incurred by the person's spouse prior to marriage, id. §
911(a), and the separate property of a spouse is not liable for a debt incurred by the other spouse either prior
to or during the marriage. Id. § 913(b)(1).
One complaint alleged defendant Eduardo Guerrero's misrepresentations in an attached loan application
but attached a loan application signed by Eduardo Ramirez. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt at 2–3, 10–13, In re Guerrero, No. 11-01223 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2011), ECF
No. 1.
In another complaint, Heritage alleged the defendant's misstatement of income on an attached loan
application that included no statement of income. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of
Debt at 3, 10, In re Chacon, No. 11-05133 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2011), ECF No. 1.
In three other complaints, Heritage alleged that the defendant misrepresented an intention to purchase
property as a primary residence (a standard allegation) even though the attached loan application clearly
stated only an intention to refinance investment property. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt at 4, 9, In re Louie, No. 11-01128 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011), ECF No. 1.
In another proceeding, Heritage supported its motion for summary judgment against defendant Miguel
Arredondo with an alleged unanswered request for admissions served on him in which Request for
Admission No. 17 asked the defendant to admit execution of a promissory note by a person named Yolanda
Lemus. See Exhibit A, Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of Request [sic] for Admissions to
Defendant Miguel Arredondo at 4, In re Arredondo, No. 10-09065 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011), ECF No.
20.
Heritage also mass-produced proposed orders submitted to the court for signature on the basis of a
stipulated judgment. One entered judgment "for the principal amount of fifteen-thousand dollars ($52,000)."
Order (Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment) at 1, In re Diaz, No. 11-02682 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2011), ECF No. 6. Yet the settlement agreement called for a judgment of $25,000, less
payments made by the defendant pursuant to the stipulation, but provided that Heritage would not enforce
the judgment if the defendant timely paid installments totaling $4320. See Stipulation and Settlement at 1–2,
In re Diaz, No 11-02682 (Oct. 24, 2011), ECF No. 5.
309
See Case Management Conference at 2:45–3:06, In re Makmuri, No. 11-04111 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept.
6, 2011), ECF No. 12.
310
PACER typically does not capture discovery documents because the parties file neither discovery
requests nor discovery responses unless in support of or in opposition to a motion or as trial exhibits.
Heritage filed them in several such instances. See, e.g., Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of
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noted earlier, Heritage also submitted multiple boilerplate declarations of an expert
opining about lending practices relating to stated income loans.311
B.   The Defendants' Hand
Attorneys representing defendants were not without benefit of some boilerplate
of their own. Answers filed by many included affirmative defenses, bereft of
factual detail, ranging from the plausible (statute of limitations, laches) to the
expected (waiver, estoppel, unclean hands) to the irrelevant (accord and
satisfaction, arbitration and award, contributory negligence, license, statute of
frauds). 312 At the extreme, one attorney filed an answer listing thirty-four
affirmative defenses, the last preserving unknown latent defenses. 313 This
standardized, over inclusive (and thus protective) response to a complaint is
understandable given the short time period within which a defendant must file an
answer to a complaint. Even when a plaintiff stipulates to an extension of time (a
typical professional courtesy), the defendant's attorney has insufficient time and
information to thoroughly consider the nature of appropriate defenses to be pleaded.
After issuance of summons, a thirty-day clock starts ticking.314 Once served, the
defendant may need time to decide whether to retain an attorney and time to find a
suitable attorney willing to schedule an appointment. The attorney may not be able
to schedule an immediate initial appointment and the defendant may need time after
the appointment to digest information (including information about attorney's fees)
and choose among options. Once retained, the attorney may be adding the matter to
an already crowded professional calendar, limiting the amount of time that can
initially be devoted to the matter. Discovery that might reveal the most appropriate
defenses cannot begin until after the parties have conferred and developed a
proposed discovery plan.315
But front-end time constraints and lack of information do not explain, or at least
do not justify, an attorney's failure to aggressively dispute the originating lender's
reliance or to discover and pursue defenses based on California's limitation on fraud
claims or Heritage's lack of standing. We must look elsewhere for explanation.
Requests for Admission to Defendant Yazmin Gonzalez, Exhibit A to Declaration of Brad A. Mokri in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment,
supra note 163.
311
See supra text accompanying notes 130–37.
312
See Answer at 5, In re Ballesteros, No. 11-04045 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011), ECF No. 7.
313
See Answer at 2–9, In re Chepetsky, No. 10-90443 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2011), ECF No. 14. This
answer included the following potpourri of clearly irrelevant defenses: plaintiff's consent to the defendant's
actions; plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages; res judicata; lack of consideration for contractual claims; lack
of definite terms in a contract between plaintiff and defendant; assumption of the risk; set off; plaintiff's
previous rejection of defendant's tender of performance; the defendant's conduct was privileged or justified;
contracts between plaintiff and defendant have been rescinded. Id. at 2–8.
314
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(a).
315
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1), (f), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7026.
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Least flattering would be that some attorneys may lack the degree of knowledge or
skill necessary to discover, formulate, or effectively communicate relatively
obscure and complex legal arguments. This probably would not explain an
attorney's failure to aggressively dispute the originating lender's reliance but might
explain the failure to discover and pursue the two defenses. The law governing the
reliance requirement in dischargeability actions under section 523(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code is relatively uncomplicated,316 and discovery of the underwriting
practices applied by an originating lender to a specific defendant's loan application
would require only a request for production of the relevant loan file and perhaps a
deposition of the originating lender's person most knowledgeable.
California's limit on fraud claims, however, is buried, incongruously, at the end
of a lengthy section in a chapter of the California Code of Civil Procedure devoted
to actions for the foreclosure of mortgages,317 and a clear understanding of its scope
and ramifications requires an understanding of what the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate panel described as a "maze of elaborate and interrelated foreclosure and
antideficiency statutes in California relating to the enforcement of obligations
secured by interests in real property."318 One lack of standing defense required a
carefully crafted argument based on obscure California common law,319 the other
required understanding and application of interrelated provisions of Article 3 of the
Commercial Code,320 and both required an understanding of federal procedural law
governing prudential standing.321 We can readily imagine that a legal team drawn
from a blue chip law firm representing a Heritage defendant pro bono would have
discovered and advanced these defenses. We can reasonably question whether
every attorney could do so.
The cost of legal representation offers a second, hopefully more common,
explanation. Given financial constraints on a defendant's ability to fund litigation, it
would not have been surprising for a defendant's attorney to have allocated most of
a limited amount of billable time to settlement negotiations and little to detailed
legal research, analysis, or briefing. At least some of the defendants in the
adversary proceedings likely would have been unable to fund extensive litigation; a
significant number of debtors continue to experience financial distress following
bankruptcy 322 and the potential attorney's fees could have been substantial. 323
316
We have seen, however, that the relevant analysis requires an understanding of the right of an assignee
to assert the reliance of the originating lender, see supra note 17, an understanding that the nature of the
required reliance (reasonable or justifiable) depends upon the nature of the misrepresentation claimed, see
supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text, and an understanding of the applicable burden of proof, see
supra note 106 and accompanying text.
317
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (2012) (in Part 2, Title 10, Chapter 1).
318
In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 107 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).
319
See supra notes 261–65 and accompanying text.
320
See supra notes 277–85 and accompanying text.
321
See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
322
See Porter & Thorne, supra note 98, at 88–93.
323
One defendant's attorney reported charging his client $1750 for seven hours of work on a discovery
motion ($250/hr.). See Notice of Motion and Motion to Compell [sic] Answers to Discovery and for
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Confronted with the possibility of liability on a five or six-figure claim and
substantial attorney's fees fighting the claim, burdened with the emotional weight of
the litigation, and seeking finality, represented defendants more often than not
settled with Heritage well before trial for a small percentage of its claim.324 Heritage
surely recognized the leverage this afforded.
Pro se defendants, in contrast, needn't have worried about attorney's fees.
Perhaps for that reason, or others, pro se defendants among all districts obtained nopayment settlements at a slightly higher rate (thirty-six percent) than defendants
among all districts represented by attorneys (thirty-one percent).325 Heritage may
Attorney's Fees at 3, In re Gutierrez, No. 10-03250 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2011), ECF No. 26. Another
defendant's attorney reported charging his client $1375, at a rate of $250/hr., for preparing a motion for
sanctions under Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See Defendant's Notice of Motion
and Motion for Sanctions under FRBP 9011 at 11, In re Louie, No. 11-01128 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 25,
2011), ECF No. 9. He also reported a total of $9,737.95 in attorney's fees and costs incurred from the
inception of the case. See id.
A third defendant's attorney explained that his standard practice in representing defendants sued in
adversary proceedings is to charge a $2500 retainer to be charged at an hourly rate of $300/hr., which he
described as $75–$100 below the going market rate in the Central District of California. See Telephone
Interview (June 25, 2014) (attorney's name withheld to protect anonymity). He commented that this retainer
would typically cover work for sixty to ninety days. Id. Thereafter, he attempts to keep his receivables below
$2000/client, including by offering small discounts for prompt payment. Id. About four to six months before
an anticipated trial, pursuant to his retainer agreement, he requires clients to pay an additional retainer for
trial. If the clients can't or won't pay, he substitutes out or, if necessary, files a motion to withdraw. Id.
324
The attorney for one defendant reported: "[T]hough I was looking forward to trial against Heritage for
my Bankruptcy clients, they recently decide [sic] to settle their claim at $8000 no interest, payable at
$167.00 per month. Given the total claim was about $127,000, I guess the settlement was reasonable." Email from attorney Peter Manning to attorney William Kennedy (Feb. 2, 2012) (on file with author).
Conversations with three defendants revealed the same story. One defendant who vehemently denied
misrepresenting his income and who had sent Heritage relevant tax transcripts as proof, nonetheless settled a
$140,662 claim for $20,016 payable over five years, because his attorney had advised that attorney's fees
could well exceed the amount of the settlement offer and had advised that Heritage had a small chance of
prevailing in the proceeding. See Telephone Interview with Defendant (Aug. 29, 2014) (name withheld to
preserve anonymity). A second defendant retained an attorney for a $1000 initial retainer. Heritage,
believing the defendant to be unrepresented, telephoned the defendant to offer a twelve percent settlement on
a $65,895 claim. In a five minute conversation, the parties settled the claim for $6000, payable over fortytwo months. The defendant believed the proceeding to lack merit, but settled because he believed he would
have to pay at least the settlement amount in attorney's fees and that he could conceivably lose in the
litigation. See Telephone Interview with Defendant (Oct. 7, 2014) (name withheld to preserve anonymity). A
third defendant settled a $124,555 claim for $30,000 payable over ninety months for the same reasons. See
Telephone Interview with Defendant (Aug. 22, 2014) (name withheld to preserve anonymity).
325
Likewise, two researchers studying litigation before the United States Tax Court found "lack of any
statistically significant effect of counsel on the IRS's recovery ratio in settled cases," a finding suggesting
that counsel do not obtain better settlements than pro se taxpayers. Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung,
Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Effects on Tax Court Litigation
Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235, 1264 (2006). More recently, however, two Harvard researchers
concluded that observational studies of case files, of which the tax court study and this study are examples,
cannot validly measure the effects of legal representation on outcome because of inherent methodological
limitations, including the failure to account for selection effects. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos
Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and
Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2176–96 (2012) (reviewing literature on dozens of observational
studies of case files in a wide range of civil contexts, including bankruptcy). This Article therefore makes no
general claim about the effect of representation on outcome. Nonetheless, it may be of interest to note the
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have recognized some pro se defendants to be both judgment proof and incapable of
making installment payments (they couldn't even afford an attorney) and may
therefore have agreed to no-payment settlements with them to avoid wasted
additional expense. Conceivably, then, retaining an attorney diminished a
defendant's chances of a no-payment settlement by signaling to Heritage the
possibility that a defendant could afford installment payments in settlement of its
claim.
Heritage's potential liability for a defendant's attorney's fees conceivably could
have offset Heritage's litigation advantages to some extent. Section 523(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code directs a bankruptcy court to award the debtor a reasonable
attorney's fee incurred in an adversary proceeding in which a creditor requests a
determination of the dischargeability of a consumer debt under section 523(a)(2),
the debt is discharged, and the court finds that the creditor's position was not
substantially justified, unless the court finds that special circumstances would make
such an award unjust.326 The creditor bears the burden of proving that its claim was
substantially justified,327 and to sustain its burden the creditor must establish that its
claim had a reasonable basis both in law and in fact, a standard derived from the
showing required for attorney's fees under the federal Equal Access to Justice
Act.328 Substantial justification must persist through trial.329
Fear of incurring liability for a defendant's attorney's fees might have deterred
Heritage from filing adversary proceedings against some potential defendants when
it considered even colorable claims of misrepresentation or reliance to have been
weak. Likewise, fear of incurring such liability might have contributed to
Heritage's decision to dismiss forty-four of the adversary proceedings in which an
attorney represented a defendant through a stipulation calling for a mutual release of
all claims.330 We cannot learn whether either is true absent knowledge of Heritage's
internal deliberations or its privileged communications with its attorneys.

further finding of this study that represented defendants in the Heritage adversary proceedings who agreed to
installment payments to Heritage in settlement of its claim fared no better, on average, than pro se
defendants who agreed to installment payments to Heritage in settlement of its claim. On average,
represented defendants agreed to installment payments totaling 11.9% of Heritage's claim, with the median
total of installment payments equal to 9.9% of its claim, whereas on average pro se defendants agreed to
installment payments totaling 9.38% of Heritage's claim, with the median total installment payments equal to
7.6% of its claim. In contrast, in those settlements in which the defendant agreed to a larger liability upon
default in installment payments, represented defendants agreed, on average, to liability equal to 39.3% of
Heritage's claim, with the median liability equal to 30.3% of its claim, whereas pro se defendants, on
average, agreed to liability equal to 47.4% of Heritage's claim, with the median liability equal to 49.9% of its
claim.
326
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (2012).
327
See, e.g., In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 114 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).
328
See First Card v. Hunt (In re Hunt), 238 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2001).
329
See In re Harvey, 172 B.R. 314, 318–19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).
330
See, e.g., Stipulation and Settlement, In re Flores, No. 10-05400 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011), ECF
No. 19; Stipulation and Settlement, In re Barocio, No. 11-05009 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2011), ECF No.
19.
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Absent conversations with defendants represented by an attorney, we also
cannot learn their fee arrangements with their attorneys or why, after securing
representation, those who settled for a mutual release of all claims thereby
abandoned a claim for attorney's fees. We can speculate with some confidence on
both questions, however. A few attorneys might have been willing to represent a
defendant pro bono (either before or after the fact). A few attorneys might have
been willing to condition the defendant's obligation to pay attorney's fees on an
attorney's fees award, but that would have been a blind and therefore precarious and
rare gamble. Heritage could escape liability for attorney's fees by demonstrating
that even its losing position was substantially justified or that special circumstances
made an attorney's fee award unjust. An attorney could not possibly have predicted
at the outset whether the debt would be dischargeable or whether, even if
dischargeable, Heritage could escape liability for attorney's fees. The "substantial
justification" and "special circumstances" components of section 523(d), therefore,
compound an attorney's uncertainty and undermine the incentive to undertake
contingent representation. Accordingly, most attorneys likely charged their clients
an initial retainer and thereafter billed for time.331 It thus would be no surprise that a
defendant would be amply motivated to stipulate to mutual releases when offered
the opportunity to avoid a very large adverse judgment and the outlay of additional
attorney's fees, even if, at the time of a Heritage settlement offer, the defendant's
attorney had a better sense of the prospect for recovering attorney's fees. Heritage
was certainly wise enough to understand and capitalize on that motivation.332 It was
also interested in protecting its own purse; it did not stipulate to pay a defendant's
attorney's fees in any of the adversary proceedings.
Only five defendants represented by an attorney, each appearing before a
different bankruptcy judge, sought to recover attorney's fees.333 Each had obtained a
judgment of dischargeability (one predicate for an award of attorney's fees), four
through summary judgment334 and one following trial.335 Three of the five prevailed
331

Had a defendant sought representation from an attorney who had represented the defendant in the
underlying chapter 7 proceeding, the attorney's fees charged for that earlier representation would not
typically have covered representation in a subsequent adversary proceeding. See, e.g., Guidelines for Legal
Services to be Provided by Debtors' Attorney in Chapter 7 Cases, U.S. BANKR. COURT, N. DIST. OF CAL.,
http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/procedure/guidelines-legal-services-be-provided-debtors-attorney-chapter-7cases (last visited Apr. 29, 2015).
332
It should be noted, however, that Heritage denied in one adversary proceeding that it was filing the
proceeding in the hope of extracting a settlement from an honest debtor hoping to save attorney's fees. See
Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees at 7, In re
Palines, No. 12-03063 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012), ECF No. 41.
333
One other defendant, Rosa Vasquez, prevailed at trial, without making an appearance at trial, shortly
after the judge granted her attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel. Memorandum, supra note 121, at 4, 13.
Her attorney's declaration in support of his motion to withdraw cited Ms. Vasquez's failure to pay attorney's
fees, failure to keep an appointment, and failure to otherwise cooperate. See Notice of Motion for Withdrawl
[sic] of Counsel at 7, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 28. Neither
she nor her former attorney thereafter sought an award of attorney's fees. Docket, In re Vasquez, No. 1001663 (Nov. 8, 2010).
334
See Summary Judgment Determining Dischargeability of Debt, In re Machuca, No. 10-05301 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011), ECF No. 37; Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant, In re Martinez, No. 11-
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on the motion, obtaining attorney fee judgments of $8,975.00,336 $69,782.19,337 and
$40,000,338 respectively.
One bankruptcy judge denied the motion of a fourth defendant on multiple
grounds. 339 Another bankruptcy judge denied the motion of a fifth defendant on
grounds stated on the record but not in the judge's order.340 The defendant's attorney
in that proceeding later explained that the judge found substantial justification for
the adversary proceeding because the defendant had failed to list his ownership of a
restaurant on his bankruptcy schedules and Heritage could therefore reasonably
argue that the loan application's reference to ownership of a restaurant was a
misrepresentation.341 If that explanation is correct, the judge's finding of substantial
justification is puzzling.
The judge earlier had found that the defendant had not in fact misrepresented
his ownership of a restaurant;342 the originating lender therefore could not possibly
have erroneously relied on that truthful representation. The judge also found that
the lender had not conducted even a minimal amount of due diligence before
approving the defendant's loan and had also not demonstrated that the defendant's
failure to include an additional source of income on his loan application could have
adversely affected the lender.343 It is thus difficult to see how Heritage could have
been substantially justified in believing that it could demonstrate reliance by the
originating lender. A similar failure to demonstrate reliance by the originating
lender led other bankruptcy judges to make two of the three attorney's fee awards
mentioned above.344 Here too, then, we see disparate outcomes, but the disparity is

01131 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012), ECF No. 37; Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
In re Montano, 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 5, 2012), ECF No. 121; Order Granting Defendant Garrett
Palines' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim of Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial, In re Palines, No.
12-03063 (Oct. 30, 2012), ECF No. 38.
335
See Judgment After Trial, In re Adrian, No. 10-01334 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2012), ECF No. 49.
336
Order Awarding Attorneys Fees at 2, In re Machuca, No. 10-05301 (Jan. 28, 2012), ECF No. 43.
337
Order on Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs at 3, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Jan. 25,
2013), ECF No. 198.
338
Order on Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs at 1, In re Adrian, No. 10-01334 (Mar. 28, 2013), ECF
No. 62.
339
See Order Denying Motion for Attorneys' Fees, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Dec. 3, 2012), ECF No.
51; Oral Argument at 13:20–16:30, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Dec. 4, 2012), ECF No. 48 (capturing
judge's conclusion that the debt, incurred to purchase a home for the defendant's sister, was not a consumer
debt, that the creditor may have been substantially justified in pursuing the proceeding, and that, in any
event, special circumstances justified denial of attorney's fees because of the defendant's unclean hands).
340
See Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees, In re Martinez, No. 11-01131 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. Jan. 29, 2013), ECF No. 47.
341
See Telephone Interview with Donna Dishbak, Attorney for Defendant Rolando Martinez (June 14,
2014).
342
See Memorandum of Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 121, at 7.
343
See id. at 10.
344
See Transcript of Defendant's 523(a) Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees at 4–8, In re Machuca, No.
10-05301 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012), ECF No. 52; Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion to
Reconsider of [sic] Court's Order Denying Request for an Award Filed by Jesus Montano, supra note 174, at
30–49.
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easier to justify than disparity in findings about actual reliance because of the
subjective and flexible nature of the "substantial justification" standard.
Heritage appealed each of the three adverse attorney fee judgments to the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. Heritage neither moved to stay the judgments
pending appeal 345 nor stayed their enforcement by supersedeas bond.346 The Panel
affirmed two of the judgments. In December 2012, it affirmed the $8,975 judgment
rendered in and unpaid since January 2012.347 In November 2013, it affirmed the
$69,782.19 judgment rendered in and unpaid since January 2013.348 Heritage paid
neither judgment after losing the appeals. 349 In January 2014, the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel suspended hearing of the third appeal, from the $40,000 judgment
rendered in and unpaid since March 2013,350 upon Heritage's January 2014 filing of
a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. It later dismissed the appeal for failure of Heritage
or its chapter 7 trustee to file required status reports.351
Heritage's filing of a chapter 7 petition following its extended failure to pay the
three judgments highlights the potential impotency of section 523(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 352 Prior to Heritage's chapter 7 filing, only one of the three
defendants attempted to enforce his judgment. The long and continuing saga of his
attorney's extraordinary but mostly unsuccessful attempts to collect both his
$69,782.19 attorney's fees judgment and a subsequent attorney's fees award of
$59,555.63 for attempting to enforce that initial judgment merit a separate article.353
345
A party may by motion seek a stay of a bankruptcy court judgment pending appeal. See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 8007.
346
A party may by supersedeas bond stay enforcement of a judgment pending appeal. See FED. R. CIV. P.
62(d), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. BANKR. P. 7062.
347
See In re Machuca, 483 B.R. 726, 728–29 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).
348
See In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 114–19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).
349
See Interview with Stanley Zlotoff, Attorney for Defendant Raul Machuca, Jr., in San Jose, Cal. (Feb.
11, 2014); Telephone Interview with Tessa Santiago, Attorney for Defendant Jesus Montano (Jan. 12, 2015).
350
See Order Suspending Prosecution of Appeal, In re Adrian, No. 13-1175 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 21,
2014), ECF No. 22.
351
See Order Dismissing Appeal, In re Adrian, No. 13-1175 (Apr. 30, 2015), ECF No. 28.
352
The same problem also attends mandatory fee shifting statutes (i.e. those in which a court must award
attorney's fees to a prevailing consumer irrespective of the plaintiff's justification for the action). For
example, a California appellate court affirmed an attorney's fee judgment of $87,525 against Heritage under
the mandatory fee shifting provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3)
(2012)). See, e.g., Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Monroy, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 49–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013),
petition for review denied, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6631 (Cal. July 31, 2013). In its subsequent bankruptcy filing,
Heritage listed the judgment creditor, Maribel Monroy, as holding a $190,000 non-priority unsecured claim.
See Petition of Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C., supra note 3, at 37 (Schedule F).
353
Since at least February 12, 2013, when the defendant filed a motion for leave to file post-judgment
interrogatories designed to elicit information about the location, nature, and extent of Heritage's ability to
pay the judgment, the defendant has attempted to enforce its judgment for attorney's fees against Heritage,
against alleged assignees of Heritage, and against persons and entities alleged to be alter egos of or
otherwise closely aligned with Heritage. See Defendant's Rule 26(b) Motion for Additional Interrogatories,
In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013), ECF No. 202. The bulk of the next 203
docket entries in the proceeding, dating through June 10, 2015, concern the defendant's ongoing efforts to
enforce its original and subsequent attorney's fee awards. See, e.g., Order Fixing Fees Incurred in Enforcing
the January 25, 2013 Order Awarding Fees, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (May 19, 2014), ECF No. 388
(awarding $55,362.10 in attorney's fees and costs incurred in enforcing the original judgment); Defendant's
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The failure of any of the three defendants to collect the judgments (except to the
extent Heritage's chapter 7 trustee may pay a dividend to unsecured creditors) also
highlights either the altruistic or the speculative efforts of the attorneys representing
the defendants, each of whom appears either to have undertaken the representation
on contingency or written off the fees.354
C.   Wild Cards
The foregoing portrait of Heritage's stacked deck captures much of what
Professor Marc Galanter described in his influential theoretical essay on the general
features of an American-like legal system.355 Professor Galanter's essay included a
detailed portrait of litigation between what he termed "repeat players," those
engaging in similar litigation over time, and "one-shotters," those drawn only
occasionally into court.356 He described the "ideal type" of repeat player as "a unit
which has had and anticipates repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the
outcome of any one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long-run
interests." 357 The repeat player's multiple strategic advantages therefore include
advance intelligence, developed expertise, ready access to specialists, economies of
scale, low startup costs for any case, the likelihood that the one-shotter will adopt a
strategy that will minimize the probability of maximum loss, and the ability of the
repeat player to forego tangible gain in one case, such as by settling a case where it
expects an unfavorable outcome, while spending resources in another regarded as
more likely to produce a favorable generally applicable rule.358 Galanter speculated
that legal services amplify these strategic advantages. The repeat player, he
suggested, may obtain better legal services than many a one-shotter in part because
of the repeat player's ability to pay higher rates for a large quantity of continuing
work and because its attorneys benefit from accumulated information and

December 23, 2014 Status Report–Collections on Judgment, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Dec. 23, 2014),
ECF No. 400. Ironically, the defendant recovered $59,555.63 of the attorney's fee award through
enforcement proceedings only to surrender that amount to Heritage's chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee in
settlement of the trustee's subsequent action to set aside that recovery as a preferential transfer. See id. at 2.
354
At the hearing on the attorney's fee application of defendant Leidy Adrian, Mr. Adrian's attorney
commented to the court that her client had paid her only $500 to help pay for a transcript. See Transcript of
Oral Argument on Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs at 40, In re Adrian, No. 10-01334 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
July 18, 2013), ECF No. 74. In the author's telephone conversations with attorneys for two other defendants,
the confidentiality of communications between attorney and client prevented the attorney's disclosure of the
amount of attorney's fees, if any, actually paid by each defendant. Speculation that those defendants have not
paid attorney's fees derives both from the amount of attorney's fees involved in each proceeding and from
reading between the lines of what each attorney was able to disclose.
355
See Galanter, supra note 295.
356
Id. at 97.
357
Id. at 98.
358
Id. at 98–101.
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experience.359 Cases often "take the form of stereotyped mass processing with little
of the individuated attention of full-dress adjudication."360
Wild cards muddy this portrait. The exercise of discretion by trial court judges
is one wildcard. As we have seen, some judges took a more inquisitive or active
role in the litigation, or a more skeptical view of Heritage's position, than others.
On functionally identical facts and issues, some denied and others granted motions
for default judgment. Although default judgments are ordinarily disfavored, a court
may, in the exercise of its discretion, enter a default judgment after considering one
or more of several factors: the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; the merits of
the plaintiff's substantive claim; the sufficiency of the complaint; the sum of money
at stake in the action; the possibility of dispute concerning material facts; whether
the default was due to excusable neglect; the strong policy favoring decisions on the
merits.361 The differences in outcome in resolution of motions for default judgment
are to some extent enshrined by procedural rules: denial of a motion for default
judgment is generally not a final, appealable order, 362 and entry of a default
judgment may only be undone if a defendant appears and successfully moves to set
aside the judgment, such as for inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.363
On functionally identical facts and issues, some judges granted a defendant's
motion for summary judgment or denied a Heritage motion for summary judgment
but one granted a Heritage motion for summary judgment. Although appellate
review of the grant of a motion for summary judgment is de novo,364 neither side on
the losing end of a summary judgment appealed. For Heritage, appeal may not have
been worth the expense. The pro se defendant suffering a summary judgment may
have lacked the resources or sophistication to appeal. Decisions in the few trials
diverged, but here too inconsistency will often be sanctioned because a trial court's
factual findings are reversible only if clearly erroneous.365
Heritage faced additional isolated instances of unpredictable judicial activism,
skepticism, or lack of tolerance. After a defendant had filed an answer to Heritage's
complaint, one judge sua sponte dismissed the complaint with leave to amend for
failure to plead fraud claims with particularity, ordered Heritage to file and serve
proof of its status as real party in interest, and stayed until further court order all

359

Id. at 114.
Id. at 108–09.
361
See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986).
362
See In re Lee, 186 B.R. 695, 697 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).
363
See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c), 60(b)(1), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7055.
364
See SNTL Corp. v. Ctr. Ins. Co. (In re SNTL Corp.), 571 F.3d 826, 834 (9th Cir. 2009).
365
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel articulated that same standard of review in both
upholding a trial court judgment of nondischargeability in favor of Heritage against defendant Javier Tovar
and in upholding a trial court judgment of dischargeability in favor of defendant Oscar Trejo against
Heritage. See In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
Aug. 3, 2012); In re Trejo, Ch. 7 No. NC-11-1652-HPaMk, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5881, at *6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
Dec. 20, 2012).
360
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discovery other than that relating to Heritage's status as real party in interest.366 In
one of the twenty-three proceedings in which Heritage and a pro se defendant filed
a settlement stipulation calling for the defendant to pay money to Heritage, the
judge, prior to entering judgment, ordered a hearing, to be attended by the
defendant, to consider the circumstances leading to the stipulation and to assess
whether the defendant understood the consequences of entry of a judgment based on
the stipulation. 367 In one of seventy-nine proceedings in which Heritage and a
represented defendant filed such a settlement stipulation, the judge ordered a
hearing on the settlement agreement and requested production of the full loan
file. 368 At a status conference following the clerk's entry of another defendant's
default, one judge required that Heritage notice a hearing on a motion for default
judgment on one of three specified days and ordered Heritage to notify the court of
the date chosen within seven days of the status conference.369 In doing so, the court
apparently voiced concerns about the credibility of the claim.370 Heritage's specially
appearing attorney failed to timely communicate the message to Heritage's regular
counsel.371 The judge dismissed the adversary proceeding when Heritage failed to
notify the court of a date chosen for the hearing.372 Heritage's subsequent motion to
vacate the dismissal for mistake and excusable neglect, noticed for a date "[t]o be
determined,"373 went unheard.374
The contrasting nature of settlements between Heritage and many of the
defendants suggests additional wildcards at work. Heritage and a defendant filed a
written settlement stipulation in 152 of the 218 adversary proceedings. Attorneys
represented defendants in 116 of these proceedings; 375 defendants represented

366

See Civil Minute Order, In re Torell, No 11-01080 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 11, 2011), ECF No. 14. After
Heritage filed its amended complaint, which included as an exhibit a copy of a note from the defendant to an
originating lender and the lender's indorsement of the note to Heritage, the judge, seemingly unsatisfied that
the indorsed note sufficed, ordered Heritage to file and serve a copy of documents showing that plaintiff was
the real party in interest. See id.
367
See Notice of Hearing on Pro Se Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, In re Ramirez, No. 11-01545
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 12.
368
See Order Setting Hearing on Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Settlement Agreement, In re Salas,
No. 10-01574 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011), ECF No. 21; Declaration of Ben Ganter Re: Production of
Full Bank File, In re Salas, No. 10-01574 (Feb. 22, 2012), ECF No. 28-4.
369
See Docket, In re Rodas, No. 10-04182 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010).
370
See Amended Declaration of Brad A. Mokri in Support of Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C.'s
Motion for an Order to Set Aside Court's Order of October 1, 2010, Dismissing the Adversary Proceeding at
3, In re Rodas, No. 10-04182 (Nov. 18, 2010), ECF No. 15.
371
See id. at 2.
372
See Order Dismissing Adversary Proceeding, In re Rodas, No. 10-04182 (Oct. 4, 2010), ECF No. 9.
373
Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C.'s Notice of Motion and Motion for an Order to Set Aside Court's
Order of October 1, 2010, Dismissing the Adversary Proceeding, at 1, In re Rodas, No. 10-04182 (Nov. 18,
2010), ECF No. 12.
374
See Docket, In re Rodas, No. 10-04182 (July 22, 2010).
375
This number includes nineteen proceedings in which an attorney substituted in for a previously pro se
defendant. In one of these nineteen proceedings, the defendant's attorney signed the settlement stipulation
but had not appeared in the proceeding.
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themselves in the remaining thirty-six proceedings. 376 Data presented in Table 2
indicates that, when represented by an attorney, defendants sued in the Northern
District who thereafter settled with Heritage obtained dismissals of the proceedings
with no payment to Heritage ("no-payment settlements") much more frequently
than represented defendants sued in the other three districts. Applying the ChiSquare test of independence to that data reveals that this disparity among districts
for represented defendants is statistically significant. 377 The disparity is therefore
almost certainly attributable to some underlying cause or causes.

TABLE 2: Stipulated Settlements with Represented Defendants
(Where "O" = observed frequency of settlements
and "E" = expected frequency of settlements)378

$0 to
Heritage

Northern
District
O = 20
E = 8.0690

Eastern
District
O=7
E = 6.8276

Central
District
O=9
E = 18.3103

>$0 to
Heritage

O=6
E = 17.9310

O = 15
E = 15.1724

O = 50
E = 40.6897

O = 26

O = 22

O = 59

Total

Southern
Total
District
O=0
O = 36
E
=
2.7931
O=9
O = 80
E
=
6.2069
O=9
O = 116

This disparity among districts in no-payment settlements for represented
defendants might be the result, in part, of what others have called local legal
culture:
[S]ystematic and persistent variation in local legal practices as a
consequence of a complex of perceptions and expectations shared
by many practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and
differing in identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions, and
expectations existing in other localities subject to the same or a

376
This number includes two proceedings in which a defendant initially represented by an attorney was
acting pro se at the time of the settlement.
377
The chances that the disparity is the result of random distribution are less than one in a hundred. In
technical terms, x2 (3) = 36.50, p < .01, where x2 = Ʃ (O – E)2/E. One reaches the same conclusion even when
excluding the small Southern District sample (where the expected frequency < 5).
The sample size for settlements with pro se defendants is too small to justify either a similar or contrary
conclusion about the distribution of no-payment settlements among districts. But the data in that small
sample at least suggests that there may be no statistically significant disparity among districts for pro se
defendants, and there is no intuitive reason to think otherwise.
378
Expected frequencies of settlements are derived by multiplying the total of a row by the total of a
column and dividing that product by the total population (e.g., 36 x 26/116).
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similar formal legal regime.379
For example, judicial pressure to use mediation, or the amenability of attorneys
to mediation,380 a potential feature of local legal culture, might explain some of the
disparity. Represented defendants mediated most frequently in the two districts,
Central and Southern, with the highest percentage of settlements requiring payment
to Heritage. Nineteen represented defendants in the Central District and six
represented defendants in the Southern District settled the litigation through
mediation. Twenty-one of the twenty-five who did so settled for some payment to
Heritage. In contrast, only one represented defendant in the Northern District
mediated the dispute. Heritage dismissed that proceeding without filing a written
settlement agreement but a status conference statement filed shortly before
dismissal refers to a tentative settlement agreement for an unstated amount.381 Yet
differences among districts in the frequency of mediation by represented defendants
do not explain all of the disparity and might not explain any of it. Only two
represented defendants in the Eastern District settled the litigation through
mediation. Both agreed to some payment to Heritage, but so did a majority of those
who settled without mediation. Likewise, many represented defendants in the
Central District agreed to some payment to Heritage without having mediated the
dispute.
Absent additional data, we can only speculate about other potential reasons for
the generally more advantageous settlement outcomes accruing to represented
defendants in the Northern District. Without exhausting the possibilities, perhaps
attorneys who represented defendants in the Northern District adversary
proceedings more frequently perceived that the assigned bankruptcy judge would be
especially exacting in considering Heritage's fraud claims—another potential
feature of local legal culture. Communicating that perception to Heritage's out-ofthe-area attorneys might have provided the defendants with more effective
settlement leverage. 382 Perhaps more attorneys who represented defendants in
379

Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal
Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 801,
804 (1994). Professor Jean Braucher earlier described local legal culture somewhat more narrowly as the
context created by local administrative practices of judges and trustees and prevailing professional attitudes.
See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L. J.
501, 503 (1993).
380
Mediation of adversary proceedings is available in all four districts. See, e.g., Bankr. N.D. Cal. R.
9040-1 to 9050-1.
381
See Joint Status Report at 2, In re Hernandez, No. 11-04007 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2011), ECF No.
13.
382
The progress of two adversary proceedings before the same judge in the Central District illustrates how
Heritage might have been influenced to settle or abandon an adversary proceeding because of its perception
of a judge's proclivity. The progress of those two adversary proceedings also supports this Article's claim
that Heritage's adversary 218 proceedings were functionally identical.
In a proceeding involving non-appearing defendant Maria Becerra, Heritage filed a motion for default
judgment in April 2011. Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and Memorandum in Support of its Motion
for Final Default Judgment by the Court Against Maria R. Becerra, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Bankr.
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Northern District adversary proceedings, in contrast to their counterparts in other
districts, had created or joined an effective network of communication with one
another (by happenstance or otherwise) and utilized that network in the Heritage
adversary proceedings for the exchange of information, ideas, work product, or
simply moral support. 383 Perhaps, fortuitously, more attorneys who represented
defendants in Northern District adversary proceedings, in contrast to their
counterparts in other districts, provided representation pro bono or at reduced rates.
Communicating that information to Heritage would diminish Heritage's settlement
leverage because Heritage would know that the defendant's continuation of
litigation would be less expensive to the defendant than Heritage might otherwise
anticipate. Whether for these or other reasons, most represented defendants in the
Northern District who settled with Heritage were more fortunate than represented
defendants in other districts.
IV.  

RESHUFFLING THE STACKED DECK

The Heritage adversary proceedings in California bankruptcy courts were not
unique. It also filed fifty adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy courts of Florida,
Nevada, and Arizona in 2011 and 2012.384 Waugh Real Estate Holdings, another
C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2011), ECF No. 12. Following a hearing on the motion in June 2011, the court requested
supplemental briefing on the issue of reliance. Court's Request for Supplemental Brief on Justifiable
Reliance in Motion for Default Judgment, supra note 140. After Heritage submitted supplemental briefing,
the court denied the motion. Denial of Judgment Against Defendant Maria Becerra, supra note 144. After
Heritage submitted additional supplemental briefing, the court again denied the motion. Order Denying
Entry of Judgment Against Defendant Maria Becerra, supra note 146. In a second proceeding before the
same judge involving non-appearing defendant Jose Villegas, Heritage filed a motion for default judgment in
May 2011, three weeks after filing the same motion in the Becerra adversary proceeding, but sought a
judgment without hearing. See Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Default Judgment by the Court, In re
Villegas, supra note 147. The court took no action on the motion, but Heritage, presumably awaiting the
court's decision on its earlier filed motion in Becerra, also took no further action on the motion (other than
seeking a protective order). See Docket, In re Villegas, No. 10-01526 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010). In
March 2013, the court issued an order to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute. See Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute, supra note 147. Shortly
thereafter Heritage requested dismissal of the proceeding. Request for Dismissal of Defendant Jose
Asuncion Villegas, supra note 147. The court then dismissed the action. See Order on Dismissal of
Defendant Jose Asuncion Villegas, In re Villegas, No. 10-01526 (Mar. 27, 2013), ECF No. 22.
383
The geographically more compact dimensions of the Northern District might facilitate the formation
and effectiveness of such a network because of the increased likelihood of personal interaction at
professional gatherings or in court. Although the Northern District stretches along the California coast from
Monterey County in the south to Del Norte County in the north, a distance of approximately 400 miles,
Heritage filed adversary proceedings exclusively in the San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose divisions of
the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California. The dimensions of the San Francisco Bay area
are considerably smaller than those of the Central District, where filings occurred in divisions as distant from
one another as Santa Barbara and Riverside Counties, and also considerably smaller than those of the
Eastern District, where filings occurred in divisions as distant from one another as Fresno and Sacramento
Counties.
384
PACER searches revealing these filings are on file with author. Review of the documents filed in these
fifty proceedings was beyond the scope of this study. Complaints in three of them, one chosen at random
from the filings in each of the three states, mimic the complaints Heritage filed in California bankruptcy
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debt buyer, filed nine adversary proceedings in Nevada bankruptcy courts in 2011,
2012, and 2013, each comparable in factual allegations and theory to those filed by
Heritage. 385 Nor are such adversary proceedings likely to be exceptional given
continuing securitization of some revenue streams that may derive from dubious
lending practices, borrower fraud, or both.386 There is thus good reason to consider
reshuffling the stacked deck in anticipation of future opportunities for repeat filing
debt buyers or other plaintiffs who are not the originating creditor ("covered
entity").387 Easier and less expensive access to information, procedures for transfer
and consolidation of related adversary proceedings, and amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code's attorney fee shifting statute would mitigate the advantages of
covered entities, increase the consistency of trial court decisions, and reduce
unnecessary duplication of both attorney and judicial effort.
A.   Reducing Information Asymmetry
Local bankruptcy rules in each of California's four federal districts require that
a plaintiff initiating an adversary proceeding file an Adversary Proceeding Cover
Sheet ("Cover Sheet") with the complaint.388 Among other things, the Cover Sheet,
an official bankruptcy form, requires the plaintiff to provide information about any
related adversary proceeding.389 Heritage filed a Cover Sheet in all but three of the
courts. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Rey, No. 11-01764 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2011), ECF No. 1; Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Spartacus, No.
11-01145 (Bankr. D. Nev. June 6, 2011), ECF No. 1; Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of
Debt, In re Williams, No. 11-01159 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 28, 2011), ECF No. 1.
385
Copies of each complaint are on file with author. In one of these adversary proceedings, the defendant
prevailed at trial upon the court's finding that Heritage had failed to sustain its burden of proving both
defendant's knowing or intentional misrepresentations and reliance by the originating lender. See In re
Daecharkhom, 481 B.R. 641 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2012), rev'd in part, In re Daecharkhom, 505 B.R. 898 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2014) (reversing limitation on award of defendant's attorney's fees).
386
For example, potentially dubious lending practices in generating securitized subprime auto loans have
prompted Justice Department coordination of a nationwide investigation of whether loans were based on
falsified income or employment information. See Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Investment
Riches Built on Auto Loans to Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2015, at A1; see also Al Yoon & Katy Burne,
Investors Clamor for Risky Debt Offerings, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2014, at C1 (strong demand for high yield
investments has led to loosening of some underwriting standards).
387
A debt buyer could be defined, as it is in California, as "a person or entity that is regularly engaged in
the business of purchasing charged-off consumer debt for collection purposes, whether it collects the debt
itself, hires a third party for collection, or hires an attorney-at-law for collection litigation." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1788.50(a)(1) (2012). Heritage disputed its characterization as a debt buyer, claiming instead an intricate
relationship with the owner of the claims that it was asserting. See supra note 2. Accordingly, to prevent
evasion of the procedures, covered entities could be defined more broadly, as suggested in the text.
388
See Bankr. N.D. Cal. R. 7003-1; Bankr. E.D. Cal. R. 7003-1; Bankr. C.D. Cal. R. 7003-1; Bankr. S.D.
Cal. R. 7003-1.
389
Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet at 2 (revised Aug. 2007), ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-forms/adversary-proceeding-cover-sheet (last visited Feb. 2,
2016). This form of the Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet (Form 104) was replaced effective December 1,
2015 by a revised form (Form 1040) that revised only its number. Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet
(revised Dec. 2015), ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcyforms/adversary-proceeding-cover-sheet-0 (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
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adversary proceedings (presumably inadvertently failing to do so in those three). In
the portion of the Cover Sheet calling for information about a related adversary
proceeding, Heritage provided no information about comparable adversary
proceedings it had filed. Instead, it consistently identified the very adversary
proceeding that it was filing as "related to" the debtor's underlying bankruptcy
case. 390 That surely is not the meaning of "related adversary proceeding." An
adversary proceeding ipso facto arises in and is related to the underlying bankruptcy
case, and the Cover Sheet also requires the plaintiff to separately provide
information about the underlying bankruptcy case.391 To re-identify the adversary
proceeding being filed as related to the underlying bankruptcy case thus provides no
additional information. Bankruptcy local rules for the Northern District of
California make this clear, defining a "related adversary proceeding" as those in
which both adversary proceedings concern some of the same parties and are based
on the same or similar claims or when both "appear likely to involve duplication of
labor or might create conflicts and unnecessary expenses if heard by different
judges."392
Heritage may have overlooked that definition, considered it inapplicable, or
deliberately ignored it. But no one seems to have noticed. PACER documents
reveal no instance in which any defendant raised this issue; they also reveal no
instance in which any bankruptcy judge criticized or sanctioned Heritage for
improper completion of the Cover Sheet even though at least some of the judges
were aware that Heritage had filed comparable actions in the same division, the
same district, or other districts.393 The Cover Sheet may simply be so pro forma that
attorneys and judges pay insufficient attention to its proper completion. Moreover,
given the format of the Cover Sheet, it is not surprising and probably not
blameworthy for Heritage to have completed the form as it did, unless it
deliberately refrained from identifying the other adversary proceedings that it had
filed. The Cover Sheet provides space for information about only one related
adversary proceeding (without inviting an attachment to list additional related
adversary proceedings), calls for that information in the same outlined box in which
the plaintiff is required to identify the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, and offers
no guidance on the subject in its instructions.394 It certainly does not seem to have
been designed to alert defendants or the court to a covered entity's mass filing of
comparable adversary proceedings.
390

See, e.g., Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet at 2, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb.
7, 2011), ECF No. 2.
391
See id.
392
See Bankr. N.D. Cal. R. 7042-1(a). Bankruptcy local rules for the Eastern District of California offer a
nearly identical definition of related cases. See Bankr. E.D. Cal. R. 123(a). Bankruptcy local rules for the
Southern District of California offer a somewhat less expansive definition. See Bankr. S.D. Cal. R. 7003-2.
Bankruptcy local rules for the Central District of California do not define a related adversary proceeding. See
Bankr. C.D. Cal. R. 7003-1–7069-2.
393
See supra text accompanying note 156.
394
Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet, supra note 390, at 1–2.
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Revised instructions on and formatting changes to the Cover Sheet (or an
alternative form of Cover Sheet for covered entities) could insure increased
disclosure of related adversary proceedings if proper completion of such a revised
Cover Sheet were to be enforceable by sanctions. Alternatively, or in addition,
federal procedural rules could be amended to require that a covered entity furnish
information about related adversary proceedings in the mandatory initial disclosures
already required without a discovery request. 395 The covered entity would be
required to supplement these disclosures as it filed additional related adversary
proceedings.396
Better still, a covered entity could be required to establish, maintain, and
regularly update a website, searchable by district and time of filing, listing all of its
related adversary proceedings. To save defendants and their attorneys the
significant cost of searching PACER for potentially helpful information from each
proceeding so listed, the covered entity could also be required to upload to the
website, and link to, each dispositive court order rendered in response to identified
types of motions (e.g. a motion for default judgment, a motion to dismiss, or a
motion for summary judgment) or rendered following trial.397 The covered entity
would also be required to identify and provide the URL for the website in its Cover
Sheet. Free open source software is available to create the website and the expense
of hosting the website would be trivial. 398 An employee's time in creating the
website and uploading dispositive court orders would add to the expense, but
probably in an amount only marginally increasing the covered entity's cost of doing
business.
B.   A Better Mechanism for Transfer and Consolidation
Beyond simple disclosure of information about "related" proceedings, the likely
purpose of the Cover Sheet is to alert defendants or judges to the possibility of
either consolidation of adversary proceedings pending before the same judge or
transfer of an adversary proceeding to another judge before whom a related
adversary proceeding is then pending. Federal rules authorize consolidation of

395
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. BANKR.
P. 7026. A party failing to provide mandatory initial disclosures is subject to a wide variety of sanctions,
including dismissal of the action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary
proceedings by FED. R. BANKR. P. 7037.
396
A party must supplement its initial disclosures in a timely manner if its initial disclosures are
incomplete in some material respect. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary
proceedings by FED. R. BANKR. P. 7026.
397
Similar websites have been utilized in connection with management of a class action. See, e.g., Vibram
FiveFingers Class Action, HEFFLER CLAIMS GROUP, https://www.fivefingerssettlement.com/ (last visited
June 4, 2015).
398
Free open source software to create the website is available at WORDPRESS.COM,
https://wordpress.com/ (last visited June 4, 2015). Low cost hosting of a website is available at BLUEHOST,
http://www.bluehost.com/ (last visited June 4, 2015).
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actions involving a common question of law or fact 399 for the purpose, among
others, of conserving the resources of the court and the parties and to avoid
inconsistent or conflicting results. 400 But consolidation simply brings together
proceedings then pending before a single judge.401 Local bankruptcy rules in the
Northern District of California go further, authorizing transfer of an adversary
proceeding to another judge in the district for the same reasons.402 Local bankruptcy
rules in the Central and Southern Districts are either less expansive or less explicit
on the subject but nonetheless seem to comprehend the same general theme: two or
more adversary cases presenting issues that can more consistently and efficiently be
resolved by one judge should be resolved by one judge.403 Local bankruptcy rules
for the Eastern District do not provide for such a transfer, but the Eastern District
requirement to file a Cover Sheet that lists a related adversary proceeding implies
that a judge in that district is empowered to order such a transfer.
No defendant or judge sought transfer of any Heritage adversary proceeding to
another judge hearing another Heritage adversary proceeding. The intra-district
transfer procedure alone is in any event ill-suited to bringing together before a
single judge a multitude of related adversary proceedings filed by a covered entity
over time in multiple districts and multiple divisions within each district. Heritage
filed the adversary proceedings over a roughly two-year period. No one (perhaps
not even Heritage) could have predicted at the outset how many proceedings it
would file in each division or each district. Spotting the pattern of virtually
identical proceedings would take time. By the time someone spotted the pattern,
some of the proceedings earlier initiated would have been closed. Even putting
these practical obstacles aside, it would not have been feasible to transfer a large
number of the Heritage adversary proceedings to one judge without an overarching
mechanism for adjusting distribution of caseloads and dealing with a variety of
procedural issues.404
Concepts and procedures identified in the Federal Judicial Center's Manual for
Complex Litigation ("Manual") 405 and in the federal multi-district litigation

399
See FED. R. CIV. P. 42, made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. BANKR. P.
7042.
400
See 8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 42.10[4] (3d ed. 2015).
401
Id. § 42.11[1].
402
See Bankr. N.D. Cal. R. 7042-1(d). Because local bankruptcy rules of the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of California govern each of its four divisions (San Jose, Oakland, San Francisco, and
Santa Rosa), this rule presumably authorizes transfer of a proceeding not simply within a division but also to
another division in the same district.
403
See Bankr. S.D. Cal. R. 7042-1(a) 7003-2, 7042-1; Bankr. C.D. Cal. R. 1073-1.
404
Although it might have been feasible to transfer the six Heritage adversary proceedings filed in the San
Francisco Division of the Northern District to one judge sitting in that division or the seven Heritage
adversary proceedings filed in the Santa Ana Division of the Central District to one judge sitting in that
division, it would not have been feasible to transfer the forty-seven Heritage adversary proceedings filed in
the Los Angeles Division of the Central District to one judge in that division, or the 125 Heritage adversary
proceedings filed in the Central District to one judge sitting in that district.
405
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004).
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statute406 suggest a mechanism that could make such transfers feasible, either across
divisions or across districts. Both contemplate consolidation of actions before a
single judge (or in some cases more than one judge) to foster consistent outcomes
and conserve judicial resources, 407 but neither applied to the Heritage adversary
proceedings. The Manual applies to complex litigation; the Heritage adversary
proceedings, viewed individually, were not complex. The federal statute applies
only if civil actions in multiple districts involve one or more common questions of
fact.408 The Heritage adversary proceeding raised separate questions of fact: Did the
defendant misrepresent salient facts to a specific lender?
Were the
misrepresentations intentional? Were they material? Did the lender actually and
either reasonably or justifiably rely on those misrepresentations?
Selected features from both, however, could be adapted to the context of related
adversary proceedings initiated by a covered entity. Without exhausting or refining
the possibilities here, we may imagine several potential features of this new
mechanism:
1. A revised Cover Sheet defining a related adversary proceeding, requiring
a covered entity to so identify itself, inviting attachments in which the
covered entity identifies related adversary proceedings, including those
already dismissed or terminated, and including a statement, if applicable,
that the covered entity contemplates the filing of additional related
adversary proceedings within the ensuing year.409 In lieu of attachments, the
Cover Sheet could require a covered entity to identify the address of a
website established by the covered entity that provides information about
related adversary proceedings, as suggested above.410
2. A procedure for determining whether to transfer multiple qualifying
adversary proceedings to a single judge and for identifying the judge,
triggered, perhaps, by the filing of at least a minimum number of related
adversary proceedings each of whose claims exceed a minimum amount
(e.g. five related adversary proceedings each with claims exceeding
$10,000).411
406

See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 405, §§ 10.1, 20.13, 20.131; JAMES WM. MOORE
ET AL., supra note 400, §§ 112.02[1][a], 112.04[1][a].
408
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., supra note 400, § 112.04[1][b].
409
For an example of a rule requiring disclosure of related federal district court actions, including those
"about to be filed" and those that may have already been dismissed or otherwise terminated, see D. Alaska
Civ. R. 40.2, http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/reference/rules/lr/civil.pdf (last visited June 2, 2015).
410
See supra text accompanying notes 397–98.
411
The Northern District of California offers a procedural model for transfer of related adversary
proceedings within a district. See supra note 402. The federal multidistrict litigation statute offers a
procedural model (use of a judicial panel on multidistrict litigation) applicable to multidistrict litigation
involving common questions of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). Federal law authorizes the appointment of
retired district or circuit court judges who might serve, id. §§ 294–96, and that authority could be expanded
to include retired bankruptcy judges. If transfer is to be made to a sitting bankruptcy judge, each district
407
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3. When a large number of adversary proceedings warrant (as in the
Heritage example), a procedure for transferring the proceedings to a threejudge panel.412
4. Authority of the transferee judge(s) to decide common questions of law
such as, in the Heritage cases, the applicability of California's limitation on
fraud claims or Heritage's standing to pursue fraud claims.
5. Deferral of any default judgment until common questions of law are
resolved in contested proceedings.
Use of such a mechanism would both increase the consistency of dispositive
rulings and conserve judicial and party resources in related bankruptcy adversary
proceedings initiated by covered entities. There was much consistency to be gained
and many resources to conserve in the 218 Heritage adversary proceedings, which,
in pursuit of $21,267,016, occupied the time of forty-seven bankruptcy judges, four
bankruptcy appellate panels, and 126 attorneys for defendants.
This proposed mechanism would not address the much more extensive
inconsistencies and inefficiencies likely generated by a covered entity's litigation of
functionally identical claims in both federal and state judicial forums. Recall that
Heritage filed three lawsuits joining multiple non-bankruptcy defendants in federal
district court and hundreds of lawsuits against non-bankruptcy defendants in
California's state courts. The lawsuits in federal district court pursued claims
functionally identical to those asserted in the Heritage adversary proceedings and
the lawsuits in California's state courts likely did so as well. Discussion of potential
mechanisms for consolidation of actions filed in both federal and state judicial
forums or coordination of discovery, settlement, pre-trial and other proceedings in
such actions is beyond the scope of this Article, but others have considered such
mechanisms.413
C.   Amendment of the Attorney Fee Shifting Provision
Three amendments to section 523(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, made applicable
to covered entities, would sharpen its teeth. First, covered entities claiming
nondischargeability for fraud could be required to post a bond to secure payment of
an attorney's fee judgment. Heritage did not pay attorney's fees judgments entered
against it, even after losing appeals of those judgments and well before it filed
could determine for itself how caseloads should be adjusted, as suggested for complex civil litigation. See
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 405, § 10.12.
412
The federal multidistrict litigation statute contemplates the possibility of transferring litigation to more
than one judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (2012). To avoid inconsistent rulings, the majority of a three-judge
panel could adopt a ruling applicable to all proceedings.
413
See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ANALYSIS (1994); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER AND NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
COORDINATING MULTIJURISDICTION LITIGATION, A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2013); William W.
Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss, & Alan. Hirsch, Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in
State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689 (1992).
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bankruptcy.414 Together with amendments suggested below, the bond's assurance of
payment of an attorney's fee judgment might encourage more contingent fee
representation of defendants sued by covered entities.
Second, upon suffering a judgment that a debt is discharged, such creditors
could be made liable for a defendant's attorney's fees whether or not the creditor's
claim was substantially justified, reverting to a standard applicable before a 1984
amendment to section 523(d). When originally enacted in 1978, substantial
justification for a creditor's claim did not protect the creditor from an award of
attorney's fees to the debtor. If a consumer debt were discharged in an adversary
proceeding, the section directed the bankruptcy court to award attorney's fees to the
debtor unless "clearly inequitable."415 The current version of the section, enacted by
as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 416
aimed to strike "the appropriate balance between protecting the debtor from
unreasonable challenges to dischargeability of debts and not deterring creditors
from making challenges when it is reasonable to do so."417 Findings of this study
suggest that, at least in the case of covered entities, the 1984 amendment may have
tipped the balance too far in the creditor's direction.418
Finally, covered entities could also be made liable for a defendant's additional
attorney's fees incurred in response to a covered entity's unsuccessful appeal from a
judgment that a debt subject to section 523(d) has been discharged or from a
judgment awarding attorney's fees to the defendant under section 523(d). In the
Ninth Circuit at least, section 523(d) does not authorize attorney's fees to a

414

See supra notes 345–54 and accompanying text.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(d), 92 Stat. 2549, 2592 (current version at
11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (2012)).
416
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 307(b), 98 Stat.
333.
417
S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 9–10 (1983) (accompanying the Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of
1983, S. 445, 98th Cong. § 209(b) (1983), the predecessor bill to the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984).
418
In a May 30, 1997 memorandum to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Judge Samuel
Bufford, Professor Margaret Howard, Professor Jeffrey Morris, and Judge Eugene Wedoff recommended
even more drastic amendment of section 523(d), for similar reasons:
415

Costs and fees may be awarded only if 'the position of the creditor was not substantially
justified' and may not be awarded if 'special circumstances would make the award
unjust.' These conditions have resulted in a reluctance by many courts to award fees
and costs to prevailing debtors, with the result that debtors cannot be assured of
recovering their costs of litigation when they prevail. This, in turn, provides a
substantial incentive to debtors to agree to settlements even of nondischargeability
claims that are not well founded. To encourage adequate representation of consumer
debtors, we strongly recommend that, as to debtors with primarily consumer debts, the
award of costs and attorneys' fees be mandatory.
NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, app. G-1.c at 27 (Oct. 20, 1997).

2016]

RANDOMLY DISTRIBUTED TRIAL COURT JUSTICE

431

defendant in these circumstances.419 Only an appellate court may award such fees
and only for a frivolous appeal. 420 This limitation imposes upon defendants a
potentially significant, perhaps insurmountable, economic burden of defending
against a non-frivolous appeal by a covered entity, with no prospect of
reimbursement for attorney's fees if successful.
V.   CONCLUSION
In economic, political, or philosophical debates, Heritage might well be praised,
defended, or vilified for its lawsuits. It might be praised for seeking to redress
prevarication that contributed to an economic crisis. It might be defended for
contributing to the availability of credit at lower prices by purchasing and thereby
reducing losses from stale debt.421 It might be vilified for scavenging among the
financial ruins of individuals duped and exploited by greedy and mendacious
brokers or enabled by devil-may-care lenders.
Those debates aside, the Heritage adversary proceedings described here offer a
rare laboratory for testing the extent to which our entry-level justice system
measures up to our aspirations for "Equal Justice Under Law." We are unlikely to
find many conditions better suited to empirical exploration of that question: (1) civil
litigation filed during a relatively brief time span by one plaintiff against 266
defendants (including co-defendant spouses); (2) some defendants defaulting, some
defendants appearing pro se, and some represented by an attorney; (3) dispersal of
the litigation among forty-seven different bankruptcy court judges, all sitting in one
state (and thus, where applicable, required to apply the relevant substantive law of a
single state); and (4) legal claims and factual allegations by the plaintiff so nearly
identical that each dispute is resolvable on the basis of one obvious and
straightforward factual question (reliance by an originating lender on a borrower's
misrepresentations) or on the basis of three less obvious and more complex legal
rules (a California statutory limitation on fraud claims and two alternative varieties
of a standing defense). The results in the Heritage adversary proceedings evidence
an unacceptable level of randomly distributed justice at the trial court level,
generated as much by the idiosyncratic behaviors of judges, lawyers, and parties as
by even handed application of law.
Appellate decision making is well documented, in both reported and unreported
opinions that are easily accessible. It therefore garners ongoing attention and reams
of published analysis. Trial court justice, exponentially more frequent and less well
documented is largely hidden from view.
419
See Vasseli v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Vasseli), 5 F.3d 351, 353–54 (9th Cir. 1993); contra In re
Wiencek, 58 B.R. 485, 489 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
420
See FED. R. APP. P. 38. An appeal is frivolous when the result is obvious or the appellant's arguments
are wholly without merit. E.g., Bell v. City of Kellogg, 922 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1991).
421
The Federal Trade Commission cited several empirical studies in support of this proposition in a 2013
report of its study of the debt buying industry. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 11 n.48.
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PACER helps us peel back some of the layers of federal trial court justice but it
is an imperfect research tool. Unless supplemented by digital recording of hearings
and trials (as in the Northern District of California 422 ), it does not capture what
sometimes may be important exchanges between attorneys and judges or
explanations for a judge's written orders. It obviously does not purport to capture
critical communications between the attorneys and their clients or communications
between attorneys for each party. 423 This study's extensive reliance on PACERderived data thus necessarily paints an incomplete, perhaps occasionally flawed,
picture of the adversary proceedings it has described and analyzed.
The data from this study nonetheless offer a revealing and sobering view of the
nature, quality, and value of legal representation in civil litigation and the contours
of justice dispensed by trial court judges. It suggests and warns that the justice
delivered by our litigation system falls well short of our aspirations, not simply in
the relatively narrow context of bankruptcy adversary proceedings or actions by
debt buyers, but, by implication, more broadly, in all trial level contexts.
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422

See supra note 10.
Interviews with defendants would have enriched this study but attempts to contact a large number of
the defendants were unsuccessful. Using addresses listed on the docket of the relevant adversary proceeding,
the author wrote to defendants in 136 of the adversary proceedings requesting an interview, enclosing a
consent form mandated by a Human Subjects Committee and a stamped envelope addressed to the author.
The postal service returned twenty-six interview requests as undeliverable. Of the remainder, only three
responded (2.2% of those mailed and 2.7% of those presumed delivered), each consenting to an interview on
the consent form. Conversations with those three defendants are described supra note 324. Given the meager
response rate, requests for an interview of defendants in the remaining eighty-two proceedings were not
mailed. In a recent study of bankruptcy stigma, the researcher reported essentially identical results when
soliciting interviews of 2,822 bankruptcy debtors who were to indicate consent to an interview by returning a
pre-paid addressed postcard listing contact information. See Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A SocioLegal Study, 87 AM. BANKR. L. J. 435, 462 (2013) (2.1% of those mailed and 2.5% of those presumed
deliverable).
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